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PREFACE
In order to control floods and provide irrigation, hydroelectric
power, and other benefits, the federal government has in recent years
built a large number of dams on the nation's major rivers.

Because of the

destruction of scenic values and natural resources caused by the con^struction of these dam projects and the necessary displacement of those
people unfortunate enough to live within the reservoir areas, the
necessity of these dams has often been questioned.

With a view only to

ward :the larger features and results of dam construction, those people who
have supported these massive projects have often failed to realize that
they involve many small matters of both economic and human relations,
since the taking of property may present the people directly involved
with a crucial life issue.

Precisely in regard to these kinds of relation

ships, the federal government and particularly the Corps of Engineers has
demonstrated a great lack of sensitivity.
Because they have traditionally lived in the river valleys and
perhaps because they have very little political significance, Native
Americans seem to have suffered to a greater extent from both dislocation
and human insensitivity in regard to these dam projects.

In Pennsylvania,

for example, the federal government violated Americans oldest treaty in
order to obtain 9,000 acres of Seneca land for the Kinzua Dam on the Upper
Allegheny.

Other tribes have been adversely affected by dam projects in

the Columbia and Colorado River Basins and in California.

In the Missouri

River Basin, the Pick-Sloan Plan, the joint water development program of
ii

the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, has caused damage
to virtually every tribe with lands along the Missouri and its tribu
taries.

One of the projects constructed under Pick-Sloan, the Oahe Dam,

required the flooding of nearly 160,000 acres of Indian land on the
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Reservations in North and South Dakota.
The Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation provides material for
an especially valuable case study.

In the first place, these Indian

people were forced to give up their best land and natural resources,
evacuate their homes and ranches in the wooded bottomlands, and move to
an empty prairie.

Hence the disruption of their entire way of life was

relatively more severe than is usually the case with other people dis
located by public works projects.

In addition, since the Oahe Dam was

one of the first Pick-Sloan projects on the Missouri, sufficient time
has elapsed since the Cheyenne River Sioux were displaced to permit an
evaluation of the consequences.
As this study will reveal, the damages the Cheyenne River Sioux
suffered as a result of the Oahe project far outweigh the benefits pro
vided to them by the Pick-Sloan Plan (i.e., flood control, irrigation,
hydroelectric power, etc.).
ters offer a

In developing this theme, the following chap

historical background of both the Pick-Sloan Plan and

the t r.eyenne River Sioux, followed by a detailed summary of the events
that occurred on Cheyenne River before, during, and after the years in
which the impact of the Oahe project was being most intensely felt by the.''
Indian people.

In addition, an effort has been made to provide at least a

tentative evaluation of these events, not only in both individual and
cultural terms but also in terms of the interaction between the Indians,

the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Congress, neigh
boring white communities, and others who took part in this episode.
The bulk of the information in this study has been obtained from
government documents and other primary sources.

In addition to these

written materials, the research has been supplemented by a series of
personal interviews conducted during a field trip in the summer of 1972 in
which my wife and I actually camped on both the Cheyenne River and
Standing Rock Reservations.

I am greatly indebted to my wife Marcia for

her perseverance during this field trip and for her patience and support
during some of the more hectic moments of preparing this manuscript.

I

would also like to thank Dr. William C. Pratt and Dr. Harl A. Dalstrom
of the Department of History for their generous advice, guidance, and
encouragement.

In addition to those people interviewed by me and

mentioned in the text, I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the
assistance and cooperation of Dudley Rehder and Richard Me Williams of
the Corps of Engineers; Kenneth Krabbenhoft, John Erhardt, and Dr. Wilfred
Bogan of the National Park Service; Dr. Donald Lehmer of Dana College;
Clyde Dollar of the W. H. Over Museum, University of South Dakota;
Janice Fleming and Kenneth Stewart of the South Dakota State Historical
Society; Liess Vantine of the North Dakota State Historical Society; Karen
Ducheneaux of Cheyenne River Reservation; Floyd Ryan of Standing Rock
Reservation; Elizabeth Laird of the Gene Eppley Library, University of
Nebraska at Omaha; and the Aberdeen and Billings Area Offices of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Finally, I would like to express my special thanks to Valerie
Franklin for her speed and accuracy in typing this manuscript.
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CHAPTER I
BIG PLANS FOR THE "BIG MUDDY”
Man has only attested to tame the Missouri River within the
last twenty years.

For the greater part of their history together,

the nature of man's relationship with the "Big Muddy"* had been that
of a long, discouraging, and apparently unending battle in which man
was unable to prevent catastrophe.

While the river made possible

many of man's finest cultural and technological developments in the
Great Plains, it at the same time provided a constant challenge to
the very lives of those men who tried to exploit its vast resources.
The Missouri seemed either to give them too much water, as evidenced
by the dozen or more disasterous floods in the century between 1844
and 1944, or too little water, as was the case during the Great
Drought of the Thirties.

During the first half of this century, the

river's rampaging yellow waters regularly flooded millions of acres
of fertile land, damaged billions of dollars worth of property, and
claimed over 800 lives.

On the other hand, for lack of rain and

irrigation the region's topsoil became so dry during the desperate

*The word Missouri is derived from an Algonquian term in the
Illinois dialect meaning "great muddy" or "big muddy." The term
was used to describe the river. It was also applied to a Chi sub
tribe of the Siouan linguistic group that settled in the lower
valley of the Missouri River. For more information see U.S.,
Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Handbook of
American Indians North of Mexico, ed. by Frederick Webb Hodge,
Bulletin 30, Part I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912),
pp. 911-12.
(Hereinafter referred to as Hodge, Handbook of American
Indians.)
\

2

Thirties that particles of it were picked up by the wind and scattered
as far eastward as Washington, D.C.

During this Dust Bowl period over

300,000 farmers left the Missouri Valley and the federal government
had to pour in millions of dollars in relief funds to aid those who
stayed.

Each time that the river triumphed in its struggle with man

it brought on another almost equally difficult battle in Washington.
This struggle was one between men who could not agree on a single
plan for bringing the river under control.

While both crisis and

controversy continued, it became apparent to the farmers of the
Missouri Valley that their economic future in this agriculturally rich
region depended on the federal government's ability to control the
floods, erosions, and droughts that constantly plagued them.^
Curiously enough, it was during the economically disasterous and
drought-ridden decade of the 1930's that the first large-scale federal
measures for controlling the Missouri were introduced.

In 1933,

President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the construction of what was
to be the largest earth dam in the world at a site on the Missouri near
Fort Peck, Montana.

3

This dam was to be a joint pro}ect of the Army

Corps of Engineers, the Public Works Administration, and the National
Industrial Recovery Administration.

Its primary purpose was to provide

flood control, hydroelectric power, and potential irrigation develop
ment for the upper Missouri Basin.

Construction on the project began

^William B. Arthur, "MVA-Its Background and Issues,"
Congressiona1 Digest, XXIX, January, 1950, p. 13. (Hereinafter
referred to as Arthur, "MVA Background.")
3
National Industrial Recovery Act, Statutes at Large, XLVIII,
sec. 202 (b), 201 (1933).

3

in October, 1933.

By June, 1937, the Missouri was diverted through

the dam's flood control tunnels and the 135 mile Fort Peck Lake, the
largest reservoir built since the Hoover Dam, was created.^

With this

project the Corps of Engineers, an agency whose primary domestic
concerns include providing safe navigation and flood control on
America's primary waterways, became involved in the business of
building massive multiple-purpose dams on the mainstem of the Missouri
River.

The powers and techniques which the Corps established at Fort

Peck determined to a great extent the important role that military
agency would have in the future development of the entire Missouri
Valley.^
In 1934, Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, the father of the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), introduced the first measure to pro
vide for a federally coordinated program for controlling the entire
Missouri River system.

He proposed the establishment of a Missouri

Valley Authority (MVA) patterned after the TVA and managed by the
Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation.

But since the

urgency of a dynamic overall plan for water development and flood
control was not apparent during those drought years, the Norris bill
received little support and never got past the Senate Committee on

4
U.S., Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Missouri
River Division, Omaha District, "Fort Peck Dam-Fort Peck Lake"
(Omaha: 1972), p. 3.
5
For a detailed discussion of the almost involuntary role change
the Corps of Engineers experienced as a result of the Fort Peck Project
see Henry C. Hart, The Dark Missouri (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1957), pp. 94-97.
(Hereinafter referred to as Hart, Dark
Missouri.)

4
g
Irrigation.

For the remainder of the decade, Congress was content to

enact piecemeal measures for flood control on the river and it was not
until the disasterous floods of the early Forties that the public
demanded an overall development plan and the construction of specific
flood control projects for the Missouri.

7

In 1943, torrential rains and an early spring thaw caused heavy
flooding over the entire Missouri River Valley from Bismarck, North
Dakota to St. Louis, Missouri.

The flood's destruction, which amounted

to over $35,000,000 in property damage for the entire Missouri Valley,
centered in Omaha, Nebraska.

The flood also wiped out $2,000,000 worth

of flood control structures that had been built by the Corps of
Engineers.

The very next spring, the river spilled its banks again to

•flood more that 4,500,000 acres of rich bottomland and bring the twoyear flood damage total to over $100,000,000.

8

These floods proved too much for the people of the Missouri
Valley and they demanded federal action.

Congressmen from the flooded

districts immediately called for new flood control surveys.

Their

requests moved Congress to direct the Corps of Engineers to set up a
plan for flood control and Colonel Lewis A. Pick, the Missouri River

6
U.S., Congress, Senate, A Bill to Improve the Navigability of the
Missouri River. . . , S. 1973, 73d Cong., 2d sess., 1934.
7
See Flood Control Acts of 1936, 1938, and 1941, Statutes at
Large, XLVIX, LII, LV.
Q

Bruce Nelson, Land of the Dacotahs (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1946), p. 318.
(Hereinafter referred to as Nelson,
Land of Dacotahs.) For a description of the flood damage in Omaha
see the Omaha Evening World-Herald, April 14, 1943.

5

Division Engineer at Omaha, was given the assignment.
Colonel Pick had only headed the Missouri Division for one year.
Although his primary wartime mission was building arsenals and air
fields, he wasted no time in carrying out his task.

Within ninety days

he submitted a ten-page report to the Chief of Engineers in Washington
which became known as the "Pick Plan."9
The relatively short study and report that Pick drew up was
primarily a plan for navigation and flood control in the lower part of
the Missouri Valley* although it dealt with ail facets of river develop
ment.

The Pick Plan called for the construction of three groups of

projects by the Corps of Engineers.

The first was to build 1,500 miles

of levees on the Missouri between Sioux City and the mouth of the river
near St. Louis, an obvious response to the recent floods.

The second

group of projects included the construction of eighteen dams on tri
butaries of the Missouri, eleven of which had already been authorized
by Congress.

The third and most dynamic group of projects called for

five major dams to be built on the Missouri proper, all above Sioux City.
This part of the plan represented a bold application of the new powers
and jurisdiction that the Corps had gained and the new techniques that
they had acquired as a result of their experience with the Fort Peck
project.

With very little research, Colonel Pick had proposed a

billion-dollar program which clearly vested all of the authority over

^U.S., Congress, House, Report on the Missouri River Basin, H.R.
Doc. 475, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944.

'\

6

the construction and operation of the projects with the Corps of
Engineers.

As one critic of the Pick Plan stated, "It is unlikely

that a division engineer ever proposed so much, so quickly, and so
vaguely.11
When the Pick Plan was made public it was strongly objected to by
the people of the upper river.

The residents of.the scarce water states

of North Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming, felt that the Army plans for
flood control and navigation would primarily benefit the people of the
lower river and would interfere with their own plans to develop
irrigation.

When the governors of these states went to Washington to

protest the Pick Plan they learned also of a separate Army plan to
create a nine-foot navigation channel on the Missouri between Sioux
City and St. Louis.

This project, the governors claimed, would leave

them with no water at all for irrigation in the upper river valley.
The governors' position was also soon affirmed and supported by the
Bureau of Reclamation.**
In an attempt to protect the interests of the upper river states,
Senators Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming and Eugene D. Millikin of Colorado
introduced an amendment to the Pick Plan and the navigation channel
bill in the Senate Commerce Committee. 12

10

This amendment was designed to

Ibid.; Hart, Dark Missouri, p. 123.

11
Nelson, Land of Dacotahs, pp. 322-23.
12

. .

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Authorizing the
Construction of Certain Public Works on Rivers and Harbors for Flood
Control and Other Purposes, S. Rep. 1030, 78th Cong., 2d sess.,
1944, pp. 30-31.

7

place navigation in a subordinate position to irrigation, to protect
irrigation development west of the ninety-eighth meridian, and to
require Congress to submit all proposed legislation for watershed
development to those states whose i n h e r e s Ls were directly involved.
The O'Mahoney-Millikin amendment was attacked by the residents
of the lower river states who were against anything that might retard
plans to control and prevent the floods from which they were suffering.
Protesting that the amendment represented a dangerous return of the old
state* s rights question, the lower states were able to muster enough
support to vote it down.

But the upper Missouri states still had

enough power to block the passage of the Pick Plan if their irrigation
requests could not be assured.
promise would be necessary.

It soon became apparent that a com

After further debate, the O'Mahoney-

Millikin amendment was again added to the two pending bills.

As a

result of this, irrigation was given primacy over navigation in the
Pick Plan.13
While the navigation-irrigation controversy between the lower
and upper river states was being resolved, the Bureau of Reclamation
came forward with their own comprehensive plan for developing the
Missouri River.

For several years the Bureau had been conducting

research for a detatiled development plan for the Missouri River
Basin which it hoped to file by 1945.

When the Pick Plan was intro

duced in Congress and asserted the authority of the Corps of Engineers

13

Ibid.; Nelson, Land of Dacotahs, p. 323.

8

over these matters, the Bureau was caught off guard.

As a result, a

relatively minor bureaucrat, W. Glenn Sloan, then the Assistant
Director of the Bureau's district office in Billings, Montana, decided
to complete the study and bring it forward before Congress approved the
Army plan.

In May, 1944, the Bureau submitted to Congress what there

after became known as the "Sloan Plan."^
The Sloan Plan was 211 pages long and was much more detailed and
r

definite than the Pick Plan.

Although it provided for both flood and

drought control, it gave priority to irrigation and hydroelectric
power development.

The Bureau of Reclamation plan called for the

construction of ninety dams and reservoirs as far up in the headwaters
of the Missouri as possible.

The agency also proposed that most of the

reservoir capacity be developed on the tributaries rather than on the
mainstem.

Sloan's plan therefore eliminated three of the Missouri

River dam projects proposed by the Army and proposed that the other
three Corps projects, including the Fort Peck Dam, be modified in order
to give priority to irrigation and power development rather than flood
control and irrigation.

The structures proposed by the Sloan Plan

would provide irrigation for nearly 5,500,000 acres of land as well as
nearly 4,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of hydroelectric power each year.
They would also provide for adequate navigation on the lower river as
well as an ample supply of water for municipal and domestic use.

Best

of all, the returns from irrigation and hydroelectric power developed

^ U . S . , Congress, Senate, Conservation, Control, and Use of Water
Resources of the Missouri River Basin, S. Doc. 191, 78th Cong., 2d sess.,
1944,

9

under the Sloan Plan would more than pay for the costs of the projects
whereas the costs of the Pick Plan would have to be covered almost
entirely by the taxpayers. 15
When the Sloan Plan was made public it was immediately criticized
by the people in the lower river states.

They felt that the Bureau’s

proposal disregarded their own flood control needs.

They were also

afraid that the irrigation development proposed by the plan would create
fertile farms in the sparce upper river region that would eventually
compete with those of the lower valley in the agricultural marketplace.

16

Once again the battle was joined and more than ever the respective
interests of the lower and upper river states and the separate plans of
the two federal agencies seemed irreconcilable.

Just as the Missouri

itself would not compromise and continued to provide water that was "too
thick to drink and a mite too thin to plow," 17 so it seemed with the men
who would not compromise between the Pick and the Sloan plans.
At this point in the apparent stalemate, the St. Louis Post-Dis
patch revived the idea of a Missouri Valley Authority (MVA).

On

May 4, 1944, in a full-page editorial which gained national attention,
the Post-;
-Dispatch appealed to the people of the lower and upper river
to resolve their differences and cooperate in bringing forth a unified

^ i b i d .; Nelson, Land of Dacotahs, pp. 322-24; Hart, Dark Missouri,
p. 125.
16
Nelson, Ibid., p. 325.
^Arthur, "MVA Background," p. 13.

10
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plan for water development on the Missouri.

While this proposal by no

means received a consensus of support in the Missouri Basin, it did draw
the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation closer to a compro
mise.

Since the idea of a MVA threatened the vested interests of both

agencies, they became determined to resolve their differences and work
toward getting a unified plan through Congress before the MVA idea
received a hearing.

But before this could happen, Senator James C.

Murray of Montana and Representative John L. Cochran of Missouri both
introduced bills in Congress which called for the establishment of a
Missouri Valley Authority and, in a special message to Congress, President Roosevelt also endorsed the idea.

19

As the proponents of the MVA gathered strength, the Corps of
Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation held an important inter*

agency conference in Omaha on October 16, 1944.

The purpose of this

meeting was to revise and coordinate the respective plans of the two
agencies.

The next day a one-page agreement was drawn up which re

conciled the Pick and Sloan plans.

This agreement specified both the

exact number of projects to be built and the jurisdiction each agency
would have over them. 20

A few weeks later, bills for the ]oint Pick-

^Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 4, 1944.
19
.
.
.
U.S., Congress, Senate and House, Bills to Establish a Missouri
Valley Authority . . . , S. 2089, H.R. 5377, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944;
U.S., Congress, Senate, Message from President Roosevelt to the Senate
recommending the creation of a Missouri Valley Authority, 78th Cong.,
2d sess., Nov. 28, 1944, Congressional Record, XC, 8479.
20
Omaha Evening World-Herald, October 16-17, 1944.

11

Sloan were introduced m

the House of Representatives. 21

Because there

was not yet any formidable support for the MVA in Congress, the legis
lation was easily passed by both houses and incorporated into the Flood
10
Control Act of 1944.*'

.

.

.

.

.

.

The next March a bill authorizing the construc

tion of a nine-foot channel on the Missouri from Sioux City to St. Louis
also became part of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945.

23

The reconciliation of the Pick and Sloan plans was described by
James S. Patton, President of the National Farmers Union and an advo
cate of the MVA, as a "shameless, loveless, shotgun wedding."^

To be

sure the agreement was reached by somewhat reluctant partners who were
not motivated by an abiding love for each other.

Their union was

certainly borne of expediency rather than mutual accord.

As a result,

each agency was necessarily reconciled to works of the other which they
had previously disapproved.

No attempt was made to consolidate or

justify the costs of the combined projects.

The exact size and height

of some of the dams was not determined and in some cases a duplication

21
U.S., Congress, House, Bills Authorizing the Construction of
Certain Public Works on Rivers and Harbors and for Other Purposes ■,
H.R. 3961, H.R. 4485, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944.
^Flood Control Act of 1944, Statutes at Large, LVIII, 827 (1944).
For a detailed history of the movement of the Pick-Sloan Bill through
Congress see Marian E. Ridgeway, The Missouri Basin1s Pick-Sloan Plan
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955), pp. 105-32.
23

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, Statutes at Large, LIX, 19
(1945) .
24

Rufus Terral, The Missouri Valley: Land of Drouth, Flood, and
Promise (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), p. 208.
(Hereinafter
referred to as Terral, Missouri Valley.)

12

of projects remained.

Likewise, no mention was made of whether or not

an adequate water supply for both irrigation and navigation could be
provided.

Details concerning the development of hydroelectric power

installations and plans for the use of this power were also left to the
future.
The Pick-Sloan Plan encompassed a total of 118 dams, thirteen of
which had previously been authorized by Congress.

The backbone of the

plan was the five multi-purpose dams that would be built on the Missouri
by the Corps of Engineers.

These included the Garrison, Oahe, Big Bend,

Fort Randall, and Gavins Point dams.

In addition, the previously con

structed Fort Peck Dam would be improved and incorporated into the
,
26
plan.
In regard to floodcontrol, the Pick-Sloan Plan aimed

at eli

minating all inundations of any consequence on the Missouri and its
tributaries.

In addition to the main stem dams it also authorized the

construction of earthen levees and concrete flood walls on both sides
of the river from Sioux City to St. Louis to protect over 1,500,000
acres of rich bottomland in the lower Missouri Valley.

The plan also

aimed at bringing 5,000,000 acres of land in northern North Dakota,
eastern South Dakota, and northeastern Colorado under irrigation for

25

U.S., Congress, Senate, Review of Plans of Engineer Corps, Army,
and Reclamation Bureau for the Development of Missouri River Basin, S.
Doc. 247, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944, pp. 1-6; Richard G. Baumhoff,
The Dammed Missouri Valley (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp.
184-95.
(Hereinafter referred to as Baumhoff, Dammed Missouri.)
Oscar F. Litterer, The Missouri Basin Development Program (Minneapolis:
Federal Reserve Bank, 1953).
26Ibid.
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the first time.

When proposals for hydroelectric power were worked out,

the plan provided for an output of 3,191,065 kilowatts, a third of which
would be produced by the power plants at Garrison, Oahe, and Fort Ran
dall.

-Besides developing irrigation for agricultural uses, the Pick-

Sloan Plan also aimed at stabilizing the soil, reducing the silt flow,
and generally increasing productivity in the Missouri Valley and in
cluded bank stabilization plans to protect bottomlands from being eaten
away by river currents.

Supplemented by the nine-foot channel below

Sioux City, the plan would also improve navigation on the river.

In

addition, it was aimed at developing mineral resources, encouraging
industrial development, protecting and increasing fish and wildlife, and
providing public recreation facilities, adequate water supplies, exten
sive land surveys, and detailed studies of historic and prehistoric man
in the Missouri Valley.
Since the Pick-Sloan Plan would touch on every aspect of life in
the Missouri Valley it was bound to be controversial.

Critics of the

plan, who were mostly proponents of the MVA idea, viewed it as "a loose
joining of two already imperfect plans with all of the imperfections of
both embraced under a single title.”2®

Even as President Roosevelt

signed the plan into law, he expressed the hope that it would in no way
interfere with the eventual creation of a Missouri Valley Authority.
far as he was concerned the question of who would administer the plan

27Ibid.
28
Nelson, Land of Dacotahs, p. 328.

As

14

remained open.

29

Encouraged by the support of the President, Senator

Murray, the liberal Democrat from Montana who became the foremost
Congressional critic of Pick-Sloan, submitted another MVA bill in
1945.

30

But Vice President Harry S. Truman routed the proposal to the

Senate Commerce Committee.

This committee had approved Pick-Sloan and

was known to be hostile to the MVA concept.

When Senator Murray pro

tested the fact that his bill was not sent to the committee of his own
choice, which is usually the author's perogative, Truman dispatched the
bill to three separate committees so that it was sure to suffer a slow
death on Capitol Hill.

Undaunted by this maneuver, Senator Murray sub

mitted several other MVA bills over the next few years.

When he could

not obtain Congressional hearings on the matter, the Montana millionaire
used his own private funds to conduct investigations.

But while Murray

was supported by several of his fellow Senators including William
Langer and Milton Young of North Dakota, Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota,
and Guy Gillette of Iowa, his MVA proposals received little support in
the House and virtually none from the White House after Truman suc
ceeded to the Presidency.

Outside of Washington, the MVA was supported

nationally by the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO), and the National Farmers Union.

On the

local level it was also supported by such organizations as the North
Dakota Farmers Union, the Missouri Farmers Association, and the St. Louis

2g
New York Times, December 24, 1944, p. 26.
30

U.S., Congress, Senate, A Bril to Establish a Missouri Valley
Authority, S. 555, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945.
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Chamber of Commerce.

Backers of the MVA also formed the Regional .

Committee for the Missouri Valley Authority.

Editorially it was

supported by the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch.

The MVA was also included in the platform of

Henry A. Wallace’s Progressive Party in 1948.^
Proponents of the MVA felt that such an agency would do a more
efficient and successful job of meeting the goals of the Pick-Sloan
Plan.

While some supporters hoped that it would be able to reduce the

size of the reservoirs as well as the amount of cultivated land that
was to be taken by the projects, others saw it as a way in which to
provide more jobs, cheaper electric power, and other benefits at the
local level for the public rather than private interests.

Some ob

servers viewed the MVA as an example of democracy in action, as a
means of regional home rule, and as a logical extension of the
successful TVA.

While some people viewed the fight between MVA and

Pick-Sloan as liberalism versus conservatism, others saw it as a
battle between two different principles of management.

Under MVA there

would be a unified program under a single administration while PickSloan represented a loose confederation of separate and often con
flicting administrative agencies.

The MVA would get all of its. money

from Congress in one annual appropriation and would therefore not
have to deal with several separate committees in both houses of

^Baumhoff, Dammed Missouri, pp. 261-72; Terral, Missouri
Valley, pp. 209-26; Nelson, Land of Dacotahs, pp. 325-38.

Congress for different parts of the water development program as was
necessary under Pick-Sloan. 32
The opponents of the MVA were much stronger than its supporters.
They included the railroads of the region, the privately owned utility
companies, the livestock, oil, and timber interests, and the state
officials of most of the basin states including Nebraska and North and
South Dakota.

The MVA was also opposed by the United States Chamber of

Commerce, the National Reclamation Association, the Mississippi Valley
Association, the National Rivers and Harbors Congress, a powerful lobby
of the Corps of Engineers, the heavy construction industry as repre
sented by the Associated General Contractors, and by the Farm Bureau.
The largest centralized organization against the MVA was the Missouri
Valley Development Association which was headed by John B. Quinn, a
public relations man and farmer from Lincoln, Nebraska.

Editorially

the MVA was also opposed by the Kansas City Star, the Omaha WorldHerald, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, and other smaller newspapers in
the region, as well as the Saturday Evening Post magazine.

These

opponents saw the MVA as a step toward socialism* i.e., the nationali
zation of interests which rightfully belonged within the realm of
private enterprise.

They viewed the MVA as a continuation of the New

Deal which they felt had attempted to create a totalitarian supergovermrint.

From their perspective, therefore, MVA was also a threat
33

to state *s rights.
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Sensitive to the criticism that it lacked an integrated and
dynamic view of the Missouri Valley as a whole, the federal government
established the Missouri Basin Interagency Committee (MBIAC).

This

agency was to consist of representatives from the Corps of Engineers,
the Bureau of Reclamation and other Department of Interior agencies
including the Office of Indian Affairs, the Department of Commerce, the
Department of Agriculture, the Federal Power Commission, the Federal
Security Agency, and five of the ten governors of the basin states.

In

addition, it was to be supplemented by the Missouri River States
Committee (MRSC), an unofficial organization consisting of all of the
basin state governors and their technical sides.
While the MBIAC proceeded to coordinate plans for the development
of the Missouri River Basin, the supporters of the MVA continued to
propose legislation which they felt would provide a more unified pro
gram.

Although the Interagency plans were much more comprehensive than

the original Pick-Sloan Plan, the MVA backers contended that the MBIAC
represented a grass roots federal-state government alliance which would
not be sufficient in turning the tide of battle against the Missouri.

34
Baumhoff, Ibid., pp. 169-79. Oddly enough, neither Pick nor
Sloan were among the original members of the Interagency Committee.
At the time that the MBIAC was being formed, Colonel Pick had been
promoted to Brigadier General and transferred to Burma where he became
famous as the builder of the Ledo Road. He later returned to serve
as chairman of the MBIAC for a brief period before he was again
promoted to Chief of the Corps of Engineers and transferred to
Washington. Although Glenn Sloan was not considered for the first
Interagency Committee, he was later appointed to it and succeeded
General Pick as chairman before he retired from federal service in
1950.
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They also held that the planning of the Committee was not consistent
with the welfare of the Missouri Valley or of the nation as a whole.
They also felt that among the many evils of the program was the fact
that it was "tramping on the rights of Indians.
The original inhabitants of the Northern Plains settled in the
valleys of the Missouri River and its tributaries.

When this Indian

land was reduced to reservation size in the nineteenth century, most
of the tribes were able to keep some of their riverside property.

In

South Dakota, for example, the Sioux kept possession of the greater
part of the Missouri shoreline in that state.

As a result, the big

water plans of the federal government were bound to effect the lands
of several Indian tribes.

Whether or not the Corps of Engineers and

the Bureau of Reclamation had deliberately chosen Indian land over
non-Indian land for their project sites, as some Indians charged,
their plans would ultimately effect twenty-three different Indian
reservations in the Missouri River B a s i n . S i x reservations on the
Missouri proper would be considerably reduced in size by the huge
projects to be constructed by the Corps of Engineers.

These reser

vations, which had the most to lose as a result of Pick-Sloan, included
the Fort Berthold Reservation of the Three Affiliated Tribes, which
would be drastically affected by the Garrison project, the Standing
Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Reservations, which would be damaged by

35Ibid.; Arthur, "MVA Background," p. 14.
36
U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Listings of Missouri River Basin Investigations Reports, MRBI Rep.
No. 108 (Billings: Missouri River Basin Investigations Project, 1970).
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the Oahe project, the Yankton Sioux Reservation, which would be reduced
by the Fort Randall project, and the Crow Creek and Lower Brule Sioux
Reservations, which would suffer as a result of both the Fort Randall
and Big Bend projects.

Other tribes would also be adversely affected

by the Bureau of Reclamation projects on the tributaries, most notably
the Crow Indians in Montana whose land on the Big Horn River would be
inundated by the Yellowtail Dam.

But of all the works included in the

Pick-Sloan Plan, Indians would suffer most from the Garrison Project. 3 7
The Garrison Dam, which was to be the largest rolled-earth dam in
the world as well as the biggest Pick-Sloan project, would require the
withdrawal of 155,000 acres of land from the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation.

This partially timbered acreage, extremely fertile and

rich in mineral resources, included some of the best land in North
Dakota and the primary land on which the Three Affiliated Tribes of
Mandan, Arikara, and Hidatsa Indians lived and worked.

The filling of

the Garrison Reservoir would not only flood the headquarters of the
reservation and the bottomlands along the Missouri River, but would
also overflow the valleys of four smaller tributaries and sever the
remainder of the reservation into five water-bound sections, isolated
from each other in terms of communication and transportation except
across water during the summer.

The physical rearrangment of the

reservation as a result would require drastic changes in the entire

For a detailed account of the effects of the Garrison Project on
the Fort Berthold Indians see Roy W. Meyer, "Fort Berthold and the
Garrison Dam," North Dakota History, XXXV, (Summer & Fall, 1968),
pp. 220-355.
(Hereinafter referred to as Meyer, "Fort Berthold.")

20

MISSOURI RIVER BASIN RESERVATIONS ADMINISTERED BY THE
ABERDEEN AREA OFFICE, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
TURTLE MT
Belcourt
ew Town

Ft. Totten

FT. BERTHOLD
FT. TOTTEN

JB Bismarck

Wahpeton

t. Yates
kSTANDING

ROCK^f:

Usseton
Aberdeen,

'CHEYENNE
RIVER
Eag!

SISSETON V,-v

**Pierre
'Rapid City

ROW CREEK
LOWER BRULE
m Chamberlain

INE RIDGE
ROSEBUD
.^Pine Ridge

Rosebud

gner

Jtfinnebago
WINNEBAGO
OMAHA

Lincoln D

Source:

U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Aberdeen Area Statistical Data, 1971 (Aberdeen: 1971),
p. 1 .

21

social, economic, and administrative structure of the Fort Berthold
Reservation.

The prospect of this action, therefore, caused much

anxiety and emotional reaction among the members of the Three
Affiliated Tribes.^®
Determined to block the construction of the Garrison project on
their land, the Fort Berthold Indians took their protest to Congress.
They also hired legal counsel to represent them in their fight.

In

1946, their lawyer obtained from Congress an amendment to the Civil
Functions Act of that year which halted all expenditures for the con
struction of the Garrison project until a suitable settlement was
reached with the Three Affiliated Tribes.

og

. This legal action was

based on the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 which provided that the
reservation land established by that treaty could not be taken from
the Indians without their own consent and that of Congress.

This

step was taken in response to the threats of the Corps of Engineers to
condemn the land in Federal District Court and obtain it cheaply through
the right of eminent domain.

These threats had increased after both the

Indians and the Secretary of the Interior rejected a cash offer that was
made for the land by the Corps.

38U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Public Lands, Fort Berthold
Reservation, North Dakota, H.R. Rep. 544, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949,
p. 16.
39
War Department Civil Appropriation Act of 1946, Statutes at
Large, LX, 163 (1946).
40
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, North Dakota, Hearings before the Sub
committee on Indian Affairs, House of Representatives, on H.J. Res. 33,
81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, p. 37. (Hereinafter referred to as
Hearings, Fort Berthold.)
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While this action was taking place, the Office of Indian Affairs
in Washington took initial steps to* bring the vital interests of Indians
into the overall planning of the Interagency Committee.

The Missouri

River Basin Investigation project (MRBI) was organized to conduct over
all surveys and preliminary studies of the Indian land situation in
regard to estimating the replacement costs, the social and economic
effects, and the damage to agriculture that would be caused by inun
dation.

Headquarters for the MRBI was established at the Billings,

Montana office of the OIA and within a few weeks members of the MRBI
team were making appraisals at Fort Berthold and elsewhere.4^
Also during the course of 1946, the Fort Berthold Tribal Council
offered an alternative dam site on the reservation free of charge to
the government.

But a dam at this alternate site, which would cause

considerably less damage to the Indians, was rejected by the Corps of
Engineers since in the Army's estimation it would not provide an ade
quate storage capacity.4^

In 1947, while no money was expended for

the construction of the Garrison Dam itself because of the Civil
Functions Act of 1946, over $6,000,000 was spent on the construction
of access roads and preliminary shoreline work.

Much to the dismay of

the Indians the reservation was invaded by Corps of Engineers truck
convoys and earth moving equipment.43

Finally, the campaign of the

41U.S., Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Secretary
of the Interior (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946),
pp. 378-79.
42

Ibid.; Meyer, "Fort Berthold," p. 245.

43
Hearings, Fort Berthold, pp. 9-10.
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federal government, to make a cash settlement with the Tribes succeeded
in July, 1947 when Public Law 296 was forced on the Indians by Congress.
This act provided $5,105,625 to the Fort Berthold Indians for their land
and improvements, for severance damages, and for reestablishment and re
location costs.

This settlement, considered generous by many in Washing

ton, meant that the Indians would receive about $33 an acre for their
land and all that stood on it.

From that amount they were also expected

to cover the costs of salvaging what they could from the land and reestablishing it elsewhere.

44

While Public Law 296 did not include any provisions for mineral
rights and specifically denied fishing rights to the Indians, it did
give them the right to claim additional compensation through Congress
or the United States Court of Claims.

Determined to exercise that

right, the Tribes gave up their struggle to stop the construction of
the Garrison project and began to work instead for a more favorable
settlement for their land from the federal government.

For the next

two years the Tribal Council fought for an additional payment in
Washington.

They claimed that actual loss to the Fort Berthold

Indians would be at least $21,981,000 based on a private appraisal
prepared by the Tribal Council.

45

A detailed brief was then presented

war Department Civil Appropriation Act of 1947, Statutes at
Large, LXI, 690 (1947); Meyer, "Fort Berthold," pp. 256-57. Tribal
representatives testified nearly two years later that when they appeared
before a House Subcommittee to negotiate a settlement in 1947, they
received a very cold reception. After they returned to the reservation
they were told that they had agreed to the provisions embodied in
Public Law 296.
45
Meyer, Ibid., pp. 258-59; Hearings, Fort Berthold, pp. 47-59.
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to the Congressional committees which made a good case for this claim.
Finally, after months of debate, the House and Senate, after arbi
trarily granting or denying certain benefits to the Indians, agreed to
a compromise figure of $7,500,000 in additional funds.

46

A settlement

based on this amount was then passed into law with President Truman's
signature on October 29, 1949.

As Public Law 437, it provided a pay

ment of $12,605,625 to the Three Affiliated Tribes, including the
amount that was already appropriated by Public Law 296.

47

The provisions of Public Law 437 called for the disbursement of
funds on a per-capita basis which would prove to be a serious handicap
to the future economic development of the Tribes.

The law also fell

short in granting to the Indians much of the additional rights and
privileges they had requested from Congress.

While it did provide

them with an extended period in which to salvage certain improvements
and mineral resources on their land prior to inundation, it did not
give them the right to share in the future use or value of that land.
It denied them the right to use the reservoir shoreline for grazing,
fishing, or any other purpose.

It also denied them any future royalty

rights on potential sub-surface mineral extractions and failed to
include any provisions for the future investigation and development
of potential irrigation projects on the reservation.

In regard to the

U.S., Congress, Senate and House, Joint Conference, Approval of
Amendments to H.J. Res. 33, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 29, 1949,
Congressional Record, XCV, 15051-52*
47
Act of October 29, 1949, Statutes at Large, LXIII, 1026 (1949).
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Indians request for a block of the hydroelectric power of the Garrison
Dam at a low rate, the law stated that electric power would be provided
to the Indians on an equal basis as provided all other persons under the
Rural Electrification Act of 1936.

While the law fell $9,375,375 short

of what the Indians felt was the fair value of their damages, it at the
same time denied them the right to claim additional compensation through
Congress or the U.S. Court of Claims.

The legislation did not provide

for a Land Readjustment Fund nor did it bar the collection of previous
Indian debts from the settlement funds. 48
With the passage of Public Law 437, the Three Affiliated Tribes
began to realize their worst fears concerning the Garrison Project.
They had lost their battle to halt the construction of the dam.

They

had also lost the battle to get adequate compensation for their loss.
They would also lose their long fight to have the deficiencies of
Public Law 437 corrected by amendatory legislation m

Congress. 49

Within a few years, the Tribes were relocated on new land, their reser
vation was inundated and segmented into five sections, and reservation
life as they had known it was seriously disrupted.

Signs of social and

Between 1950 and 1970 over twenty-five bills were introduced in
Congress to provide for the relief of the Fort Berthold Indians and
to amend Public Law 437. Only one of these bills was ever passed and
it only gave the Tribes the right to use ten acres of federal land
that had previously been used for a BIA school which had been destroyed
by fire. See U.S., Congress, Senate, A Bill to Declare that the
United States shall hold Certain Land in Trust for the Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, N. Dak., S. 775, 91st Cong.,
1st sess., 1969.
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economic decline became everywhere apparent.

The cattle operations

had to be liquidated, unemployment rose to as much as 79 per cent,
and dozens of federal agencies eventually had to pour millions of
dollars into welfare, health, education, community action, manpower,
and self-help programs.

After twenty years of hard work the Fort

Berthold reservation is beginning to make great progressive strides,
but the psychic scars of the Garrison ordeal are still visible.

50

The Fort Berthold experience is an important one for this study.
Not only is it an example of the most brutal aspects of the Pick-Sloan
Plan as it affected Native Americans, but it also established many
important precedents for future settlements with Indian tribes con
cerning the taking of their land for the construction of dam and
reservoir projects on the Missouri.

The Cheyenne River Sioux learned

many important lessons from the Fort Berthold experience.

As a result,

they were able to handle their negotiations in Washington much more
judiciously and were also able to receive a more satisfactory settle
ment from Congress in 1954.

Likewise, the Standing Rock, Crow Creek,

and Lower Brule Sioux tribes learned much from the Cheyenne River
negotiations and were able to get an even better settlement m

1958.

51

Immediately prior to the passage of the final Fort Berthold
settlement by a joint Congressional conference, Representative Wesley
A. D'Evart of Montana stood up to give his closing remarks.

Although

^°Meyer, "Fort Berthold," pp. 329-355.
51
Cf. Act of September 3, 1954, Statutes at Large, LXVIII, 1191
(1954) and Acts of September 2, 1958, Statutes at Large, LXXII, 17621768 (1958).
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never a great friend of the Indian, D'Evart was a member of the House
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs.

As he addressed his colleagues in Con

gress, however, he expressed the hope "that in the future we shall treat
these wards of the Government in a better way, a way which will recognize
their treaty rights before we proceed to drown them out."52

Apparently,

there were few officials in Washington who shared Congressman D'Evart*s
hope since in every future case land negotiations with the Indians were
never settled until after the Corps of Engineers had started construction
on the dam projects and in some cases the projects were completed long
before a final settlement was reached.
In 1946, while the Corps of Engineers were making land surveys on
Port Berthold for the Garrison project, they also were breaking ground
for the Fort Randall Dam in South Dakota.

The Fort Randall project

required the taking of 9,514 acres from the Crow Creek Sioux, 7,997
acres from the Lower Brule Sioux, and 3,369 acres from the Yankton
Sioux.

The taking of this land also required the relocation of eighty-

four families on the Crow Creek Reservation, nineteen on the Lower Brule
Reservation, and sixteen on the Yankton Reservation. 53

In 1948, the

52

U.S., Congress, House, Representative D'Evart speaking for Indian
land rights, H.J. Res. 33, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 29, 1949,
Congressional Record, XCV, 15052.
53

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Authorizing the Negotiation and Ratification of Separate Settlement Con
tracts with the Sioux Indians of the Lower Brule and Crow Creek Reser
vations in South Dakota for Indian Lands and Rights Acquired by the
United States for the Fort Randall Dam and Reservoir, Missouri River
Development, and to Authorize an Appropriation for the Removal from the
Taking Area of the Fort Randall Dam and Reservoir, Missouri River Devel
opment , and the Reestabli shment of the Indians of the Yankton Indian
Reservation in South Dakota, H.R. Rep. 2466, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954,
p. 2; U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Effects
of the Fort Randall Project on Crow Creek and Lower Brule Reservations,
MRBI Rep. No. 70 (Billings: Missouri River Basin Investigations Project,
1949), pp. 1-29.
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Corps of Engineers succeeded where they had failed with the Fort Bert
hold Project.

They were able to obtain land from the Yankton Sioux

through condemnation proceedings in the Federal District Court of South
Dakota.

Although this action violated treaty rights, the Corps was able

to obtain right of way on the Indian land by depositing $121,310 with the
\

Court.

This amount was held to be the fair cash value of the land based

on the Army's own appraisal and it was to be disbursed to individual
tribal members as soon as full title to the land was granted to the
United States.

Because of this action, the tribe found it necessary to

fight in Washington for additional compensation. 54

In 1954, two years

after their land was taken from them, the Yankton Sioux received an
additional $106,500 from Congress.

55

In 1953, the Corps of Engineers also obtained the land they needed
on the Crow Creek and Lower Brule Sioux Reservations through similar
condemnation proceedings.

The Corps deposited $365,079 and $233,756

with the Court for the Crow Creek and Lower Brule lands respectively.
The next year, Congress ordered the Corps and the Department of Interior
to negotiate a more equitable settlement with each of the tribes.

But

when the Indians refused to accept either of the separate appraisals
made by the Corps and the MRBI, the Corps asked the Justice Department
to arrange a final settlement in court based on the condemnation pay
ment.

In 1955, the Federal District Court gave the Corps of Engineers

54U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
H.R. Rep. 498 (Same title as H.R. Rep. 2466 above.), 83d Cong., 1st
sess., 1953, p. 2.
55Act of July 6, 1954, Statutes at Large, LXVIII, 452 (1954).
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title to the Indian land although all gas and oil rights were retained
for the tribes.

The Court also added $23,700 and $36,855 to the deposits

of the Crow Creek and Lower Brule respectively to bring the settlement up
to the MRBI appraisal.

In addition, the Court also disbursed the amount

of the original deposits to the Indian land owners.

.1 Because

this settle

ment also clearly violated their treaty rights, the Crow Creek and Lower
Brule Sioux also took their case to Congress.

They maintained that the

taking of their best land affected all of the tribal members on their
reservations and not just those families that were forced to relocate.
Because of this, they asked Congress for funds to establish a rehabi
litation program for their reservations in addition to a higher payment
for their land.

56

Meanwhile, in 1956, at a cost of over $203,000,000

Fort Randall became the first project completed under the Pick-Sloan Plan
on the Missouri River.

57

In 1958, long after the Indian lands required

for project were flooded and the Indian families were relocated, Congress
awarded $1,395,312 in additional funds to the Crow Creek Sioux and
$976,523 to the Lower Brule Sioux.

58

By that time, however, construction

had begun on the Big Bend project and the Crow Creek and Lower Brule

56
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Providing Additional Payments to Indians of the Lower Brule Sioux
Reservation, S. Dak., Whose Lands have been Acquired for the Fort
Randall Dam and Reservoir Project, H.R. Rep. 2054, pp. 2-3.
______ Providing for Additional Payments to Indians of the Crow
Creek Reservation, S. Dak., Whose Lands have been Acquired for the
Fort Randall Dam and Reservoir Project, H.R. Rep. 2086, pp. 2-3.
85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958.
57

Pierre Daily Capitol Journal, August 12, 1956.

58
Acts of September 2, 1958, Statutes at Large, LXXII, 1762-68
(1958).
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tribes were again scheduled to suffer the effects of inundation and to
fight for a settlement with the federal government.
In 1948, construction began on the Oahe Dam, the third major PickSloan project on the Missouri River.

Located six miles above Pierre,

South Dakota, the Oahe project was to have the largest hydroelectric
power plant and the second largest dam and reservoir capacity of all
the Corps of Engineers projects.

The Oahe Reservoir would also be the

largest one on the Missouri, stretching over 230 miles to just below
Bismarck, North Dakota.

Although the Oahe Dam site was not located on

Indian land, the Oahe Reservoir would flood more Indian land than any
other Pick-Sloan project.

Over 160,000 acres of land on the Standing

Rock and Cheyenne Sioux Reservations in North and South Dakota would be
inundated.

On the Standing Rock Reservation, the flooding of nearly

56,000 acres would require the relocation of 170 Indian families although
most of the federal and tribal facilities at Fort Yates, North Dakota,
the largest town on the reservation and the agency headquarters, would
be saved.^9
On the Cheyenne River Reservation the flooding of over 104,000
acres would require the removal of 200 Indian families and the re
location of Cheyenne Agency, South Dakota, the main population center

59U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Authorizing the Negotiations for Contracts with Indians in Connection
with the Construction of Oahe Darn, S. Dak., S. Rep. 1737, 81st Cong. ,
2d sess., 1950; (Hereinafter referred to as S. Rep. 1737, Authorizing
Oahe Contracts.) U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Effects of the Oahe Reservoir Project on the Cheyenne River
Reservation and Standing Rock Reservation, MRBI Rep. No. 29 (Billings:
Missouri River Basin Investigations Project, 1947), pp. 1-30. (Herein
after referred to as MRBI Rep. No. 29, Effects of Oahe Project.)

31

on the reservation and the town which housed the federal and tribal
headquarters, hospital, and boarding school.

In addition, the most

fertile land on the reservation and most of the timber resources would
be lost.

60

Before beginning the story in detail of just how the Cheyenne

River Sioux were effected by the Oahe project, however, it will be
helpful to know what the land and the people of the reservation were
like before the Oahe Dam was built and the Indian land was flooded.

To

find this out requires a trip back in time to the middle of the Nine
teenth Century.

60

Ibid.

CHAPTER II
A GLIMPSE OP HISTORY ON CHEYENNE RIVER
The Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation was originally part
of the Great Sioux Reservation established by the Fort Laramie Treaty
of 1868.1

The Great Sioux Reservation included all of what is now

South Dakota west of the Missouri River.

The Fort Laramie Treaty

prohibited whites from hunting, settling, or establishing westward
trails on this reserved land.

For their part, the Sioux released all

of their land east of the Missouri except the Crow Creek, Lower Brule,
Yankton, and Sisseton Reservations which had previously been established.
The United States government, in turn, agreed to pay annuities to the
Indians for their appropriated lands.

Since it became increasingly

difficult to effectively administer the vast area occupied by the
Sioux, the federal government later decided to divide the Great Sioux
Reservation into general divisions which would recognize the different
tribes of the Sioux Nation.

As a result, the Cheyenne River Sioux

Reservation was established as a separate reservation by an Act of
March 2, 1889.

This Act defined its boundaries as follows:

Beginning at a point in the center of the main channel of
the Missouri River, ten miles north of the mouth of the
Moreau or Owl River, said point being the southeastern
corner of the Standing Rock Reservation; thence down said
center of the main channel of the Missouri River; including
also entirely within said reservation all islands, if any,
in said river, to a point opposite the mouth of the Chey
enne River; and up the same to its intersection with the

^U.S., Statutes at Large, Vol. XV, "Peace Treaty of Fort Laramie,"
April 9, 1868, pp. 635-47.
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one hundred and second meridian of longitude; thence
north along said meridian to its intersection with a
line due west from a point in the Missouri River ten
miles north of the Moreau or Owl River; thence due
east to the place of beginning.2
The area of the reservation as described in this law encompassed
2,804,000 acres.

Within the next seventy years the amount of land held

by the Cheyenne River Sioux was further reduced by more than 1,300,000
acres.3
Although the original tribes of the Sioux Nation are no longer
given recognition, four of these tribes were represented on the Cheyenne
River Reservation in 1889.
foot, and Two Kettle Sioux.

They were the Minneconjou, Sans Arc, BlackAlong with the Oglala, Hunkpapa, and Sicangu

or Brule Sioux, these tribes made up the largest division of the Sioux
Nation— the Titonwan (Men of the Prairie) or Teton Sioux.

The Teton

tribes speak a Siouan dialect called Lakota and are sometimes called the
Western Sioux because they were the first of the Sioux to leave their
traditional homes in the woodlands of the Upper Great Lakes region and
migrate to the Norther Plains.

Largely because they violently resisted

the invasion of white settlers on their land, the Teton Sioux became the
aboriginal prototype whose characteristics are most often used to de
scribe the North American Indian.^
2
Act of March 2, 1889, Statutes at Large, XXV, sec. 4, 889 (1889).
3
The Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation presently has approximately
1,510,821 acres.
4
The other two divisions of the Sioux Nation are the Santee or East
ern Sioux who speak the Dakota dialect and the Wiciyela or Middle Sioux
who speak the Nakota dialect* U*S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Fact Sheet on the Sioux (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1970), pp. 1-2 (Hereinafter referred to as BIA, Sioux Fact Sheet.);
William K. Powers, Indians of the Northern Plains' (New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1969), pp. 45-46 (Hereinafter referred to as Powers, Indians of
Northern Plains.); Hodge, Handbook of American Indians, I, 376-77.
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For several generations the Teton Sioux lived near Big Stone and
Lake Traverse in western Minnesota.

Here, following what archeologists

have termed the Woodland Cultural Tradition, the Sioux lived in semi
permanent houses and developed villages and ceremonial mounds of various
types.

They subsisted by hunting on foot, fishing, and gathering wild

berries and other forest foods rather than cultivating their own crops.
They also made pottery that was both functional and decorative.
Gradually, these Indians were pushed further westward by the Chippewa who
had received firearms from the French.

The Teton Sioux were also lured

westward by the prospect of hunting the great game herds that roamed the
Plains.

A few members of these tribes probably reached the Missouri

River before 1750 and by 1765 they had dispossessed the Cheyenne and
Kiowa from the Black Hills.

The Teton Sioux also forced the Arikara out

of South Dakota, made persistent attacks on the more northern villages of
the Hidatsa and Mandan, and fought for many years with various other
Plains Indian tribes.

5

Soon after their arrival on the Northern Plains, the material
culture of the Teton Sioux was drastically changed by two very important
new acquisitions— the horse and the gun, which were diffused through a
rather complex Indian trading network from the Spanish and French settle
ments respectively.^

The Teton tribes readily adapted these two new

possessions to their newest economic activity— the hunting of the great

5
Hodge, Ibid.; Waldo R. Wedel, Prehistoric Man on the Great Plains
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), p. 211.
g
John C. Ewers, Indian Life on the Upper Missouri (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), pp. 23-25.
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buffalo herds.

They soon learned to exploit the buffalo for all of their

material needs and this new source of wealth caused them to crystallize
a new life pattern around the buffalo and the horse.

Because the buffalo

was migratory, the Teton Sioux became nomadic and their economic
dependence on the buffalo soon caused them to acquire most pf the
traits which are considered typical of Plains Indian culture, i.e., the
kinship bands, the Soldier Societies, the Sun Dance, geometric decorative
art, etc.

The unity of this life pattern, which represented the

cultural apex of the Sioux, was also symbolized in the rich mythology
and religious ceremony of the camp circle.

Though scarcely reaching its

full flower before 1800, this way of life began a sharp decline by 1850
as the competition between the Sioux, the white man, and the other tribes
for the buffalo and the other material resources of the Plains became
fiercely intense.

7

.
While it is generally felt that the Teton Sioux were

inherently bellicose individuals wh o .considered war to be a sport, the
Sioux warfare on the Plains should be understood in terms of this com
petition and the rapid and successive adjustments that these people were
required to make to both white and native forces during this period.

The

warrior culture of the Sioux with its emphasis on combat heroics was a
means by which war could be made attractive to the individual Indian and
was the result rather than the cause of Indian warfare.
were warlike because they had to be.

The Teton Sioux

If they had not been a warrior

7
.
Ruth M. Underhill, Red Man's America: ‘A History of Indians in the
United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 155;
Vernon D. Malan and Clinton J. Jesser, The Dakota Indian Religion,
Bulletin 473, Rural Sociology Department, Agricultural Extension
Station, South Dakota State University (Brookings: 1959), pp. 42-59.
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society during this time they might not have survived.8
In the late 1840s waves of white fortune hunters crossed the
southern periphery of the Sioux territory on their way to the gold
fields of California.

Many of these prospectors abandoned their

original plans and decided to settle in the Plains area.

The Sioux and

other tribes resisted this intrusion and a small-scale war soon erupted
on the Plains.

Hostile confrontations between the Indians and the

whites became so frequent that the federal government was called upon to
negotiate and enforce a peace settlement.

In 1851 a peace conference

was called at Fort Laramie, Wyoming and nearly 10,000 Plains Indians
gathered to meet with representatives of the United States government.
In the treaty which resulted from this unusual conference, the Indians
pledged to maintain peace among themselves and to permit the establish
ment of roads and military posts across their territory while the
United States agreed to honor all Indian land rights, claims, and
privileges.

While both sides pledged "to maintain good faith and

friendship in their mutual intercourse, and to make an effective and
lasting peace," it soon became apparent that neither party could live up
to these promises.

The whites continued their encroachment on the

Indian land as the military posts multiplied and the wagon train west
was quickly followed by the stagecoach, the Pony Express rider, and
the telegraph line.

9

8
W.W. Newcomb Jr., "A Re-Examination of the Causes of Plains War
fare," American Anthropologist, LII (April-June, 1950), pp. 317-30.
9
U.S., Statutes at Large, Vol. XI, "Peace Treaty of Fort Laramie,"
September 17, 1851, p. 749; Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee:
An Indian History of the American West (New York: Holt, Rinehart,
Winston, 1970), p. 68 (Hereinafter referred to as Brown, Bury My Heart.)
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In 1855 General William S. Harney led a punitive expedition
against the Teton Sioux.

His campaign began the long period of military

occupation of the Northern Plains which lasted for the rest of the
century.

His defeat of the Brules under Little Thunder was decisive

enough to pacify all of the Teton tribes for a few years.

During the

Civil War, however, the Sioux again became restless, especially after
the suppression of the Santee tribes following the so-called Minnesota
Uprising in 1862.^

Another punitive expedition was sent up the

Missouri River under the command of General Alfred Sully in 1863 and
his troops established two military posts on the river; the first Fort
Sully in South Dakota and Fort Rice in North Dakota.

The discovery of

gold in Montana and Idaho brought another wave of white prospectors up
the Missouri at about the same time and Sully*s command was assigned
the task of keeping navigation open to the gold field's.^*

In 1865

Congress authorized the establishment of new routes to the West through
the Teton buffalo range.

The Sioux protested the construction of the

new roads and military posts which were rapidly making their land a
mere thoroughfare for white prospectors and settlers.

After the words

of their leaders failed to bring results, the Teton Sioux tribes united
with the Cheyenne to take action to stop the white invasion.

Under Red

■^For a detailed account of the Minnesota Sioux Uprising of 1862
see Roy W. Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux: United States Indian
Policy on Trial (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.
Ray H. Mattison, "Report on Historical Aspects of the Oahe
Reservoir Area, Missouri River, North and South Dakota," South Dakota
Historical Collections (Pierre: 1954), XXVII, 12 (Hereinafter referred
to as Mattison, "Historic Oahe Sites."); Robert G. Athearn, Forts of the
Upper Missouri (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), pp. 121,
133-34 (Hereinafter referred to as Athearn, Forts of Upper Missouri.)
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Cloud, an Ogiala leader, these Indians waged war on the new military
posts in the Powder River country of Wyoming and Montana.

After a

successful series of battles which included the Hayfield and Wagon Box
fights and the so-called Fetterman Massacre, the Teton Sioux won their
war.

After they signed the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, the United

States agreed to abandon Fort C.F. Smith, Fort Phil Kearney, and Fort
Reno.

To celebrate their momentary victory, the Indians burned these

. .
military
posts to the ground. 12

In accordance with the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, which
established the Great Sioux Reservation, General Harney established
an Indian agency at a point on the Missouri ten miles south of the
Cheyenne River to deal with the Indians in that area. 13

.
The population

of the Minneconjou, Sans Arc, Blackfoot, and Two Kettle Sioux tribes at
that time was estimated by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to be as
high as 6000.

Most of these Indians only visited the agency once a

year to collect their annuities, but in April, 1870 they became so rowdy
that the agent in charge requested increased military protection.

As a

12

For a modern analysis of the Hayfield and Fetterman battles see
J. W. Vaughn, Indian Fights: New Facts on Seven Encounters (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), pp. 14-116 (Hereinafter referred to
as Vaughn, Indian Fights.) For a detailed description of Red Cloud's
military and political victories see James C. Olson, Red Cloud and the
Sioux Problem (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965); and Brown,
Bury My Heart, pp. 121-46.
13The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 was the last of the
actual
treaties between the Sioux Indians and the United States. In 1871
Congress terminated the further negotiation of treaties and stipulated
that all future agreements with Indian tribes would merely beratified
as public laws. This made
the process easier for the federal government
since the passage of a law required only a simple majority vote of Con
gress while a treaty required a two-thirds vote of the Senate. See
Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871, Statutes at Large, XVI, 544 (1871).
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result, the military post of Fort Bennett was established on May 17, 1870
to protect the Cheyenne River agency from the Indians. 14
The second Fort Laramie Treaty was also violated by both sides.
Many defiant warriors from the various Teton tribes refused to live on
the Sioux Reservation and joined Sitting Bull, the Hunkpapa leader, in
the Powder River country.

The whites, for their part, began construc

tion of a railroad along the Yellowstone River and after General George
Armstrong Custer's reports of gold in the Black Hills, the Sioux terri
tory suffered still another white invasion.

In the fall of 1875, the

federal government permitted many of the restless Teton tribesmen to
leave the reservation to hunt buffalo in the Powder River country.

In

January, 1876 government officials suddenly changed their minds about
the wisdom of this decision and ordered the Indians to return immediately
to the reservation or be considered hostile.

Because of the severe cold

and their dwindling food supply, the Indians decided to stay where they
were.

As a result, the War Department authorized General Phillip

Sheridan to launch military operations against all of the Sioux bands
not on the reservation including those under Sitting Bull and Crazy
Horse, a young Oglala leader.

In March, General George Crook's troops

launched a surprise attack against a sleeping Oglala and Northern Chey
enne encampment on the Powder River.

The Indians escaped with their

horses, joined Crazy Horse's followers in the mountains, and returned

^Mattison, "Historic Oahe Sites," pp. 47-51; Athearn, Forts of
Upper Missouri, p. 273; See also Harry H. Anderson, "A History of the
Cheyenne River Indian Agency and Its Military Post, Fort Bennett,
1868-1891," South Dakota Historical Collections (Pierre: 1956),
XXVII, pp. 390-551.
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in June to rout General Crook and his forces at the Battle of the Rose
bud.

After their victory these Indians moved west to join the main body

of Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho hostiles at a large encampment
in the valley of the Little Big Horn in Montana.

General Custer and his

Seventh Cavalry foolishly tried to attack this encampment on June 25,
1876 and all but a few of his command were annihilated.

A number of the

Cheyenne River Indians distinguished themselves in the fighting that day
including Hump, White Bull, and Iron Thunder of the Minneconjou tribe
and Kill Eagle of the Blackfoot tribe.

White Bull later claimed to be

the man who personally was responsible for the death of Custer and he
drew several pictographs of the battle to document his claim.

This

famous battle represented the last military victory of the Sioux.
Scattering in all directions after their triumph, each of the bands
that participated in the "Custer Massacre" were systematically hunted
down and defeated by United States military forces.

15

Following the disaster of the Little Big Horn, all of the Indians
on the Great Sioux Reservation were declared prisoners of war.

General

Alfred H. Terry brought 1500 troops to the reservation and seized all of
the Indians* horses and weapons.

Nine infantry companies, comprising

426 troops, were stationed at Fort Bennett under Lt. Colonel George P.
Buell and soon a new military post was constructed to accommodate even

15

For a modern analysis of the Rosebud battle see Vaughn, Indxan
Fights, pp. 117-44. For a brief description of the Custer fight and
the events surrounding it see Brown, Bury My Heart, pp. 276-313. For
an account of the part White Bull played in the killing of Custer see
James H. Howard, ed. and trans., The Warrior Who Killed Custer: The
Personal Narrative of Chief Joseph White Bull (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1968), pp. 50-59.

more troops. 16

As a result of this action, many of the Indians decided

to leave the reservation to join those hostiles who had not yet been
captured.
land.

But the wandering bands found it difficult to survive on the

The old way was gone.

The buffalo herds had been systematically

slaughtered by the commercial white hunters and it was extremely hard
to find food and stay hidden from the federal soldiers.

Between 1876

and 1880 over 8000 of the hostile Sioux returned to the reservation to
give themselves up to the agents in charge.

In 1877 Crazy Horse also

came out of hiding and surrendered to his old enemy, General Crook, at
Fort Robinson, Nebraska, and was murdered shortly thereafter by Little
Big Man, a fellow Oglala tribesman who had been hired by the government
to serve as an Indian policeman.

The other Oglalas under Red Cloud

settled near the Pine Ridge Agency in the southwest corner of the Great
Sioux Reservation and the Brules under Spotted Tail, who was also later
assassinated by one of his own people, settled near Rosebud agency in
the southeast corner of the reservation.

The Hunkpapas and some of the

other Teton bands under Sitting Bull, however, escaped to the plains of
Saskatchchewan where they pleaded with the Canadian government .to give
them a reservation.

But the Queen's representatives were uncooperative

and Sitting Bull and his followers were also forced to return to the
Sioux Reservation and surrender in 1881.
official end of the War of the Plains.

This action marked the
Claiming that the Sioux had

violated the terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty by going to war with the
United States, the federal government seized their sacred Black Hills

16
Mattison, "Historic Oahe Sites," p. 48.
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and the buffalo ranges in the Yellowstone and Powder River country.

The

Sioux also lost most of their land in Nebraska as well as a fifty mile
strip adjoining the Black Hills and a triangle of land between the forks
of the Cheyenne River.

17

At about the same time that the hostile Sioux bands were returning
to the reservation, a great wave of Northern European immigrants was
also pouring into the Missouri Valley.

These men wanted roads through

the Indian territory to the West as well as cheap land on which to
settle.

They, began to think of ways to break up the Great Sioux

Reservation and they urged the government to remove all of the Sioux and
ship them to the Indian Territory in what is now Oklahoma.

While Con

gress was willing to find ways to answer the demands of those who wanted
the Indian land broken up, it was convinced that removal was no longer a
workable solution and in 1877 a law was passed which directed the Presi
dent to prohibit the removal of any of the Sioux Indians to the Indian
Territory. 18

In 1881 the Teton Sioux signed a contract which granted

the Northern Pacific and Dakota Central railroads right of way through
the reservation.

By 1885 most of the Dakotas east of the Missouri had

been settled by whites and the Indian agents at Cheyenne River Agency
complained that the white settlers were stealing the Indian's timber and
that white stockmen were illegally using the Indian land for grazing.
Once all of the Teton Sioux were on the reservation, the Indian

^Brown, Bury My Heart, pp. 416-20.
^®Act of March 3, 1877, Statutes at Large, XIX, 287 (1877).
19
Mattison, "Historic Oahe Sites," p. 52.
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Bureau began in earnest its task of bringing "civilization" to the
Indians.

This, of course, meant the abandonment of the native culture

of the Sioux and the adoption of the white man's way.

Various Christian

missionary organizations also became very active in this work.

During

the 1870s the Cheyenne River Agency was officially under the admini
strative control of the Episcopal Church.

Both boarding and day schools

were established in the Cheyenne River area by both the Episcopal Church
and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, which was
sponsored by the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches.

One of the

earliest missionaries to this area, Thomas Riggs, established the Oahe
Chapel and Indian Boarding School just north of Fort Pierre in 1873.
The Oahe Dam project took its name from this small, Indian mission.

Oahe

is a Dakota word meaning "a place to stand on."2®
The first Episcopal Church established on the Cheyenne River
Reservation was built sixteen miles north of the Cheyenne River Agency
at the Camp of Four Bears and his Two Kettle band.

Later the St. Johns

Church and Rectory was established at Cheyenne River Agency.2*- While
the Christian missionaries were beginning to teach the virtues of
Western Civilization, government officials were trying to destroy the

20

Ibid., pp. 34, 51. For an account of the founding of the Oahe
Mission by Thomas Riggs see Stephen R. Riggs, Mary and I: Forty Years
with the Sioux (Minneapolis: Ross and Haines, 1969), pp. 327-31. A
pamphlet distributed by the Corps of Engineers at the Oahe Dam site
claims that Oahe means a foundation, "something about which the nomadic,
tent-dwelling Dacotahs knew little." See U.S., Department of the Army,
Corps of Engineers, Missouri River Division, Omaha District, "Welcome to
Oahe Dam" (Omaha: 1970), p. 3 (Hereinafter referred to as Corps of
Engineers, "Welcome to Oahe Dam.").
21
Mattison, "Historic Oahe Sites," p. 13.
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most important aspects of the Teton culture.

In 1882 Indian Agent

Leonard Love permitted the Cheyenne River Indians to hunt a few buffalo
that had wandered onto the reservation.

This was to be the last buffalo

hunt for these tribesmen and it represented the end of their glorious
hunting days and symbolized as well the end of much of their aboriginal
culture.

Later the Indians often amused themselves by chasing down the

govemment-issue cattle as if they were the great buffalo bulls of old,
but this activity was also soon outlawed.

On April 10, 1883 the

Secretary of the Interior, Henry M. Teller, established orders which
prohibited all of the traditional Sioux dances, feasts, and religious
customs.^

While this directive was specifically aimed at prohibiting

the Sun Dance because of its acts of self-torture, it also outlawed the
traditional Sioux marriage rites, the practices of the medicine men and
shamans, and forbade the willful destruction of property associated
with the Sioux way of showing grief.

In order to break down the Teton

tribal system the Indian agents stripped the recognized leaders of their
power and promoted those men who would cooperate with them to positions
of authority not sanctioned by the tribe.

Courts of Indian Offenses

were established and members of the former Aticita and Soldier Societies
were hired as Indian policemen to enforce the agent's will.

If all else

failed, the agents could control the tribes by withdrawing their govern-

22

Robert M. Utley, The Last Days of the Sioux Nation (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 22-23.
(Hereinafter referred to as
Utley, Last Days of Sioux.)
23U.S., Department of Interior, Fifty-fourth Annual Report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883), p..xv.
\
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ment rations since rations were the only food the Sioux had throughout
the 1880s.

Due to the widespread corruption in the Indian Service both

the quality and the quantity of government supplies declined miserably
during this period as did the health of the Indians.24
Having broken the spirit of the Teton Sioux, the United States
government next aimed at further breaking up their land.

In 1887 Senator

Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts devised a plan whereby the Indian
reservations could be broken up by allotting the lands to individual
Indians in the same way that the public lands had been opened under the
Homestead Act.

The Dawes Severalty Act also aimed at breaking up the

tribes by making citizens out of their individual members.

This act

granted a 160 acre allotment to heads of Indian families, eighty acres
to single adults and orphans, and forty acres to dependent children.
Those Indians who accepted these allotments were to receive full property
rights as well as American citizenship if they maintained this land for
twenty-five years during which time the land would be under a nontaxable
and inalienable trust status.

All of the reservation land not assigned

to individual Indians was also to be held in trust for the tribe but
could be opened to white settlement providing the federal government paid
the tribe an adequate sum for it.

The Indian Service would also retain

some of the land on the reservations for its own facilities. 25

24
25

Although

Utley, Last Days of Sioux, pp. 31-39.

Dawes Severalty Act, Statutes at Large, XXIV, 338 (1887). Since
Sioux women and children traditionally had equal property rights, the
"head of family" concept was alien to these Indians and so the law was
amended in 1891 to permit equal shares for all. However, this new law
also permitted white ranchers to lease allotments, from the Indians. See
Act of February 29, 1891, Statutes at Large, XXVI, 794 (1891).
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Dawes may have also had a genuine humanitarian interest in the cultural
assimilation of the Indians as well as the establishment of a farm
economy on the reservations, the legislation which he sponsored in 1887
f

was most clearly aimed at bringing the Indian land within the public
domain.

In 1888 the federal government also decided to break up the Great
Sioux Reservation by dividing it into several smaller reservations which
recognized the Indian agencies that had already been established.

In

order to reduce the portions of Indian land without abrogating the treaty
rights of the Sioux, government officials threatened to take the land if
the Indians did not offer it for sale.

This kind of intimidation became

a favorite tactic of government negotiators and, as this study will
demonstrate, it was one that was still used over sixty years later by
those government representatives who needed to acquire Indian land for
the Pick-Sloan projects on the Missouri River.

In the spring of 1889

Congress authorized a special commission to negotiate with the Sioux
concerning the further relinquishment of their land.

The negotiations

conducted by this committee led to the signing of a treaty which ceded
more than 9,400,000 acres of Indian land to the United S t a t e s . A
separate reservation was established for the Cheyenne River Indians and
they agreed to relinquish all of their land south of the Cheyenne River.
Since Cheyenne River Agency would no longer be within the boundaries of

^ R o y M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain 17761936 (2d ed., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962), pp. 282-84.
^ A c t of March 2, 1889, Statutes at Large, XXV, 888 (1889) .
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the reservation, it was moved in 1891 to a point fifty-five miles up the
Missouri River opposite the small white settlement of Forrest City.28
South Dakota had been admitted to the Union in 1889 and the area com
prising the Cheyenne River Reservation was designated as Dewey, Ziebach,
and Armstrong counties.28
Finding themselves robbed of their land, confined to the reser
vation, and stripped of nearly all the traditional aspects of their
culture including their appeal to the supernatural through the Sun
Dance, the Sioux in 1890 became enchanted with a new mystic cult called
Ghost Dance.

Heavily influenced by Christianity, this new religion had

been founded in the Pyramid Lake region of Nevada by a Pauite named
Wovoka.

Wovoka believed himself to be the "Indian Messiah."

He

prophesied that all of the white oppressors would disappear to the
Spirit World and all of the ghosts of the Indian ancestors as well as
the great herds of buffalo and wild horses would return to the Earth
World if the Indians would merely sing and dance as he prescribed.

He

also proclaimed that if the Indians wore garments painted with magic
ghost symbols they would never be harmed since even the white man's
bullets could not penetrate the sacred Ghost Shirt.28

28Mattison, "Historic Oahe Sites," p. 53.
28U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fact
Sheet on Cheyenne River Indian Reservation, South Dakota (Aberdeen:
1970), p. 2 (Hereinafter referred to as BIA, Cheyenne River Fact Sheet.);
See also Herbert S. Schell, History of South Dakota (Lincoln: Univer
sity of Nebraska Press, 1968), p. 222 (Hereinafter referred to as Schell,
History of South Dakota.)
28Brown, Bury My Heart, pp. 432-34.
pp. 60-83.
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Kicking Bear, A Minneconjou from the Cheyenne River Reservation,
had visited Wovoka and had viewed his miracles and learned the Dance
of the Ghosts.

When he returned to Cheyenne River he taught the dance

to his tribesmen and he also went to Standing Rock Reservation, where
Sitting Bull now lived, to further relate his new experiences.

Soon

hundreds of the Cheyenne River Indians under the leadership of Big Foot
and Hump, two veterans of the Plains Wars, gathered at the western end
of the reservation to dance.

The Ghost Dance spread rapidly to Standing

Rock and before long nearly all other activities ceased on the Sioux
reservations. ■L
Although the ends of the Ghost Dance were to come about through a
kind of mystic, non-violent revolution rather than overt acts of human
violence, the federal government became very disturbed by this new
activity among the Indians.

Nearly 3,000 troops were ordered to the

Sioux country and the Indian agents were requested to identify and arrest
all of those who were leaders in the "Messiah Craze."

Accordingly, in

December, 1890, Captain E. P. Ewers arrested Hump and his followers and
brought them to Fort Bennett and Captain J. H. Hunt induced sixty-seven
Minneconjou dancers to surrender at the post.

When the Indian agents

tried to stop Big Foot and his band of 600 from dancing, however, he led
his followers off the reservation to a place on Deep Creek that the Sioux
considered holy.

Meanwhile, on Standing Rock Reservation, Agent

^Brown, Ibid., p. 431; Utley, Ibid., pp. 84-95.
32

Mattison, "Historic Oahe Sites," pp. 48-50.

James McLaughlin ran Kicking Bear off the reservation and ordered the
arrest of Sitting Bull.

Though he had been extremely skeptical of the

Ghost Dance and had not been very active in it, Sitting Bull was
murdered by the Indian policemen who came to arrest him.

The death of

this venerable Hunkpapa leader came as a great blow to all of the Teton
Sioux and had it not been for their faith in the promises of their new
religion they might have gone again to war.

Instead, the Indians on

Standing Rock and Cheyenne River were determined to seek refuge in one
of **the Ghost Dance camps that was still active on Pine Ridge Reser
vation.

Despite the bitter December cold and the fact that he had been

hemorrhaging from a severe case of pneumonia, Big Foot agreed to lead
this group from a camp on Cherry Creek.

As these Indians began their

trek to Pine Ridge, Cavalry troops from Fort Bennett and other military
posts were ordered to track them down, arrest them, and transport them
to a military prison in Omaha.

Four troops of Cavalry under Major

Samuel Whitside finally intercepted Big Foot and his people near
Porcupine Creek on Pine Ridge Reservation and moved them to a military
encampment near Wounded Knee Creek.

The next day, December 29, 1891,

the Indians were rounded up and forced to surrender the few weapons
that they had in their possession.

While soldiers tried to confiscate

a rifle which belonged to a young Minneconjou named Black Coyote, who
was deaf and could not understand their instructions, his weapon
accidentally discharged.

The report of the gun startled the soldiers

and suddenly the troopers of the Seventh Cavalry, Custer's old outfit,
now under Colonel James W. Forsyth, opened fire on the Sioux prisoners.
When the Indians started to run the Hotchkiss machine guns mowed them
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down.
The victims of the "Battle of Wounded Knee" were buried in a mass
grave near where they had fallen.

In 1901 the tribal members of the

Cheyenne River Reservation erected a monument at this gravesite in
honor of Big Foot and the other men, women, and children who had died
with him.

Wounded Knee was the last armed conflict between the Teton

Sioux and the United States government.

The massacre also ended the

Ghost Dance for all of the Plains Indians.

But for the lost generation

of Sioux who had desperately turned to that religious movement as
their final hope, life went on despairingly.^
In order to implement the Dawes plan to create a farm for every
Indian, the Indian Service tried to teach the Sioux to become selfsufficient.

Seeds and implements were provided for the Indians and

experienced farmers were brought in to teach them how to farm.
for a number of reasons, this program failed miserably.

But,

Traditionally

the Teton Sioux had never been agriculturists and they considered the
labor of tilling the soil to be both effeminate and demeaning.

The

years of living off the government dole had also destroyed their
incentive.

More important, however, the land and climate of the buffalo

country was simply not well suited for planting.

The Indians on

Cheyenne River were continually discouraged by the fact that their crops
seemed always to be either washed away, burned up, or eaten by locusts.

^Brown, Bury My Heart, pp. 435-45. For a more moderate and de
tailed account of the Wounded Knee Massacre see Utley, Last Days of
Sioux, pp. 200-230.
^^Utley, Ibid., p. 5.
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In 1887 Charles E. McChesney, the Indian agent at Cheyenne River, told
the Indian Bureau that "the drawbacks to successful agriculture are so
great as to not be overcome with any reasonable amount of labor."

35

The Indian Bureau officials in Washington, however., continued their
agricultural policies as if all of the Indians were growing rich on
their little farms.

36

The Sioux proved to be much more successful at raising stock
than they were at harvesting corn.

In 1877 the Indian Bureau gave

them over 3,000 head of cattle and the tribes were successful at in
creasing the size of their herds until they were seriously depleted by
severe blizzards during the winter of 1886-1887.

Even then, the Indian

ranchers actually suffered fewer losses than did neighboring white
ranchers.

37

In the years following Wounded Knee there were many other changes
in the Cheyenne River area.

After the Cheyenne River Agency was re

located up river, there was no longer any need for the military post
at Fort Bennett and so it was abandoned in November, 1891.

38

While

the new Cheyenne Agency was fast becoming a regular Indian town, the
old Indian settlements, such as the camps of Four Bear and Martin
Charger, were also becoming permanent Indian communities.

39

Between the

35Ibid., p. 23.
36
Ibid., pp. 23-25.
37

Ibid., p. 25

38
.
Mattison, "Historic Oahe Sites," p. 50.
39
The Camp of Four Bear, one of the early Two Kettle chiefs, was

\
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Cheyenne and Moreau Rivers the Swift Bird and Blackfoot camps also con
tinued to grow and the new Indian communities of Cherry Creek, Red
Scaffold, Bridger, and Thunder Butte sprang up on the western end of
the reservation.^

While the white encroachment on the reservation

subsided during the 1890s, it began again after the turn of the century.
The Milwaukee Railroad obtained a six mile right of way through an
eighty-seven mile stretch of the northern part of the reservation in
1900 and in 1902 the Indian Bureau leased out nearly 1,500,000 acres of
the Indian land to a nationally known cattle syndicate.

41

In 1908 the

government opened up a large portion of the unallotted land on the
reservation to white homesteaders for a price of from two to six dollars
an acre.

42

There was such a stampede for this land that the Indian

established in 1880. Charger's camp was established in 1882 near the
site which became the new Cheyenne Agency in 1890. It was named after
Martin Charger, a Sans Arc leader who was believed to be the great-grand
son of Captain Merriweather Lewis. Charger was a leader in the local
Indian humanitarian society known as the Fool Soldier Band. This group
of Indians was organized during the Sioux Uprising of 1862 to rescue
those whites who were held captive by the Santee Sioux. By exchanging
their own horses and furs, the Fool Soldiers were able to obtain the
release of the white prisoners, including many women and children, and
return them to their homes. For more information on the Fool Soldier
Band see Doane Robinson, "A History of the Dakota or Sioux Indians,"
South Dakota Historical Collections (Aberdeen: 1904), II, 307-313.
40

Frank Ducheneaux, The Peace Treaty of Fort Laramie, April 29,
1868 (Eagle Butte, South Dakota: By the Author, 1968), p. 38.
41
Schell, History of South Dakota, p. 251.
42

The Indians so strenuously objected to the allotment policy that it
had to be discontinued on Cheyenne River in ,1905. The next year the fede
ral government removed the trust restrictions from all allotments and those
Indians judged competent were given the right to sell their land. See
Angie Debo, A History of the Indians of the United States (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), pp. 253, 265 (Hereinafter referred to
as Debo, History of Indians.); Act of March 1, 1906, Statutes at Large,
XXXV, 1015 (1906); Act of May 29, 1908, Statutes at Large, XXXV, 460 (1908).

Bureau had to sell it by lottery.

The white homesteaders who poured

into the area built bridges over the Missouri and Cheyenne Rivers and
surrounded the Indian lands with their farms and ranches.

In 1910 the

government also sold a portion of the unallotted land to a development
company for the construction of townsites and before long the white
settlements such as Parade, Dupree, and Eagle Butte sprang up on the
. 4 3
reservation.

While the Indian Bureau was being kept busy answering the demands
of those white interests who wanted cheap Indian land, it alsocontinued
its task of stripping away the last vestiges of the Teton Sioux culture.
Emphasizing vocational training for Indian youth, the government estab
lished boarding schools which kept the Sioux children away from their
parents during most of their formative years.

While the traditional

dances and ceremonies were no longer completely prohibited, the Indian
agent at Cheyenne River reported in 1918 that he had succeeded
in stopping all dances save the sidestep which is in
the nature of a compromise or substitute for the old
dances: that no paint or feathers are allowed to be
worn and that persons under the age of forty years,
returned students, and employees of the Government
are not permitted to participate therein.^
Although most of the Indian Bureau programs ultimately failed,

43
Act of June 23, 1910, Statutes at Large, XXXVI, 602 (1910).
44

Letter, E. B. Merrett, Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs
to James McGregor, Superintendent, Cheyenne River School, November 15,
1918, University of South Dakota, Collections, American Indian Research
Project.
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including the infamous Dawes plan, many of the Cheyenne River Indians
did become moderately successful as ranchers and they increased the
size of their herds every year.

But during the first World War they

could not resist selling most of their stock while beef prices were
high.

As a result, these ranchers were again plunged into poverty

during the inflationary period that followed the war.

During the

agricultural depression of the 1920s and the drought and grasshopper
infested period that followed in the early 1930s, many of the Cheyenne
River Sioux were forced to either sell or lease their allotted lands
in order to survive.4^
In the early 1920s the government tried to dispose of the
remainder of the unallotted land on the reservations by paying the
Indians the cash value of their land and disclaiming any further govern
ment responsibility.

The so-called Omnibus Bill, sponsored by Secretary

of the Interior Albert B. Fall who was later found to be an accomplice
in the Teapot Dome scandal, passed the House but was rejected by the
Senate as a result of the opposition organized by Senator Robert M. La
Follette of Wisconsin.4^

In 1924, largely in recognition of the large

number of Indians who had enlisted in the armed forces and distinguished
themselves during the First World War, Congress extended citizenship to
all of the Indians who had not already received it under the Dawes Act.4^

4^Utley, Last Days of Sioux, p. 25.
46Debo, History of Indians, p. 286.
^ A c t of June 2, 1924, Statutes at Large, XLIII, 253 (1924) .
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Thus, fifty-six years after the Black American, the American Indian was
officially recognized as a citizen on the United States.
In 1926 the Institute for Government Institution (the Brookings
Institution), under the direction of Lewis Merriam, conducted a seven
month study of the conditions on Indian reservations for the Secretary of
Interior.

Published in 1928, the 827 page Merriam Report revealed that

the indifferent, biased, and often corrupt administration of the Indian
Bureau was largely to blame for the poverty, poor housing, unhealthy
conditions, and general discouragement of the Indian people.

This invest

igation also made several important recommendations for changes which
would de-emphasize the ’government preoccupation with matters of property
and lead to a more humanitarian approach to Indian Affairs.

This study

aroused the concern of many government officials and led to a full-scale
Senate investigation of Indian matters.

The Merriam Report also generated

a reform movement outside of government which President Herbert Hoover
<

tried to pacify and President Franklin D. Roosevelt tried to answer. 48
Roosevelt's New Deal brought John Collier to the position of Com
missioner of Indian Affairs.

Though not an Indian, Collier had long been

active in the Indian reform movement and was the first Twentieth Century
commissioner to approach his job from the viewpoint of the' ethnologist and
social scientist rather than that of the political hack.

He implemented

many of the reforms that had been suggested by the Merriam Report and, under

48Lewis Merriam, ed. , The Problem of Indian Administration
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1928), pp. 1-827; Debo, History of
Indians, p. 288.
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his leadership, Congress in 1934 passed both the Wheeler-Howard and
the Johnson-0'Malley Acts.

49

The Wheeler-Howard Act, also known as the Indian Reorganization
Act, restored the right of self-government to the Indians by allowing
them to draw up their.own tribal constitutions, elect their own tribal
officials, and regulate most of their own business and other activities.
This law also restored the ownership of all remaining surplus lands on
the reservations to the tribes and prohibited the further allotment of
Indian land and the further alienation of allotted and inherited land.
The act provided new credit facilities for Indians including a
$10,000,000 annual revolving loan fund, a $2,000,000 annual land
acquisition fund, and other special loan programs for business, agri
culture, and education.

Wheeler-Howard also established a more tolerant

government program for the Indians which restored their religious free
dom, gave full recognition to native practices and ceremonies, and
diminished somewhat the emphasis on cultural assimilation.

Boarding

school children were no longer required to attend Christian services
and the use of peyote in religious ceremonies was also given legal
protection.

50

The Johnson-0'Malley Act of 1934 authorized the Indian Bureau to
enter into contracts with state and local agencies for various health,
49
50

Debo, Ibid.

Indian Reorganization Act, Statutes at Large, XLVII, 948 (1934);
Gordon Macgregor, "Changing Society: The Teton Dakotas," in The Modern
Sioux: Social Systems and Reservation Culture, ed. by Ethel Nurge
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), p. 99 (Hereinafter
referred to as Macgregor, "Changing Teton Society."); Schell, History of
South Dakota, p. 338; Debo, Ibid., pp. 290-291.
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education# and welfare services for Indians.

51

This law was a part of

Commissioner Collier*s program to break up the Indian Bureau's monopoly
on Indian services and extend them to agencies that might do a better
job of administering them.

Collier also used his office to promote

Native American pride by hiring ethnologists and historians to produce
texts on Indian history and culture for use in schools.

He later wrote

a book himself entitled Indians in America.52
On the Cheyenne River Reservation, the new Indian program restored
confidence in Indian leadership and provided a greater implementation of
policies which were better suited to the actual needs and wishes of the
Indians.

The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council adopted a Constitution

and By-Laws in 1935, the purpose and precepts of which were established
in its preamble:
We the Sioux Indians of the Cheyenne River Reservation in the
State of South Dakota in order to establish our Tribal organi
zation, to conserve our Tribal property, to develop our
common resources, to establish justice, and to promote the
welfare of ourselves and our descendents, do hereby ordain
and establish this Constitution and By-Laws for our Tribal
Council as a guide to its deliberations. 3
This Constitution established representative government on
Cheyenne River by dividing the reservation into thirteen political
districts.

One representative from each of these districts was to be

elected to the Tribal Council while the Tribal Chairman, Secretary,

^ A c t of April 16, 1934, Statutes at Large, XLVIII, 596 (1934).
52
Debo, History of Indians, p. 291; John Collier, Indians of
America (New York: New American Library, 1947).
53

Constitution and By-Laws of Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Council Files, Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation,
Eagle Butte, South Dakota (Hereinafter referred to as CRSTC Files.).
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and Treasurer were to be elected at large.

All of these tribal

officials were to be elected for four year terms.

The Constitution also

made provisions for voting requirements, primaries, an election board,
referendum, recall, and initiative, tribal courts, tribal police, and a
tribal code of law and order.

Luke Gilbert was elected as the first

Chairman of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and he served until 1942.
Later the two largest districts were permitted to have two representa
tives each and the membership of the Tribal Council was therefore
expanded to fifteen.54
While the rest of the nation suffered its most serious economic
crisis during the 1930s, the various New Deal programs brought a new
vitality to Cheyenne River.

Vine Deloria Jr., a Standing Rock Sioux

and the author of Custer Died for Your Sins;

An Indian Manifesto, has

said that "to the Indian reservations the Depression was a boon."5^
At first direct relief programs were set up on the reservations by
federal and state agencies as well as the Red Cross, but this form of
aid was soon replaced by the special work-relief programs conducted by
the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).

These programs made regular

wages available for the majority of the able bodied Indian males for
the first time in their lives.

The CCC activities also provided

vocational training as well as practical experience in forest and range

54Ibid. See also William 0. Farber, "Representative Government;
Application to the Sioux," in The Modern Sioux; Social Systems and
Reservation Culture, ed. by Ethel Nurge (Lincoln; University of
Nebraska Press, 1970), pp. 123-39.
55Vine Deloria Jr., "This Country was Alot Better Off when the
Indians were Running It," New York Times Magazine, March 8, 1970, p. 32.
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conservation programs.

On Cheyenne River a rehabilitation program was

established to revive the livestock Industry and a land consolidation
program was implemented in order to provide for larger grazing units.
In 1942 the Cheyenne River Tribal Council became the first local Sioux
government to establish a code of land management designed to purchase
new Indian lands and make greater utilization of the old.

The CCC and

tribally sponsored programs brought new material wealth and new status
to the Indians in the eyes of their families and as a result the Sioux
"climbed from absolute deprivation to mere poverty, and this was the
best the reservation ever had.
World War II also brought new experiences to the Cheyenne River
Sioux.

While the reservation prosperity ended as work-relief programs

were cut back and social services became non-existent, many of the
Indians left the reservation for the first time to serve in the armed
forces or to work in the defense plants or as migrant farm workers.
These experiences had a varied effect on these people.

For some of

the Indians it was the most traumatic experience of their lives and
they were anxious to return to the familiarity of the reservation
once it was all over.

Others learned to better cope with the outside

world and found it hard to return to the reservation after seeing the
relative affluence in which other Americans lived.

Many of the

Indian veterans went back to the cities and later emerged as leaders
in the urban Indian movement.

But most of the Sioux came home to the

^ I b i d . ; Schell, History of South Dakota, p. 339.
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reservation after they were discharged or again locked out of offreservation employment.

From this wartime experience there emerged

both the economic and political Indian leaders of the post war period
and the generation of hapless Indian migrants who found themselves
caught between the security of the reservation and the attractions of
the city and who could not psychologically adjust to either one.
C-.i , On the eve of the construction of the Oahe Dam, the Cheyenne
River Sioux still had a relatively low standard of living.

But by this

time the reform era of Indian administration was beginning to slow down.
Collier and the other progressive Indian administrators left the govern
ment and Congress lost its reform spirit at about the same time that new
public works projects and agricultural expansion caused attention to be
focused once again on the taking of Indian lands.

Dillon S. Meyer, who

had been in charge of the Japanese internment camps during World War II,
was made Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1950 and in government circles
CQ

talk turned to the topic of the "Indian termination policy."^
Because of the increased costs of Indian administration and the
continuation of poverty, illiteracy, low educational achievement, and
poor health on the reservations, a program to terminate the services
of the Indian Bureau and dispose of the reservations by incorporating
them into counties or placing them under private management drew strong
support from a number of Congressmen, Indian Bureau officials, private

^Macgregor,

"changing Teton Society," p. 101.

CQ

Debo, History of Indians, pp. 302-303.

citizens, and a few of the Indians themselves.

This termination policy

was largely an expression of the general desire to promote the rapid
assimilation of the Indians and therefore eliminate them from the
American conscience.

It called for the repeal of the Indian Reorga

nization Act, the removal of all special restrictions on Indian land
including its trust and nontaxable status, and the breakup of all tribal
organizations and assets.

The Indians who supported this movement were

mostly those who had only a small fraction of Indian blood and lived off
the reservation.

These Indians had something to gain and nothing to

lose as a result of termination since most of them would still receive
cash benefits from the liquidation of the reservations.

In a long debate

in Washington those Indians who did have much to lose tried to convince
the federal government that the termination policy would only serve to
dump Indian land on the open market and leave the Indian permanently at
the bottom of American society with even fewer opportunities for
advancement.

The case against termination was supported by the three

largest Indian interest groups; the National Congress of American
Indians (NCAI), the Indian Rights Association, and the Association of
American Indian Affairs (AAIA).

This cause was also championed by a

number of other groups including the Quakers and by a number of young
reformers including a lawyer named Ralph Nader who wrote about the
damaging effects of termination m
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the Harvard Law Review.

Congress did in fact terminate the federal services of some

eg

Ibid., pp. 304-11; Stan Steiner, The New Indians (New York:
Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 176, 259.
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tribes including the Menominee of Wisconsin and the Klamath of Oregon
and in 1952 it gave states the right to extend civil and criminal law
over the reservations.

60

Excercising this option, South Dakota assumed

legal jurisdiction over the Sioux reservations and was supported in this
action by the powerful white cattlemen who leased Indian land.

Angrily

protesting this move, the Sioux circulated a petition for a state-wide
referendum and they were eventually able to muster enough support to
defeat the law.

61

After a number of "anti-termination" Democrats were

sent to Congress following the Congressional election of 1954, it was
decided that the administration and services of the Indian Bureau should
be continued but should also be realigned in order to permit the greatest
participation of the Indians themselves in their own affairs.
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Debo, Ibid., p. 311. For a good summary of federal termination
activity see U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, The
States and Their Indian Citizens, by Theodore W. Taylor (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 48-^62. See also U.S., Congress,
House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Report with respect to
the House Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs to Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. H.R.
Rep. 2503 pursuant to H. Res. 698, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952, pp. 14-17.
(Hereinafter referred to as H.R. Rep. 2503, BIA Investigation.)

CHAPTER III
THE IMPENDING FLOOD
In his book The Other America

Michael Harrington pointed out

that poverty in the United States is largely invisible because America's
poorest people usually live "off the beaten track" and are therefore
removed "from the living, emotional experience of millions and millions
of middle-class A m e r i c a n s . T h e poor of the Black ghetto are in
creasingly isolated from even the casual observation of the suburban
middle-class while the plight of the rural poor in such areas as
Appalachia is often ignored in favor of their scenic surroundings.

The

inaccessibility of the reservation and the isolation of the Native
American poor from mainstream America, however, has created an extreme
case of cultural invisibility.

Representing the poorest of the poor,

the Indians are apparently the most "invisible" of all Americans.

Not

only is their poverty outside the experience of most of their fellow
citizens, but it even escaped the attention of Mr. Harrington in the
first edition of his book.^

Despite the fact that the poverty, hunger,

^"Michael Harrington, The Other America; Poverty in the United
States (New York; The Macmillan Co., 1962), p. 4.
2In the introduction to the second edition of The Other America,
Harrington apologizes for omitting Indians from his original analysis
although he makes no further comment about their economic plight other
than to state they are "probably the poorest of all."
(2d ed., Balti
more; Penquin Books Inc., 1971) p. x. Poverty in America is another
important source book written in the 1960's which also served as a
guideline for the War on Poverty. Edited by Louis Fermin, Joyce L.
Kornbluh, and Alan Haber, with an introduction by Michael Harrington,
this study identified the Indians as the "hardest hit of the country's
poverty stricken" but then only devoted two more sentences to them and

and disease of the Indian has been more thoroughly documented than that
of any other low-income group in this country, most Americans are not
willing to believe that poverty of such proportion could exist in their
midst and so the statistics and reports of the Indian Bureau often fall
outside both the credibility and sensitivity of our affluent society.
Because of this attitude the Indians were almost abandoned as a result
of a strong movement in the 1950s to terminate their federal services.
Although they were very much a part of the old frontier, the Indians
were largely excluded from the New Frontier of President John F. Kennedy
and the eradication of their poverty was never an important front in the
War on Poverty, the program of President Lyndon B. Johnson which was
greatly influenced by the Harrington book.
Hidden among the prairie wastelands and windswept buttes of central
South Dakota, the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation is tucked away in an
isolated section of one of America's most isolated states.

If the Black

Hills are South Dakota's heaven, then this barren and forgotten land
must certainly be its hell.

Like the urban ghetto, Cheyenne River is

usually only visited by those from the outside world who cannot other
wise avoid it.

Unlike Appalachia, the dreary scenery of this country

only serves to more clearly emphasize the destitution of its inhabitants.
One visitor has described it as "The Black Hole of Calcutta of the

the nature of their poverty.
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan,
1965), p. 132. Vine Deloria Jr. suggests that the Indians are also
culturally invisible*because of the great amount of misinformation
about them that exists in the minds of most white Americans. See
Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto
(New York: Avon Books, 1969), p. 20

Prairie."3* Only the names of the towns are picturesque— Iron Lightning,
Red Scaffold, Green Grass, Whitehorse, Firesteel, Glad Valley, Timber
Lake, Eaggle Butte.

At a time when new Native American power movements

and a new historical and sociological focus appear to be making the
Indian more visible to his fellow Americans, the Cheyenne River Sioux
cure becoming even more isolated.

In common with most rural areas of the

nation, the population of the counties which surround the reservation
has been declining steadily since 1930 and many of the towns are dying.
The closest town with a population of more than 5000 is Pierre, the minicapitol of South Dakota, which lies ninety-three miles southeast of the
reservation and has a population of 9699.

The only paved access to

Cheyenne River is provided by U.S. Highway 212 which bisects the reser
vation.

This two-lane blacktop road was once the favorite route of those

travelling from Minneapolis-St. Paul to the Black Hills, Yellowstone
Park, and points west.

But, since the construction of the interstate

highway system through North and South Dakota, it is now only used by
local traffic and those few tourists whose curiosity is such that they
cannot accept the popular image of the "drugstore Indians" of the Black
Hills and other resort areas and must find out for themselves what the
real Sioux of today are like.^

These visitors to Cheyenne River find a

3
Steiner, The New Indians, p. 172.
4
Although Interstate 94 and 90 run the entire width of North and
South Dakota respectively, these highways seem to carefully avoid passing
through or even near the eleven Indian reservations in these two states.
Indian names and themes, however, are used widely by white merchants who
own places of business along these routes. They litter the highways with
their billboard advertisements for Indian arts and crafts, Indian dancing,
and even mock battles between Indian warriors and white Cavalrymen. But
while they exploit the Indian image, they do not utilize local Indian
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people who are at the same time blessed with a glorious history and
cursed with an almost inhuman and inescapable poverty.

But there has

been progress.
In the years just prior to the construction of the Oahe Dam,
it seemed as though the Cheyenne River Sioux would never rise again.
Despite the comparative prosperity of the war years and the new
attitudes and programs of the Indian Bureau, the majority of the tribal
members had still not been able to escape the depths of poverty.

In

1950 most of them still lived in one or two room log houses with no
electricity or indoor plumbing.

Nearly all of the Indian households

used wood stoves for both heating and cooking and potentially con
taminated water which had to be hauled in containers.

A majority of

the homes also had unsatisfactory disposal facilities including in
operable septic tanks, inadequate privies, or a complete lack of toliet
and garbage facilities.

5

As might be expected as a result of these living conditions, the
health of the Indians was also very poor.% An especially high rate of
tuberculosis existed on the reservation and this was the principal
cause of death among the Indians.

A very high frequency of those

gastro-intestinal diseases and vitamin deficiencies associated with

labor and most of the Indian goods they sell are made in Japan and sold
by white college students hired during the tourist season. The only
Indians that most tourists are exposed to are those who are hired to
wear their feathered headdress and native costumes and dance or tell
amusing stories.
§
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
A Review of Indian Health Programs, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House
of Representatives, 85th Cong., 1st sess,, 1963, p. 42

improper diet, particularly those caused by a lack of adequate meats and
vegetables was also present.

Because many of the Indians had to endure

the harsh Dakota winters with inadequate clothing and shelter there was
a large number of deaths each year caused by pneumonia.

In addition,

there was the usual Indian health problems of acute alcoholism and
extreme melancholia which were clinically related to many other kinds
of physical and mental illness and were socially related to many family
and financial problems, acts of violence, and the relatively high rate
of suicide on the reservation.

A high level of venereal disease and

illegitimacy also existed.0
In 1950 the health facilities of the reservation were extremely
limited.

Only two doctors and three nurses served a reservation popu

lation of approximately 4300 from the forty-bed St. Stephens Hospital at
Cheyenne Agency.

This facility was located as far as 150 miles from some

sections of the reservation.

The Indian Health Service (IHS) provided

only limited ambulance service and refused to make night calls.

A trip

to the hospital for those who did not have their own means of trans
portation often required a taxi fare of $25 or more.

While some of the

tribal members lived closer to medical facilities which were located off
the reservation, many of the local doctors and health clinics either■
refused to treat them or demanded cash in advance.

Although most of the

medical services on the reservation were free to all enrolled members
of the tribe, a large number of the Indians were reluctant to make use

^H.R. Rep. No. 2503, BIA Investigation, pp. 350, 1317.
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of them.^
Like the living and health conditions on Cheyenne River, the
educational situation was largely unsatisfactory in the early 1950s.
Despite the fact that schools had been established on the reservation
for well over half a century, the average tribal member had only a
sixth grade education and the overall education level was increasing
only three grades per generation.

In 1950 out of a total adult popu

lation of 2628 there were only 240 high school graduates ten of which ■
had also graduated from college.

At the same time there were still

about 100 Indians who were completely illiterate and about half of this
number could not speak English.

While five per cent of the school-age

children did not attend school, those boys who did still received most
of their training in industrial arts and vocational agriculture while
most of the girls were trained in home economics or elementary typing
7
The hospital was feared by many Indians as "a place of death."
Some of them felt that the IHS doctors were inferior because they
received such low pay and others resented them simply because they
were white. As a result, many of the tribal members preferred to have
their ailments diagnosed and treated by the members of their own family
or those elders of the tribe who were known to be “medicine men." in
1951, only about half of the maternity cases on the reservation re
ceived professional care and the IHS doctors reported that a majority
of the Indians only came to the hospital as a last resort, i.e., to have
their lives saved after folk medicine had failed to heal them. These
doctors also reported that those who did come to the hospital often came
too.late for adequate treatment, were usually uncooperative during
examination, and often refused to follow their medical advice. Of
course, this situation was complicated by the fact that the Indian
cures often worked better than those of the white doctors. See
John Cassel, Etra Page, and Gaynelle Hogan, Economic and Social
Resources Available for Indian Health Purposes: A Study of Selected
Reservations in the Aberdeen Area, Institute for Research in Social
Science, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill:; University of
North Carolina Press, 1956), pp. 38-41.
(Hereinafter referred to as
Cassel, et. al., Indian Health Resources.)

72

and bookkeeping.

The only adult education program on the reservation

was restricted to veterans.8
Despite the emphasis on vocational education at the Indian Bureau
schools, the training the Indians received seldom brought them regular
employment and the economy was as discouraging as the other facts of
life on Cheyenne River.

Only about one-fourth of the adult members of

the tribe were regularly employed in 1950 and the average family income
was only $1,620. 9

Most

of those who had jobs were employed in ranch,

farm, or construction work or were hired
various non-supervisory jobs.

bythe Indian Bureau for

Outside of ranching, only four Indians

owned their own business and they included a storekeeper, a hamburger
shop owner, and two service station proprietors.

Many of the tribal

members were hired as migrant farm workers in the summer but were
forced to go on the welfare rolls in the winter after their savings had
been depleted.

As a result, federal, state, and county welfare

assistance was the most

important source of income on the reservation

after ranching and land leases.^8
8
Ibid., p. D-3; H.R. Rep. 2503, BIA Investigation, p. 1318.

9
According to the 1950 census, the median family income m the
United States was $3,073. Median income for families in South Dakota
in 1950 was $2,771. See U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
United States Census of Population: 1950, Vol. I, Characteristics of
Population, pt. 1, United States Summary, and pt. 41, South Dakota.
^There were a number of obstacles to Indian employment during this
period. The various governmental and tribal programs could simply not
generate sufficient job opportunities and private non-Indian citizens
were unwilling to invest in the economic development of the reservation.
Job opportunities off the reservation were limited by the fact that many
local employers discriminately refused to hire Indians. For their part,
the tribal members were seriously hampered by their lack of training and
job skills. They were reluctant to leave the reservation in search of
"\
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The one bright spot in the reservation economy was the Indian
livestock program.

In 1950 the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Cattle

Enterprise was the principal industry and financial endeavor on the
reservation.

Financed by funds made available under the Indian Re

organization Act of 1934 as well as by the Tribal Council, this enter
prise was established to loan money, livestock, and equipment to those
tribal members who wanted to start ranching operations.

In 1951 the

Tribal Cattle Enterprise had a net worth of about $700,000 including
4,378 head of cattle worth about $150 each.

In 1952 there were 341

Indian families who were engaged in livestock operations on Cheyenne
River and many were confident that the ranching program would someday
make all of the tribal members self-sufficient.
The livestock industry as well as the general economy of the
reservation was seriously crippled by a complicated series of Indian
land problems for which the federal government was mostly to blame.
Soon after the passage of the Dawes Act in 1889, the Indian Service
began to discover how foolish it had been to divide reservations such

work. The Indians were often unfamiliar with regular work patterns and
many employers could not cope with the conceptual attitudes peculiar to
the Indian cultural experience. Their "live for today" philosophy often
made them unwilling to stick to one job for very long and their concept
of time did not always lend itself well to the idea of the hourly wage
and the time card. While many of the tribal members clearly lacked the
incentive to take advantage of the limited opportunities that were
available, many of those who were ambitious were only frustrated by the
number of seemingly insurmountable obstacles that were continually
placed in their path. Cassel, et. al., Indian Health Resources, pp.
D y.0-14); H.R. Rep. 2503, BIA Investigation, pp. 1317-1318.
^ I b i d ., p. D-7; H.R. Rep. 2503, BIA Investigation, p. 361.
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as Cheyenne River into small rectangular allotments.

Because it was

almost impossible to develop economic farm or ranch units on the
individual tracts, the government tried to combine these allotments into
larger areas with natural boundaries and water and shelter access so that
they could be used as grazing units.

At the same time, however, the

government also permitted these units to be "checkerboarded" by white
homesteaders and it soon became impossible for an individual Indian
without capital to control a single grazing unit.

Owning a portion of

the land and usually having the money to either purchase or lease more
of it, the white rancher was placed in a favorable position.

Not

being able to use the land himself because of the divided interests in
it as well as his own lack of money, the Indian was forced either to
sell his land and thus forever alienate it from the tax-free status of
the reservation or lease it out and live in idleness and poverty on the
rental money.^
As the original Indian allottees died off their land interests
were divided among their heirs and the leasing problem grew continually
worse.

Again the Indians often found it an easy solution to sell their

inherited land and as a result thousands of acres of land became
alienated from the reservation at the same time that the Indian owned
land that remained became even more checkerboarded.

As the years passed

the fragmentation of the land interests became phenomenal.

Some of the

allotted tracts were divided among hundreds of heirs and fifty or more
heirship equities were vested to individual Indians.
12

Debo, History of Indians, p. 294.

When some of these
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estates had to be settled in order to make compensation for lands that
were to be taken in connection with the Oahe project, one-half section
of land worth about $500 was found to have 156 heirs, twenty-nine of
whom were deceased but whose interests in the estate had; never been
probated.

Expressed as a fraction, the least individually-owned

interest in this estate was found to be 13/324,000. 13

For years many

of the Indians received annual checks for fifty cents or less for their
interest in a leased allotment.

Several of them have kept these checks

and today they like to display them and joke about them.

As rather sad

souvenirs they symbolize to these Indians the stupidity of a government
system which would let the Indian land problem continue in chaos to the
point where Indians received checks that cost more for the government to
process than they were worth.

Although the Indian Reorganization Act of

1934 forbade the further sale of inherited lands, Congress has never
provided a solution for the heirship problem as the fragmentation of
.
.
Indian interests
continues
and each year becomes even more chaotic. 14
Soon after it was organized, the Cheyenne River Tribal Council
began to work toward its own solution of the heirship problem.

In

1937, the Council established a land consolidation program to bring as
much land as possible back into Indian use and ownership.

Financed by

credit funds made available under the Indian Reorganization Act as well
as a portion of the annual revenue of the tribe, this program provided
13

"The Missouri River Program-Its Impact on the Indian People,"
CRSTC Files. This factsheet may have been prepared by the Aberdeen
Area Office of the BIA in the early 1950's.
14

Debo, History of Indians, p. 294.
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for the purchase or trade of tribal and individual land interests by the
"exchange assignment" method.

Combining the traditional aspects of

communal tribalism with modern real estate methods, the exchange assign
ment system provided that any Indian who owned an allotment or an
interest in heirship land could voluntarily transfer the ownership of
that land to the tribe in exchange for an assignment to the same land or
other land of equal value which he could then utilize.

In this way the

tribe could increase the amount of its collectively owned land at the
same time that individual Indians could gain the use of enough land to
support an economic unit.-^
Although the funds for this program were limited while the
complications were numerous, the Cheyenne River Sioux were able to
increase the amount of tribally owned lands from approximately 492,000
acres in 1937 to over 798,000 acres in 1950.

At that time, however,

390.000 acres of the reservation remained in heirship status and
200.000 acres of the best Indian grazing land was leased to Western Farm
Management, commonly known to the Indians as the "Chicago outfit," for
an average fee of $5.41 per animal unit.

Although the tribe soon

terminated this firms lease and was able to move some Indian operators
back on this land, white ranchers, as late as 1955, still operated 63
per cent of all the land on the reservation including over 90 per cent
of the nonirrigated farm land, and over 60 per cent of the grazing
15 Henry W. Hough, Development of Indian Resources, Indian
Community Action Program (Denver: World Press, 1967X, pp. 38-41.
(Hereinafter referred to as Hough, Development of Indian Resources.)

A few months after the passage of the Pick-Sloan legislation, the
Army Corps of Engineers began making aerial photographs and topo
graphical maps of the Cheyenne River Reservation.

In 1946 the Missouri

River Basin Investigation (MRBI) project made a brief reconnaissance of
the Indian range and forest land and also began a preliminary investi
gation of the overall effects of the Oahe project.

The next year,

Stewart Kern, an agricultural economist, prepared the first MRBI reports
on' Cheyenne River. 17

These 1947 reports briefly outlined the damages

that could be expected on the reservation based on preliminary investi
gations.

They outlined the administrative responsibilities and problems

the Indian Bureau would have in regard to the dislocation of Indian
families and the readjustment of both the economic and social structure
of the reservation.

In 1948 the MRBI issued the first publication to

set out in general terms the extent to which all of the various.
reservations would be involved in the Missouri River development
™,rtrTr.awi 18
program.
The early government reports made it apparent that the Oahe Dam
16
.
.
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council Records, November 30, 1951,
CRSTC Files; Cassel et. al. * Indian Health Resources, p. D-6; H.R. Rep.
2503, BIA Investigation, p. 1317.
17

U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Oahe Dam
and Reservoir: Effect of its Construction on the Basic Economy of the
Cheyenne River Reservation, MBRI Rep. No. 14 (Billings: Missouri River
Basin Investigation Project, 1947)* pp. 1-25; MRBI Rep. No. 29, Effects
of Oahe Project, pp. 1-30.
18
U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, The
Indians and the Pick-Sloan Plan, MRBI Rep. No. 67 (Billings: Missouri
River Basin Investigations Project, 1948), pp. 1-35.
(Hereinafter
referred to as MRBI Rep. No. 67, Indians and Pick-Sloan.)
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and Reservoir project would have a serious effect on the Cheyenne River
Sioux.

In 1947 the MRBI report estimated that at least 60,000 acres of

Indian land would be flooded.

By 1950 the Department of Interior had

hiked this estimate to 95,000 acres and, by the time detailed land
appraisals were completed in 1952, the taking area was set at 104,420
acres.^

Of this final estimate, 58,444 acres was owned by the tribe

and 45,976 acres was owned by individuals.

About a quarter of this

tribally owned land was covered by exchange assignments.

These assign

ments included some of the best land on the reservation in terms of
providing water, feed, and natural shelter for livestock operations.
Although most of the bottom lands that would be flooded were located
along the Missouri River, which made up the seventy-eight mile eastern
border of the reservation, lands extending about thirty miles back from
the mouth of the Moreau River would also be flooded.^
Approximately 434 individual Indians either owned land or held an
heirship interest in land within the taking area.

At least 113 Indian

families would have to be removed from the reservoir area.

Their bottom

land homesites were considered the best on the reservation because they
19

.
. .
Ibid., p. 12. S. Rep. No. 1737, Authorizing Oahe Contracts, p. 3;
U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Appraisal of
Indian Property on the Oahe Reservoir Site within the Cheyenne Indian
Reservation, South Dakota, MRBI Rep. No. 132 {Billings: Missouri River
Basin Investigations Project, 1952), p. 2. (Hereinafter referred to as
MRBI Rep. No. 132, Cheyenne River Property Appraisal.)
- 20U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Progress
Report on Individual and Tribal Rehabilitation Programs of the Cheyenne
River Sioux People to December 31, 1956, MRBI Rep. No. 152 (Billings:
Missouri River Basin Investigations Project, 1957), p. 9 (Hereinafter
referred to as MRBI Rep. No. 152 , 1956 Rehabilitation Progress Report.);
MRBI Rep. No. 29, Ibid.; S. Rep. No. 1737> Ibid., p. 4.
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provided easy access to water and forest resources and had a compara
tively fertile soil.

Eighty of the families would lose cultivated

tracts of land that were used either for home gardens or for growing
feed crops.

About 403 acres of cropland, on which was produced about

75 per cent of the corn and 10 per cent of the small grain on the
reservation, would be lost.

21

. Because the Cheyenne River Sioux had worked so hard over the
years to develop a thriving livestock industry on the reservation, they
were greatly embittered by the fact that the Oahe project would take
their most prized ranch land.

About 12,360 acres of meadowland, 12,412

acres of sheltered pastureland, and 75,087 acres of choice grazing
land would be lost.

Approximately 7500 cattle wintered each year in the

timbered bottomlands, which provided natural shelter, and in the
meadows, which also provided hay for winter feed.

As a result of the

taking of this land, over seventy-five cattle enterprises would have to
be either liquidated or relocated.

Several of the Indian ranchers would

lose all of their bottomlands, crop lands, and pastureland in addition
to the headquarters for their livestock business and would be left with
only those upland grazing areas that were above the taking line.
Replacement of the lost land with that of equal value would be virtually
impossible since land with similar features would not exist on or near
the reservation after inundation.

Cattle shelters, fencing, and other

ranch facilities would have to be constructed on whatever replacement
land was found in order to compensate for the loss of the natural

21S. Rep. No. 1737, Ibid.; MRBI Rep. No. 29, Ibid., pp. 13-14.
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features of the bottomlands.

Without the adjoining meadows and

sheltered pastures, the grazing lands above the taking line would not be
able to support an economic unit and would be difficult to dispose of
since few of the surrounding land owners would be interested in adding
more grazing land to their operations.

As a result, the market value of

this remaining land would decline rapidly.

For those Indians who were

just beginning to gain a self-sustaining foothold in the range cattle
22
business, it appeared that the Oahe project spelled disaster.■

The withdrawal of the bottomlands would also have a serious effect
on other aspects of the Indian economy.

The 15,000 acres of woodland

within the taking area represented 90 per cent of the timbered area on
the reservation.

This timber-supply provided the only source of fuel

for at least one-fourth of the tribal members and many of them also
depended on it as a source of lumber.

Since these timbered areas could

not be replaced, the loss of this land would require the Indians to
either purchase their wood fuel supply elsewhere or develop an industry
to extract lignite coal deposits on the reservation.

In the future the

Indians would also have to purchase building and fencing supplies which
they had previously obtained without charge.

23

Since the practice of gathering and preserving wild fruits such as
22

S. Rep. No. 1737, Ibid.; MRBI Rep. No. 29, Ibid., pp. 10-14;
MRBI Rep. No. 132, Cheyenne River Property Appraisal, p. 15.
23

S. Rep. No. 1737, Ibid., p. 5; MRBI Rep. No. 29, Ibid., pp. 15-16;
U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, The Timber
Resources of the Cheyenne River and Standing Rock Reservations within the
Taking Area of the Oahe Reservoir in North and South Dakota, MRBI Rep.
No. 131 (Billings; Missouri River Basin Investigations Project, 1952),
p. 4. (Hereinafter referred to as MRBI Rep. No. 131, Timber Resources
within Oahe Reservoir.)
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buffalo berries, black currants, wild plums, choke-cherries, service
berries, and mouse beans was common the the reservation, the loss of the
plant life of the woodlands would also cause a great reduction in the
natural food supply.

These fruit sources provided approximately 150

Indian families with their annual fruit supply.

A traditional part of

the Sioux food staple these fruits added both variety and bulk to their

The timbered areas also served as a shelter and feeding ground for
many different types of wildlife which in turn provided many Indians
with another important source of food.

More than 400 deer, several

hundred beaver, and thousands of rabbits and raccoons lived year round
in these woodlands while thousands of pheasants and other game birds
wintered there each year.

The hunting and trapping of these various

forms of wildlife provided an. important source of food, and sometimes
24
For someone unfamiliar with the Indian way of life, it is diffi
cult to appreciate the importance and usefulness of these plants to the
Sioux. These fruits were eaten raw, dried and stored for winter, made
into soups and sauces, or mixed with other foods to add flavoring.
These plants traditional had a number of other uses. Buffalo berries
were used in female puberty rites and the sprouts from wild plums were
also used in religious ceremonies. The wood from the service or juice
berry plant was used to make arrow shafts. Chokecherries used to be
mixed with dried buffalo meat to make pemmican, which was once the pri
mary staple of the Sioux. The chokecherry also supplied the name of one
of the Sioux months— "black cherry moon" or the month when the choke
cherries were ripe, which also determined the time of the Sun Dance.
The plant was also used for medicinal purposes as a cure for diarrhea
and other ailments. Mouse beans were one of the most palatable wild
vegetables on the frontier. This form of wild pea is collected and
Stored by field mice and is then collected from their nests by the
Indians. According to tradition, the Sioux always left an equal
quantity of corn or other grain in the nests to replace the food they
had taken. Mouse bean soup was considered a delicacy. See U.S.,
Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, "Uses of Plants
by the Indians of the Missouri River Region," by Melvin Randolph Gilmore,
Thirty-Third Annual Report of the American Bureau of Ethnology
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 43-154.
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income, for over 100 Indian families as well as a source of recreation
for many others.

While the Cheyenne River Sioux fully exploited the

resources of the bottomlands, they seldom made use of the Missouri
River itself except as a source for their water supply.

Though the

river contained a wide variety of fish, the Indians never learned to
exploit this food source and forms of water recreation such as swimming
• •
25
and boating were also uncommon activities.
The Oahe project would completely flood the town of Cheyenne
Agency, the administrative headquarters and main population center of
the Cheyenne River Reservation.

The government and tribal buildings

there were valued at more than $1,000,000, including the Cheyenne River
Boarding School, the St. Stephens Hospital, dormitories which housed 250
students, tribal and government office buildings and workshops which
employed 125 people, and the government and privately owned residences
of the 600 people who lived at the agency.

A 105 acre school farm,

which provided partial subsistence for the students of the boarding
school, as well as the St. Johns Episcopal Church and the Corpus Christi
Catholic Church would be lost.

On other parts of the reservation,

the

Moreau River Day School, the Four Bear Day School, and some other
churches would have to be relocated.

At least eight Indian cemeteries

would have to be relocated, five of which were Protestant and contained
a total of about 700 graves and three of which were Catholic and had
about 400 graves.

In addition, some private Indian burials, a monument

to the Indian war veterans, and the !lMedicine Rock” a traditional
25

S. Rep. No. 1737, Authorizing Oahe Contracts, p. 5.; MRBI Rep.
No. 131, Timber Resources within Oahe Reservoir, p. 4.; MRBI Rep.
No. 29, Effects of Oahe Project, pp. 14-16.
'\
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religious shrine of the Sioux would also have to be relocated.

96

While the preliminary investigations revealed that the Cheyenne
River Sioux would suffer a large number of serious losses as a result
of the Oahe project, Kern, in his 1947 report, could only note two
important benefits that they would receive.

He felt that the project

would create many employment opportunities and produce a great demand
for both skilled and unskilled laborers.

Of course, this assumed that

the Corps of Engineers, the private contractors, and the other government
agencies involved in the Oahe project would be willing to hire Indians
and that local employers would also overcome their long established
prejudice against Indian employees.

The second important benefit,

according to Kern, was that the Oahe power plant would provide cheap
electrical power which would permit many of the Indian families to
materially improve their standard of living.

But while this might be

true in regard to those Indians living near established transmission
lines, the poor rural Indians would probably still not be able to bear
the heavy costs of transmitting electricity to their area and, given
their present income, many of the Indians would not be able to afford
electrical power no matter what its cost or availability.

27

The MRBI general report of 1948 was also optimistic that the Oahe
project would present the Cheyenne River Sioux with an extraordinary

26S. Rep. No. 1737, Ibid.; MRBI Rep. No. 29, Ibid., pp. 16-18.;
U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Location and
Census of Indian Cemeteries, Cheyenne River Indian Reservation, South
Dakota, MRBI Rep. No. 120 (Billings: Missouri River Basin Investigations
Project, 1951), pp. 1-3.
27MRBI Rep. No. 29, Ibid., pp. 5-6.

opportunity to expand into irrigation farming.

Under the Pick-Sloan

Plan, the Bureau of Reclamation proposed to build an irrigation unit on
the Moreau River which would provide water for 17,700 acres of land in
the northern part of the reservation.
was owned by tribal members.

About 70 per cent of this land

While irrigation farming was an interesting

goal it was not a particularly realistic one as far as these Indians
were concerned.

Irrigation units were usually only used by commercial

farmers while the Sioux were not even very successful as subsistence
farmers.

They had had no experience with irrigation and hardly any of

them would be able to make the capital investment required to establish
irrigation systems once the water was available. 28
The 1948 report also listed a number of other thorny problems
which the Cheyenne River Sioux might be confronted with as a result of
the Oahe project.

Assuming that the Indian lands would be taken through

condemnation by the Corps of Engineers under the right of eminent domain
just like non-Indian lands within the taking area, the tribal members
would only be entitled to receive the "fair market value" of their land
based on the Corps of Engineers' own appraisal.

While this kind of

settlement usually presupposes that land of equal value can be found
elsewhere, this was clearly not the case in regard to these Indians.
They would not be able to acquire land as good as that that would be
lost within hundreds of miles of the reservation.

There was no

MRBI Rep. No. 67, Indians and Pick-Sloan, pp. 10-11, 20.

\
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assurance that land of any kind could be purchased by them at a reason
able price.

The Cheyenne River Sioux were therefore presented with an

ominous problem.

If there was a delay in finding new homesites once

their present property was condemned they might be forced to live off
the compensation they received for it and would then run the risk of
ending up both homeless and broke.

The precedent for this kind of

settlement in regard to the Pick-Sloan projects had already been esta
blished in 1947 when the Corps of Engineers made a settlement with the
Fort Berthold Indians which paid them the appraised value of their prop
erty and improvements only.

This kind of condemnation procedure would

not provide funds for the cost of moving the Indians to new homes,
developing new lands so that they could be utilized in the same way as '
the old, or readjusting the livestock operations to meet new conditions.
Such a settlement also threatened to take away the shoreline rights of
the Indians since the Corps of Engineers would control the shoreline
after condemnation and the Fish and Wildlife Service was given priority
under law to establish the shoreline for recreation and conservation
development.

29

In order to help the Cheyenne River Sioux with these and other
problems, the MRBI staff was assigned the responsibility of maintaining
a liaison between the Corps of Engineers and the tribal and agency
representatives.

They were also directed to make investigations of the

Indian employment opportunities, the potential requirements for in
creased electrical energy, the effects of wave action on the shoreline,

29Ibid., pp. 7-8.

'
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and the accessability of water for domestic and livestock uses.

They

were also to provide direct assistance in planning for and actually
moving the 113 Indian families from the taking area, and they were
also asked to conduct a timber survey, to prepare a complete economic
study of the reservation, to make a wildlife study in cooperation with
the Fish and Wildlife Service, to draw up a plan for the removal of
Cheyenne Agency, and to plan a new road system. 30
In the meantime, in 1948, at a site on the Missouri River six
miles northwest of Pierre, South Dakota, the Corps of Engineers began
construction on what was to be the largest rolled-earth dam in the
world.

At an estimated cost of over $340 million the Oahe Dam and

Reservoir project would turn the midsection of the muddy Missouri into
a big blue lake longer than Ontario and deeper than Erie.

The proposed

height of the dam had been increased from 192 to 245 feet by the Corps
of Engineers and the proposed output of the power plant was later
increased from 150,000 to 595,000 kilowatts.

The maximum pool level

was also gradually increased and this accounted for the increase in the
amount of land that would have to be taken.

As construction began on

the project the maximum pool level had not yet been accurately pro
jected on ownership maps.3^Meanwhile, the Indians of the Missouri River Basin were focusing
their attention on the negotiations that continued between the repre
sentatives of the Fort Berthold Reservation and Congress in regard to

3QIbid., pp. 23-27.
31

MRBI Rep. No. 29, Effects of Oahe Project, pp. 3-4.; New York
Times, August 3, 1958.
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the Garrison Dam project.

While the Corps of Engineers had already

made a $5,000,000 settlement with the tribe, these Indians were trying
to establish a legal basis for further financial benefits as well as
special considerations from Congress.

They based their case on the fact

that the involuntary loss of a substantial portion of their reservation
had clearly violated those treaty rights which guaranteed the integrity
of their reservation.

They felt that on the basis of these treaty

rights, their status as wards of the government, and their present
economic condition, the ordinary process of condemnation by right of
eminent domain did not constitute just compensation and they asked
Congress to provide for a new appraisal of their property, additional
funds to cover the costs of removal, the development of the residual
reservation, and other special rights and privileges.

After a long

and hard battle in Washington, Congress finally took special cognizance
of the situation of the Fort Berthold Indians and provided them with an
additional payment of $7,500,000 although it denied their requests to
retain full mineral and shoreline rights and the right to use a block
of the hydroelectric power of the Garrison Dam for their own use.33
Based on this final Fort Berthold settlement. Congress in 1950
passed Public Law 870 which authorized the negotiation of separate
settlement contracts with the Cheyenne River and Standing Rock
reservations for lands and rights that would be acquired as a result of
the Oahe project.33

This act provided that the Army's Chief of

33The Fort Berthold Act, 63 Stat. 1026 (1949).
^ A c t of September 30, 1950, Statutes at Large, LXIV, 1093-95
(1950).
(Hereinafter referred to as The Oahe Act, 64 Stat. 1093 (1950).)
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Engineers and the Secretary of the Interior would share the responsi
bility of directing negotiations with Indian representatives that would
be chosen by the respective Tribal Council.

It declared further that

the final settlement contracts should not only provide for the payment
of just compensation for the Indian lands and improvements to be taken,
but should also cover the costs of relocating and reestablishing those
tribal members affected "so that their economic, social, religious, and
community life can be reestablished and p r o t e c t e d . T h i s also
included the costs of relocating the Indian cemeteries, tribal monuments,
and shrines.

In order to assist the negotiators in arriving at the

amount of just compensation, Congress requested that the Corps of
Engineers and the MRBI staff prepare a tract-by-tract appraisal schedule
to determine the fair market value of the land and property to be
flooded.

This appraisal was to include the value of all improvements,

standing timber, minerals, land-usage, and severance damages.

Those

individual Indians who rejected the government appraisal on their
property would be given the option of having the value of their land
determined in Federal District Court at the expense of the Corps of
Engineers.

Once all the appraisals were determined, the Corps of

Engineers and the MRBI were then to prepare a schedule of dates for the
removal of Indian property from the taking area. -The final settlement
contracts with each of the tribes were to be negotiated, approved, and
submitted to Congress within eighteen months and they would not take
effect until they had been ratified by an act of Congress and by three-
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fourths of the adult tribal members on each reservation.

In the event

that the negotiators could not reach an agreement on the contract
proposals, they were to be considered and determined by Congress except
that under no circumstances would the negotiations be permitted to
restrict or delay the construction of the Oahe project.

Once the final

contract was ratified it would convey title to all of the land to the
United States and would represent a final and complete settlement of
all Indian claims m

regard to their land.

35

While the passage of the Oahe Act of 1950 somewhat eased the fears
of the Indian property owners on Cheyenne River, they were still
disappointed by the fact that it had not mentioned such important
matters as the rights to use the shoreline of the Missouri River as
well as a block of the hydroelectric power of the Oahe Dam.

Because

they felt that the Fort Berthold Indians had been robbed by the govern
ment, they were determined to negotiate an even better settlement and
to fight for these and other important benefits.

35Ibid.

CHAPTER IV
THE TRIBE GOES TO WASHINGTON
The initial reaction of the Cheyenne River Sioux to the Oahe pro
ject was extremely negative.

None of the Indians wanted to be moved

from their land or to lose their economic resources.

Likewise, they

were not happy about the prospect of having their homogeneous communities
uprooted or their fixed and accepted pattern of government services en
dangered.

Besides fear and apprehension, the tribal members also

experienced a feeling of anger.

They were incensed that the United

States was again so willing to breach the faith of its solemn treaty
Obligations and sacrifice the interests of .the Indians in order to
satisfy the white man's bid for progress.

As a result of this anger,

some of the Indians were determined to resist the federal government.
They began to think of ways to forestall or postpone the construction of
the Oahe Dam, a project which they felt could only mean disaster for them.
Had it been possible for all of the tribes affected by the Pick-Sloan Plan
to grganize their opposition, hire a battery of competent lawyers, and
gain the support of a few influential Congressmen, an Indian resistance
movement in the mid-1940s might have succeeded in eliminating at least
some of the mainstem reservoir projects on the Missouri River.
intertribal cooperation was virtually nonexistent at that time.

But
The

legal and political resources available to the Indians were extremely
limited, and the moment of opportunity soon passed.^*
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The federal government ignored what it considered to be the minor
protests of the Indians and construction began on several of the reser
voir projects before tribal representatives were even consulted.

Within

a short time, the dire and foreboding events foretold by the Pick-Sloan
Plan became realities for the Indians.

In the ensuing period their re

sistance faded as they came to accept what the government had already
determined to be inevitable and they resigned themselves to making the
most of whatever alms might be offered in compensation.

But their

feeling of bitterness continued.
In accordance with Public Law 870, the Cheyenne River Tribal
Council on December 9, 1950 appointed a seven-man committee to negotiate
a final settlement with the federal government concerning the Oahe pro
ject.

Those men selected included Frank Ducheneaux, Sidney Claymore,

Edward Claymore, Lloyd Le Beau, Nelson Le Beau, John Little Cloud, and
Alex Chasing Hawk. 3

All of these men were members of the Tribal Council

with the exception of Frank Ducheneaux, who was the Tribal Chairman.

The

Claymores, the Le Beaus, and Ducheneaux were members of three of the
1
Frank Ducheneaux, interviews held at private residence on Cheyenne
River Sioux Reservation, South Dakota, July 30-31, 1972 (Hereinafter
referred to as Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.); Ellen Ducheneaux,
interviews held at Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Jail, Eagle Butte, South
Dakota, July 31, August 1, 1972 (Hereinafter referred to as Ellen
Ducheneaux, interviews.); Lloyd Le Beau, interview held at Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Housing Office, Eagle Butte, South Dakota,
July 31, 1972 (Hereinafter referred to as Lloyd Le Beau interview.)
2Ibid.
^The Oahe Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1093-94, sec. 1 (1950); Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Council Resolution 1428, December 9, 1950, CRSTC
Files.
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largest and most prominent "mixed blood" families on the reservation
while both Little Cloud and Chasing Hawk were full-blooded Sioux.

Most

of these men had had experience in dealing with government officials and
Sidney Claymore was especially valuable as a tribal negotiator since he
was a professional land and property appraiser.

As fitted his position

as Tribal Chairman, Frank Ducheneaux was named the chief negotiator for
the Tribal Negotiating Committee.

4

Ducheneaux was a veteran of the infighting of tribal politics.
Having been elected a charter member of the Cheyenne River Tribal
Council in 1934, he had served as a Councilman for sixteen years prior
to his election as Tribal Chairman in the fall of 1950.

Born in 1903

near Trail City (then known as Cheyenne Junction) on the northern border
of the reservation, he had attended the Trail City public schools
through the eighth grade.

But what Ducheneaux lacked in formal education

he soon made up for in political shrewdness.

Grooming himself to fill

the vacuum of tribal power, he became a popular and benevolent leader, a
cordial diplomat, and an astute and powerful politician.

Except for the

years between 1958 and 1962, he served as the Tribal Chairman and
political boss of Cheyenne River until his retirement in 1970.

During

this reign he became known to some of his constituents as "the Mayor
5
Daley of Cheyenne River."
4
.
Frank Ducheneaux, Lloyd Le Beau, interviews.
5
Frank Ducheneaux, Ibid.: Clyde Dollar, interview held at private
residence, Vermillion, South Dakota, July 23, 1972. This reference is
to Richard J. Daley, the Democratic mayor of Chicago.
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As chief negotiator for the Oahe settlement, Ducheneaux appointed
his wife Ellen to serve as Secretary of the Tribal Negotiating Committee.
Ellen Ducheneaux, who was a talented politician in her own right,
eventually became a regular member of the negotiating committee and
later was named Superior Judge of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court.
The Tribal Negotiating Committee was also to be advised by Ralph Case,
the tribal attorney, who was a close friend of the Ducheneaux family.
Case had grown up in the Dakotas and had once lived at old Fort Bennett.
A former Major in the Army, he had resigned his commission to become an
Indian claims lawyer, a vocation in which, he openly admitted, he wanted
to both help the Indians and make money.

He was first hired as a tribal

attorney for the Cheyenne River Sioux in 1922.

Establishing an office

in Washington, D.C., he eventually represented nearly all of the other
Sioux tribes.

Working on a commission basis, he had represented the

Sioux in the $189,000,000 Black Hills suit in the U.S. Court of Claims.
He spent many years and much of his own money on the research and
expenses of this case and after the suit was denied in 1942 he tried in
vain to bring it before the Indian Claims commission.^

In regard to the

Pick-Sloan Plan, Case had represented the Fort Berthold Indians in their
negotiations concerning the Garrison project in 1949.

Though the

experience he gained in working for that settlement proved valuable to
6
In 1934 the Teton Sioux tribes brought suit against the United
States for the value of over 73,000,000 acres of the Black Hills
alleged to have been taken by treaties. In 1946, the Indian Claims
Commission was formed specifically to adjudicate all, fraud, treaty
violations, and other Indian claims against the government. A settle
ment has never been reached in regard, to the Black Hills case. See
H.R. Rep. 2503, BIA Investigation, p. 356.
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the Cheyenne River Sioux in their own negotiations, the Port Berthold
tribe had not been happy with his services and they communicated their
feelings to several of the other tribes.

Soon Case was fired by all of

the tribes except the Cheyenne River and the Fort Peck Indians.

When

he died in Washington in June, 1957, Frank Ducheneaux and his wife and
Alex Chasing Hawk were the only Indians at his funeral.

7

Soon after the Tribal Negotiating Committee was appointed, the
Corps of Engineers, as directed by Public Law 870, employed Gerald T.
Hart and Associates, a private land appraisal firm from Denver, Colorado,
to prepare an appraisal on all of the Indian property within the Oahe
taking area.

In the spring of 1951, the Hart appraisers began their

work and a team of MRBI foresters also began a survey of the timber
resources on the reservation.

In August, after the timber survey was

completed, MRBI personnel decided to evaluate the fairness and accuracy
of the Hart appraisal.

Q

On November 15, the Hart firm submitted its

appraisal to the Cheyenne River Tribal Council.

This appraisal had

found that approximately 102,847 acres of the reservation would be
flooded by the Oahe project and that 131 Indian families would have to
be relocated.

The Hart appraisal also determined that the land, improve

ments, timber, and severance damages within the taking area had a "fair
market value"^ of $1,605,410.

(See Table 1, p. 108 ) Of this amount,

7
Frank Ducheneaux, Ibid.: Eagle Butte News, July -3*9, 1957.
8
MRBI Rep. No. 131, Timber Resources within Oahe Reservoir, p. 1.;
MRBI Rep. No. 132, Cheyenne River Property Appraisal, p. 4.
9
The Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Indian Affairs agreed on
the following definition of "fair market value" as properly reflecting
the intent of Congress in Public Law 870: "Market value is the highest
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$1,243,516 was considered to be the fair market value of all of the land
within the taking area.

This amounted to an average value of approxi

mately $12 an acre.^0
Immediately upon receiving the Hart appraisal, the Tribal
Negotiating Committee checked it against tribal and agency land records,
information furnished by Indian property owners, and their own field
inspections.

Within a short time the tribal negotiators found a number

of errors in the description of the land appraisal.

Certain buildings,

fences, stock water ponds, and other improvements had been omitted and
some of the cropland and timber had been overlooked.

The committee also

felt that in many cases the Indian property and damage estimates had
been valued too low. 11

In view of these findings, the committee re

quested a conference with representatives of the Department of the

price fairly determined in terms of money which could be commanded for
property by a seller who is fully informed as to the rights and benefits
inherent in or attributable to the property and as to the highest and
best use to which it is adaptable, from a buyer who is also well informed
as to the said rights, benefits, and uses inherent in or attributable
to the property, if the property should be exposed for sale in the open
market for a reasonable length of time."
(MRBI Rep. No. 132, Ibid.,
P. 20).
^U.S., Congress, House, Report of Tribal Council of the Cheyenne
River Sioux Reservation, S. Dak. on H.R. 2233, 83d Cong.,.1st sess.,
January 29, 1953, Congressional Record, XCIX, 646-49. (Hereinafter
referred to as Tribal Council Report on H.R. 2233, 83d Cong., 1st sess.,
99 Cong. Rec. 646-49 (1953)). A MRBI study later revealed that the
average per acre value of state school lands sold in 1951 was $27.67
in Dewey County and $20.18 in the seven county area which adjoined the
reservation west of the Missouri River. Even the Basic Data Report
used by the Hart firm in their appraisal had found that the average
value per acre of private lands sold in the twelve county area sur
rounding the reservation was $17.64 in 1951.
(MRBI Rep. No. 132, Ibid.,
pp. 22, 26.')
1;LMRBI Rep. No. 132, Ibid. , p. 4.
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Interior and the Corps of Engineers to discuss the appraisal errors.

On

January 7, 1952, the entire negotiating committee met with Dillon S.
Myer, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in Washington to arrange for
such a conference.

In answer to their request, Commissioner Myer

scheduled a meeting with General Lewis A. Pick himself on January 11 at
the headquarters of the Chief of Engineers.

At this conference General

Pick was presented with an eight-page list of errors found in the Hart
appraisal.

After reviewing the list, the General agreed that the

errors would have to be corrected before further negotiations could pro
ceed.

He promised that the Corps of Engineers would reevaluate the

descriptions and valuations of the Hart appraisal and correct any errors.
Frank Ducheneaux then suggested that a conference be held on Cheyenne
River on April 15 to resolve the appraisal differences and to discuss
other topics related to the contract negotiations.

In a memorandum to

Ducheneaux later that day, General Pick confirmed the date for the Chey
enne River conference and expressed the hope that the final contract
1o
negotiations could be started no later than September 15. *
Because of severe rains which caused flood conditions on the
Missouri River during April, the negotiating parties found it impossible
to meet during that month and the date of the conference was changed to
May 13.

On that date representatives of the Corps of Engineers, the

Department of the Interior, and MRBI personnel met with the Tribal
Negotiating Committee at Cheyenne Agency.

At this meeting it soon became *

■^Tribal Council Report on H.R. 2233, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 99
Cong. Rec. 647 (1953) . Memorandum from Lewis A. Pick, Lt. General, Chief
of Engineers, to Frank Ducheneaux, Chairman, Negotiating Committee of
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council, Washington, D.C., January 11, 1952,
CRSTC Files.
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apparent that each of the three parties to the proposed contract had
arrived at a different description and valuation for the land/ improve
ments, timber, and severance damages within the taking area.

Despite

the promises of General Pick, the Corps of Engineers still maintained
that the Hart appraisal was correct.

The MRBI personnel then revealed

that they had found a number of errors in the Hart appraisal though not
as many as claimed by the tribal negotiators.

Because it appeared

physically impossible to adjust the differences between the appraisals,
the negotiators suggested that a reexamination of the entire subject be
undertaken.

In order to accomplish this task, the conference members

appointed a six-man Reviewing Committee.

This committee was instructed

to make a classification and description of all the land on Cheyenne
River within the Oahe taking area, to classify, describe, and place a
monetary value on all of the land and other property that had been
omitted by the Hart appraisal, and to review all of the appraisals that
had been protested by members of the tribe.

The MRBI staff also decided

to supplement the work of the Reviewing Committee by conducting their own
separate appraisal.^
Public Law 870 had provided that a final contract with the Chey
enne River Sioux was to have been negotiated and submitted.to Congress
within eighteen months after the law had been enacted, which was
September 30, 1950.^

By the time the negotiating conferences were held

^Tribal Council Report on H.R. 2233, Ibid. MRBI Rep. No. 132,
Cheyenne River Property Appraisal, pp. 1-4. Summarization of Conferences,
May 13-14, 1952, Cheyenne Agency, South Dakota, Renegotiation with the
Cheyenne'River Sioux Tribe under Public Law 870, 81st Cong., CRSTC Files.
^ T h e Oahe Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1095, sec. 5 (1950).
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at Cheyenne Agency in May, 1952, the time limits of the law had already
been exceeded and nearly fourteen months of negotiation and research
had failed to bring an agreement on the land appraisal, which was only
the first order of business in .the contract negotiations.

Because it

was obvious that the law had not allowed enough time for negotiation,
the Tribal Negotiating Committee asked Congress to extend the time limits
of the act.

Accepting this request. Congress passed an amendment to the

original law which extended the contract deadline to January 31, 1953.

15

At a conference in Omaha on August 5, the negotiators further agreed
that final contract negotiations would begin in Washington on November
10 and continue for as long as was necessary to reach a final contract
settlement.

Acting on this Omaha agreement, the Reviewing Committee and

the MRBI staff gathered together to coordinate and settle their
appraisals. 1_6
In September, 1952, the Reviewing Committee-MRBI appraisal was
completed and published as MRBI Report No. 132.

According to this new

appraisal, the fair market value of the total Oahe damages on Cheyenne
River was found to be $2,053,117, an increase of $447,707 over the Hart
appraisal (See Table 1, p. 108 ).

Part of this difference was a result

of the increase in the total amount of land found within the taking area.
The MRBI report estimated that 104,420 acres of Indian land would be
flooded whereas the Hart appraisal had been based on 102,847 acres.

^•^Act of April 8, 1952, Statutes at Large, LXVI, 46-47 (1952).
■^Tribal Council Report on H.R. 2233, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 99
Cong. Rec. 648 (1953).
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the new appraisal had also increased the total land value from
$1,243,516, which was the Hart appraisal, to $1,590,574.

This amount

represented an average price per acre of approximately $15, which was
$3 per acre more than the Hart appraisal.

As soon as the MRBI report

was published, the Tribal Negotiating Committee began checking it for
errors and they also set to work to complete their own contract de1 7

mands. *
On November 10 the Tribal Negotiating Committee met once again in
General Pick's office in Washington to organize procedures for the final
contract negotiations.

The negotiators agreed that the conference would

take place in the hearing room of the Secretary of the Interior and on
November 12 they gathered there to begin their last round of talks.
Despite General Pick's

earlier assurances that the Army would make

adjustments in the Hart appraisal and despite the fact that the MRBIReviewing Committee appraisal had discovered a 1573 acre error in the
Hart firm's land description, the Corps of Engineers again announced
that the original appraisal of $1,605,410 represented their official
offer.

The $2,053,117 appraisal of the MRBI-Reviewing Committee study

was then presented as the official offer of the Department of the
Interior.

However, the tribal negotiators had not yet had the floor.

Rising to speak, Frank Ducheneaux announced that the Tribal Negotiating
Committee had found errors in both of the appraisals and that they would
present a final and complete draft of their own contract proposals on
November 14.

On that date the tribal negotiators presented the Corps of

^7MRBI Rep. No. 132, Cheyenne River Property Appraisal, p. 3.
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Engineers and the Department of the Interior representatives with copies
of their proposed contract which included the results of the tribal
appraisal.

The government representatives, however, were not willing

to discuss the merits of the proposed contract since they felt they
should have more time to study the tribal requests and they asked that
the conference again be adjourned until November 17.

18

The contract proposed by the Tribal Negotiating Committee
included a number of provisions which would guarantee certain rights,
privileges, and benefits to the Cheyenne River Sioux in regard to the
Oahe project.
$23,500,000.

The Indians also asked for a cash settlement of over
Of this amount, $2,614,779 represented the tribal appraisal

of the land, improvements, timber, and severance damages within the Oahe
taking area, $8,316,092 was the appraised value of what the tribal
negotiators termed "tangible future damages" including the loss of
grazing permit revenues, and the future value of the timber, wildlife,
wild fruits, and other resources, and $12,599,432 was requested to
establish a rehabilitation program for the entire tribe.

In regard to

the land and property appraisal, the tribal negotiators had arrived at
the figure of $2,614,779 after carefully reviewing all of the resource
data used for the other appraisals and recording the errors that were
found (See Table 1, p. 108 ).

Their final appraised value was more than

$1,000,000 higher than the Hart appraisal and was also more than $500,000
18

Tribal Council Report on H.R. 2233, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 99
Cong. Rec. 648 (1953). Agenda for Cheyenne River Negotiating Con
ference, Washington, D.C., November 10, 1952, Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribal Records.
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above the MRBI-Reviewing Committee report.

Considered separately, the

total land value arrived at by the Tribal Negotiating Committee was
1q
$1,940,222 or approximately $18.50 per acre.
The Tribal Negotiating Committee felt that their request for
$8,316,092 in tangible future damages was based on a reasonable premise.
Since the tribe as a whole would suffer as a result of the loss of the
land, timber, wildlife, and wild product resources within the taking
area, the tribal negotiators felt that the entire tribe and not just
individual land owners should be compensated for this loss.

They also

felt that this compensation should include a payment for the future as
well as the present value of these severance damages.

Of the total

amount they requested, $1,857,500 was for the loss of the future value
of the wildlife and wild fruit resources, $2,444,125 was for the future
value of the timber, and $4,014,467 was for the future loss of grazing
revenues.20
The tribal committee's boldest request was for $12,599,482 to
establish a tribal rehabilitation program.

Public Law 870 had provided

that the final settlement with the Cheyenne River Sioux would pay the
19
.
Criteria for Negotiations, Cheyenne River Sioux Negotiating
Committee, Washington, D.C., November 14, 1952, CRSTC Files (Hereinafter
referred to as Tribal Negotiating Criteria, Nov. 14, 1952.); U.S.,
Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Providing for
the Acquisition of Lands by the United States Required for the Reservoir
created by the Construction of Oahe Dam on the Missouri River and for
Rehabilitation of the Indians of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation,
S. Dak., H.R. Rep. 2484, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954, pp. 3-8.
(Herein
after referred to as H.R. Rep. 2484, Acquisition of Cheyenne River Lands.)
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costs of "reestablishing the tribe. . .so that their economic, social,
21
religious, and community life can be reestablished and protected. **•
Interpreting this provision broadly and recognizing that Congress had
provided additional funds to the i?'ort Berthold Indians for this pur
pose in 1949, the tribal negotiators once again based their claim on
the fact that the entire tribe would suffer as a result of the Oahe
project.

According to their own estimate, 200 Indian families would
A

be directly affected by the project and another 581 families would
suffer as a result of the loss of tribal resources, the disruption of
activities and services on the reservation, and the fact that the
moving of their relatives and neighbors from the bottomlands would cause
further crowding on the already marginal reservation land.

As a result,

they felt that a general rehabilitation program for all members of the
tribe should be part of the final compensation in order to bring the
entire reservation up to a common level of decency.

In view of the

termination policies being discussed in Washington, the tribal nego
tiators reasoned that the federal government might be willing to offer
them a settlement which would permit them to make a giant step toward
22
self-suf fici ency.
.

f

Based on a report that had been prepared by the MRBI staff in
June, 1951,22 the tribal committee had prepared their own resume of
the social and economic conditions on the reservation including such
2^The Oahe Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1095, sec. 2 (b) (1950).
22,Pribal Negotiating Criteria, Nov. 14, 1952.
23

U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Socio-Economic Report and Costs of Removal from Oahe Taking Area,
Cheyenne River Reservation, South Dakota, MRBI Rep. No. 117 (Billings:
Missouri River Basin Investigations Project, 1951), pp. 1-52.
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items as housing, domestic water supply, annual cash income, and non
cash subsistence values.

The amount requested by the Tribal Negotiating

Committee for rehabilitation was their estimate of how much it would
cost to accomplish all that was required according to the MRB± report
and their own resume.

This estimate was broken down as follows:

Repayment Cattle Program . . . . . . . $3,288,000
600,000
Domestic Water Supply ................
Farm Program
.
210,000
Land Purchase Program . .
.......... 1,000,000
Industrial Assistance Program ........
297,500
Rehabilitation HousingProgram . . . . 1,000,000
Rehabilitation Road Program . . . . . . 2,153,932
Educational Loan Program . . .. . . .
500,000
Tribal Welfare Program.. ........ . . 2,800,000
Business Enterprise Program ..........
750,000
TOTAL . . $12,599,432
In addition to these requests for monetary compensation, the
contract proposed by the Tribal Negotiating Committee also specified a
number of other provisions which the Indians wanted to include in the
final settlement.

They requested that the costs of relocating and re

establishing the Indian cemeteries, monuments, and shrines as well as
the reconstruction of facilities within the taking area such as roads,
bridges, schools, and administrative buildings be charged against the
funds appropriated for the Oahe project and not against any settlement
funds paid to the tribe.

In regard to the relocation and reconstruction

of facilities, the tribal negotiators requested that the Tribal Council
be given exclusive jurisdiction over these matters and they demanded
that the facilities "be restored to a condition not less advantageous

Tribal Negotiating Criteria, Nov. 14, 1952; H.R. Rep. No. 2484,
Acquisition of Cheyenne River Lands, pp. 3-8.
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than the condition they are now in."

They asked that the Indians be

permitted to retain all mineral rights within the reservoir area, that
they be given a reasonable amount of time in which to salvage timber and
improvements on their land prior to inundation, and that they be per
mitted to reside within the reservoir area and make use of their land
until the gates of the Oahe Dam were closed.

oc.

Once the gates were closed, the tribal committee asked that the
tribal members be permitted to retain grazing rights along the shoreline,
that they be given free access to the shoreline and reservoir for hunting
and fishing, and that they be allowed to establish boat ramps, resorts,
and other recreational facilities along the reservoir.

In regard to

grazing along the shoreline, they also declared that the federal govern
ment should be held responsible for any hazards caused to Indian live
stock as a result of the fluctuation of the water level of the Oahe
Reservoir.

These shoreline provisions were very important to the tribal

negotiators because the rights they requested had been denied the Fort
Berthold Indians in their settlement in 1949.

From the outset the

members of the tribal committee had agreed that they would not accept
any settlement which did not guarantee these shoreline rights.

Regarding

the Oahe Dam itself, the tribal negotiators also requested that a 20,000
kilowatt block of the hydroelectric power plant output be provided at a
low cost for the exclusive use of the Cheyenne River Sioux.
;

This too

had been requested by the Fort Berthold Indians and denied in 1949.

25Ibid.
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The proposed contract of the Tribal Negotiating Committee also
contained a number of provisions which had been designed to protect the
settlement funds of the tribe once they were appropriated.

The Indians

wanted their money to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury and to draw
interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum until expended by the
tribe.

The negotiators maintained that the Tribal Council should have

exclusive control over the distribution and expenditure of all contract
funds and that individual tribal members should receive credit rather
than cash for their property so that the use of the settlement funds
for the purchase of substitute land would be guaranteed.

They also

asked that the funds paid to them be tax exempt, that they- be prohibited
from being used for the employment of administrative personnel to carry
out the contract, and that they not be allowed to be encumbered for any
liens or debts except those against the tribal or federal government.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs was requested to help tribal members
conserve and reinvest the money they would receive for their land.

A

provision was also included to guarantee that nothing in the contract
would interfere with the financial benefits the tribe was already
receiving under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.

Another provision

requested that the Tribal Council be reimbursed up to $100,000 for the
expenses it had incurred in connection with the contract negotiations.

27

Regarding the land problems associated with the Oahe project, the
federal^ government was requested to assist the Indians in finding new
land.

Despite the heirship problems associated with trust lands, the

tribal negotiators requested that all new lands purchased, both inside
27ibid.
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and outside of the reservation, come under federal trust status.

While

this request seemed to run counter to the intentions of the tribal land
consolidation program, the tribal negotiators were apparently more
interested in protecting the new land from alienation and taxes than
they were from fractionation.

They requested further that the holders

of land exchange assignments be regarded as owners of trust land so that
they could be given title to their holdings and that the owners of
inherited lands be permitted to consolidate their interests as they
wished.

They asked that all unsold lands once opened to homestead entry

or sale be restored to tribal ownership.

Regarding the right of

individual tribal members to reject the appraisal of their land and
property and to ask for a final settlement in U.S. District Court, the
tribal committee requested that attorneys be provided for these
individuals and that all legal fees be paid by the federal government.
Finally, the tribal negotiators asked that the Department of the
Interior provide new surveying markers at all section and quarter
section corners on the reservation in order to facilitate the relocation
program, that it undertake reforestation and the development of coal
resources to replace the fuel supply that would be lost as a result of
the flooding of the timber lands, and that it investigate and develop
.

•

Oft

potential irrigation projects on the reservation. °
On November 17 the negotiating conference reconvened to discuss
the Tribal Negotiating Committee's contract proposals.

Growing

increasingly impatient with the course of the negotiations, the

\

»
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representatives of the Corps of Engineers declared that they would make
their final offer to the tribe on November 21.

In the meantime, the

Corps of Engineers finally decided to make a review of the three
appraisals to determine if a higher payment could be justified.

This

review resulted in a total appraisal figure of approximately $1,725,531,
which was only slight more than $100,000 above the Hart appraisal (See
Table 1, page 108).

In view of their experience at the negotiating

conference up to then, the Corps of Engineers representatives knew that
the Tribal Negotiating Committee would not accept this new appraisal,
especially since it was still $300,000 less than the Department of
Interior offer.

In an attempt to reconcile the differences between the

two government appraisals, Major General G. J. Nold, representing the
Chief of Engineers, authorized the Army negotiators to make a final
offer of $2,000,000.29
The Tribal Negotiating Committee, after considering the Army
offer, asked for additional time to prepare a counter offer.

On

November 26 they submitted a counter offer of $2,500,000 with the
stipulation that if the Corps of Engineers failed to accept this com
promise figure it would not prevent the tribal negotiators from
returning to their original request of $2,614,779.^

General Nold told

OQ

Tribal Council Report on H.R. 2233, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 99
Cong. Rec. 648 (1953) ; "Statement of Representative of the Chief of
Engineers Submitted to the Chairman of the Tribal Negotiating Committee
of the Sioux Indians of the Cheyenne River Reservation and the Repre
sentative of the Secretary of the Interior at a Meeting on November
24, 1952 at Washington, D.C.", CRSTC Files.
30

"Statement of the Tribal Negotiating Committee of the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Council Submitted to the Negotiators under Public
Law 870 on November 29, 1952, Washington, D.C., CRSTC Files,
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the Indians that their new offer was unacceptable.

The representatives

of the Department of the Interior declined to make another offer and
once again the matter stood in disagreement.

General Nold then asked

the tribal negotiators if they wished to discuss the other provisions
of their proposed contract.

Frank Ducheneaux replied that since it

was evident that an agreement could not be reached on the appraised
values, he considered it useless to discuss the other provisions of the
proposed contract.

The stalemate could not be broken.

After a moment

of silence, a representative of the Secretary of the Interior made a
motion to adjourn the conference, it was quickly seconded, and the
tribal negotiators walked out of the hearing room.

As Lloyd Le Beau

later recalled, "the tribe just couldn't deal with the Corps of
Engineers at all."

31

Following the breakdown of the Washington Negotiating Conference,
the Tribal Negotiating Committee planned a strategy for getting their
proposed contract through Congress.

Public Law 870 had provided that

if the negotiators could not reach agreement on a final contract
settlement, the provisions not agreed upon should be submitted to Conop

gress for final determination. J

Since the conference had not been able

to agree on any of the contract provisions, the tribal representatives
asked the members of the South Dakota Congressional delegation to submit
a bill in Congress which would include all of the tribal contract pro
visions.

After considering this request, Senator Francis Case and

Representatives E. Y. Berry advised the Indians to scale down some of

^Tribal council Report on H.R. 2233, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 99
Cong. Rec. 649 (1953>; Lloyd Le Beau, interview.
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their compensation demands and to omit some of their contract proposals.
Following this advice, the tribal negotiators trimmed their requests
for tangible future damages from $8,316,092 to $6,871,467 and cut their
rehabilitation request from $12,599,432 to $12,289,432.

They agreed to

omit their request for a block of the hydroelectric power of the Oahe
Dam after they were advised that Congress would never consider such a
demand since it had already determined in regard to the Fort Berthold
settlement that such a request would violate the provisions of the
Rural Electrification Act of 1936.

The Tribal Negotiating Committee

also withdrew their requests concerning the tax exempt status of the
settlement funds, the prohibition against the employment of admini
strative personnel out of these funds, the restoration of unclaimed
homestead lands to tribal ownership, the replacement of the fuel supply
and surveying markers by the Department of the Interior, and the
exclusive right to establish resorts and recreational facilities along
the Oahe shoreline. 3 3
On January 29, 1953, Congressman E. Y. Berry introduced a bill in
the House of Representatives which asked for $21,675,678 in compensation
for the Cheyenne River Sioux in regard to the Oahe project. ^

This bill,

3^The Oahe Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1095, sec. 5(b) (1950).
3^H.R. Rep. 2484, Acquisition of Cheyenne River Lands, pp. 1-2,
6-8.; Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.
••
34
U.S., Congress, House, A Bill to Provide for the Acquisition of
Lands by the United States for the Reservoir Created by the Construction
of the Oahe Dam on the M i s s o u r i River and for the Rehabilitation of the
Indians of Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, S . Dak., and for other
Purposes, H.R. 2233, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 1953.
.

\

I'll

H.R. 2233, also included all of those provisions of the tribal contract
that had not been previously withdrawn.

Berry, a Republican, considered

himself a neighbor of the Cheyenne River Sioux since he lived in Me
Laughlin, South Dakota, a small white community just north of the
reservation near the North Dakota border.

Before he had been elected

to Congress in 1950, Berry had been a judge in Corson County, a state
senator, and a member of the South Dakota Board of Regents and the
Missouri River States Commission.

He was also the editor-publisher of

the Me Laughlin Messenger in Me Laughlin and the Corson County News in
McIntosh, South Dakota.

In view of their past dealings with this man,

the tribal members of the Cheyenne River Reservation considered him to
be hostile to their interests.

They resented his paternalistic attitude

toward them and they felt that he lived too close to the reservation and
was too influenced by the white ranchers in the region to be objective
about the problems of the Cheyenne River Sioux.

His membership on the

House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs was considered a "liability” by
the tribal negotiators and they also felt that he was unduly influenced
by Senator Arthur V. Watkins of Utah, the chairman of the Senate Sub
committee on Indian Affairs, who was considered by several tribal
groups to be "an Indian hater."

35

After being introduced in the House, the Berry bill was referred
to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs which was under the
chairmanship of Representative A. L. Miller of Nebraska.
35

On March 12,

•
Frank Ducheneaux, Ellen Ducheneaux, interviews;
U.S., Congress,
Congressional Directory, 83d Cong., 2d sess., (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 131-32.
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1953, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens sent to Chairman Miller
the Corps of Engineers recommendations concerning the Berry bill.
These recommendations revealed that the Corps was not willing to offer
very much compensation to the Indians and that it considered the tribal
requests to be extravagant.

While the Corps was willing to pay the

Indians $2,000,000 for their property, plus up to 25 per cent of that
amount for relocation expenses, and whatever else could be squeezed
out of the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the Oahe project funds, it was
evident from the Army recommendations that it clearly felt that the
Cheyenne River Sioux were not entitled to any further compensation or
benefits, including the shoreline provisions.*30
Throughout the remainder of 1953 and during the first few months
of 1954, lengthy hearings were held on the Berry bill before a Joint
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and later before the House Subcommittee
on Indian Affairs. 3 7

Frank Ducheneaux recalled that the tribal

negotiators quickly learned two important lessons in dealing with
Congress as a result of these hearings.

The first lesson was that to

accomplish anything in Washington the tribal committee had. to pay for
their own expenses since the Bureau of Indian Affairs would only pay
for visits of up to five days and that was not a long enough period for
the Indians to "cut through the white tape."

ip

But the tribe did keep

^Letter from Robert T. Stevens, Secretary of the Army, to the
Honorable A. L. Miller, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., March 12, 1953?
H.R. Rep. 2484, Acquisition of Cheyenne River T.ands, pp, 9-11.
37

The actual proceedings of these hearings were not available for
this study.
38p>rank Ducheneaux, interviews.
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a close account of their expenses since it was expected that they would
be reimbursed for them out of the final Oahe settlement.

The other

lesson was that the members of Congress wanted to talk to "real Indians"
and they were much happier when they were being addressed by stereotypic
full-bloods in feathered headdress and beaded regalia than when they had
to deal with less typical looking Indians such as Frank Ducheneaux, who
wore business suits, smoked cigars, and talked like lawyers.

In order

to satisfy this Congressional whim, the tribal negotiators decided that
John Little Cloud would speak in Sioux at the hearings and that Alex
Chasing Hawk would then translate Little Cloud1s remarks into broken
English, even though both men could speak perfectly good English.
Congressmen were delighted.

The

But while the tribal negotiators succeeded

in putting on a good show at the hearings, they were not as successful
at getting the men in Washington to approve their requests for comp
ensation.

They were repeatedly asked to scale down their request for

tangible future damages and to cut the costs of the rehabilitation
program. 393
On March 18, 1954, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Orme
Lewis sent to Representative A. L. Miller of the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs the Department of the Interior's re
commendations on the Berry bill.

This report recommended the passage

of the bill but suggested several important amendments, including the
reduction of both the total payment and interest rate of the final
39Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.
.

settlement. ^
By the time the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs had completed
its hearings on the Berry bill in the spring of 1954, the Tribal Nego
tiating Committee had agreed to cut its request for tangible future
damages from $6,871,467 to $3,973,076 and to slash the costs of the
rehabilitation program from $12,289,432 to $6,044,500.

These amounts

were then recommended along with certain other amendments in the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affair's report on the Berry bill
which was submitted to the House of Representatives on July 23.

During

the eighteen month period that the bill had been considered by this
committee, the total amount of compensation had been reduced from
$21,675,678 to $12,732,354.

The committee had also attached a number of

amendments to the original bill although most of the other provisions
requested by the tribal negotiators had been left intact.

Following the

recommendation of the Department of the Interior, the interest rate on
the settlement funds was cut from five per cent to;four per cent per
annum and the Secretary of the Interior and not the Tribal Council was
given final authority over the relocation of facilities and the dis
bursement and expenditure of all settlement funds.

While the committee

did not alter the tribal request to have all substitute lands within the
reservation come under federal trust status, it did provide that sub
stitute lands purchased outside of the reservation would keep their
existing status in regard to taxation.

In other words, these lands

40 Letter from Orme Lewis, Assistant Secretary of the Interior,
.
to
the Honorable A. L. Miller, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular- Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., March 18, 1954;
H.R. Rep. 2484, Acquisition of Cheyenne River Lands, pp. 12-14.
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would be held by Indian owners under a fee patent. 41
Following the recommendations of the Department of the Army, an
amendment was included to authorize the Corps of Engineers to give
public notice of the closing of the Oahe Dam one year in advance so
that the Indians could remove themselves and their property from the
taking area.

This amendment also provided that after the expiration

of that one year period the United States government would no longer
be held liable for the loss of life or property within the taking area.
The committee also included an amendment which established the pro
cedure to be followed by those Indians who rejected the appraisal of
their property and wished to have final determination made in U. S.
District Court.

While the tribal negotiators had requested that the

government pay the court costs and attorneys fees for these individuals,
the committee amendment required that the Indians pay for own legal
counsel.

Before a case could be heard, however, the Tribal Council

would be required to deposit with the court an amount equal to the
appraised value of the property in question.

This money was then to be

used to pay part or all of the final judgment.

If the final amount was

more than the original appraisal, the government was authorized to make
up the difference out of Oahe settlement funds.

The committee apparently

felt that this amendment would have the effect of both discouraging
future litigation and protecting the government from any further pay
ment.

In regard to the request of the Tribal Negotiating Committee for

$100,000 to offset tribal expenses resulting from the settlement nego41

H.R. Rep. 2484, Ibid., pp. 6-8.
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tiations, the committee also included a provision that not more than
$50,000 of that amount could be used for attorneys’ fees.

42

On August 3 the Berry bill as amended by the Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs was voted on in the House of Representatives.

In

his final remarks prior to the voting, Representative Berry urged his
colleagues to pass the legislation he had proposed as a step toward
eventual termination:
As an illustration of the good intention and desire of the
Indian people to work out this program and to get the
greatest results, they have asked that these funds be ear
marked for these various purposes and be used for those
purposes as nearly as possible. The Tribal Council of
the reservation has spent many, many hours in working
and planning and studying to bring before this Congress
the most efficient program possible. I hope that this
Congress will see fit to go along with them and to help
get them in shape, financially, and economically, and
intellectually, so that they, too, may be able to get
out from under the yoke of the Indian Department before
too long.^3
The Berry bill was passed by the House and referred to the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, chaired by Senator Arthur V.
Watkins of Utah.

While it had taken nearly a year and a half for the

House Committee to deliberate on the Berry bill, the Senate Committee
took only two weeks to make its legislative recommendations.

Following

the suggestion of the Department of the Interior, the Senate Committee
reduced the amount of compensation for the land, improvements, timber,
and severance damages from $2,614,779 to $2,250,000, the amount of the
revised MRBI appraisal.

The Secretary of the interior and not the

^ U . S ., Congress, House, Representative E. Y. Berry speaking on H.R.
2233, 83d Cong., 2d sess., August 3, 1954, Congressional Record, C,
13160.

117

Tribal Council was given the final responsibility for the distribution
of these funds.

The amount of tangible future damages was cut from the

$3/973,076 figure recommended by the House to $3,134,014.

The reha

bilitation program was further reduced from $6,044,500 to $5,160,000.
This represented an overall reduction of $2,088,341 or from $12,732,355
to $10,644,014.

Except for a few minor word changes the Senate

Committee made ho further amendments to the Berry bill and it was
reported on the floor of the Senate on August 1 7 . ^

The next day the

bill passed the Senate as amended and on August 19 the House concurred
with the Senate amendments. 4 5

On August 20, the bill proposed by

Representative Berry for the compensation of the Cheyenne River Sioux
in regard to the Oahe Dam project became Public Law 776 with the
signature of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

46

The initial reaction of the Tribal Negotiating Committee to the
final settlement was keen disappointment.

For forty-five days prior to

signing of the bill into law these men had attended hearings, con-;
ferences, and the sessions of Congress nearly every day and they felt
both tired and defeated.
a settlement.

They had spent nearly four years negotiating

While they could find some consolation in the fact that

44

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Providing for the Acquisition of Lands by the United States Required for
the Reservoir Created by the Construction of Oahe Dam on the Missouri
River and for Rehabilitation of the Indians of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation, S. Dak., S. Rep. 2489, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954, pp. 1-2.
45

U.S., Congress, Senate and House, Senate approves H.R. 2233 as
amended, House concurs, 83d Cong., 2d sess., August 18-19, 1954,
Congressional Record, C, 14979, 15229.
46
Act of September 3, 1954, Statutes at Large, LXVIII, 1191 (1954).
(Hereinafter referred to as The Oahe Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 1191 (1954)).
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Congress had approved most of their requests, they were not happy about
the fact that they had received nearly $13,000,000 less than the amount
they had originally sought.

In their fatigue and frustration the tribal

negotiators thought about continuing their fight by urging the members
of the tribe to reject the settlement.
this move.

But Ralph Case advised against

He reminded the tribal negotiators that if the Cheyenne

River Sioux refused to ratify the final settlement they might ultimately
have to settle for condemnation, in which case they would receive only
the amount offered by the Corps of Engineers.^

Despite a provision in
/

Public Law 776 which stipulated that it would be "the final and; com
plete settlement of all claims, rights, and demands. . .arising out of
the construction of the Oahe project,"

48

Case told the tribal repre

sentatives that they could best carry on their fight by asking for
amendatory legislation from Congress.

Although the Cheyenne River Sioux

finally decided to follow this advice, the future would prove Case
wrong.

Over the span of the next several years the repeated attempts of

the tribe to gain additional compensation and benefits from Congress all
proved unsuccessful.

49

Reflecting several years later on the nature of the negotiations
and the terms of the final settlement, many of the tribal negotiators
felt that they could have received a better deal from a Democratic
Congress.

For this reason, they regretted the fact that they were not

^ Frank Ducheneaux, Ellen Ducheneaux, Lloyd Le Beau, interviews.
48The Oahe Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 1191 (1954).
49

.
Frank Ducheneaux, Ellen Ducheneaux, Lloyd Le Beau, interviews.
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able to continue the negotiations for at least another year.

They also

regretted that they had not had more experience in dealing with Congressmen and other government officials.

■■■•.-

Although immediately

following the final settlement the tribal negotiators still felt
hostile toward the representatives of the Corps of Engineers and, to a
lesser degree, the Department of the Interior, they generally felt that
most of the Congressmen they dealt with were

willing to listen to any of

the tribal demands that were within reason.

Later they realized that

these men too had not always been completely

candid and that they should

have been more insightful in dealing with them.

As for

their own re

presentation, the Cheyenne River Sioux came to realize that they had
simply been "outgunned."

Seven reservation Indians and one white lawyer

had seemingly had to defend their case before all of the lieutenants of
officialdom and their bureaucratic regiments.

While several of the

tribal members felt that Ralph Case had been too inclined "to go along
with the boys" in Washington, Frank Ducheneaux realized and appreciated
the tremendous odds Case had had to face.

As the only tribal attorney

he had often had to work against dozens of government lawyers.

50

Despite the bitter feelings of the tribal negotiators, they had
succeeded in obtaining one of the highest cash per acre settlements of
any Indian tribe up to that time.

They had also negotiated a much

better settlement than the Fort Berthold Indians had in 1949.

Public

Law 776 had provided the Cheyenne River Sioux with a cash settlement
of $10,644,014 and the guarantee that the costs of relocating and re50

Ibid.
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establishing the cemeteries, schools, administrative buildings, and
other facilities would be taken out of the Corps of Engineers ap
propriation for the Oahe project.

The law also stipulated that "the

economic, social, religious, and community life of all said Indians

;

shall be restored to a condition not less advantageous to said Indians
than the condition said Indians are now in."

The Cheyenne River Sioux

were permitted to retain mineral rights within the taking area,
salvage rights and the right to remain on the land and use it until the
gates of the dam were closed, and grazing, hunting, and fishing rights
along the shoreline of the reservoir, subject to federal regulations.
The law also granted their request to have the federal government take
responsibility for all hazards to Indian livestock created by the
reservoir, to have substitute lands purchased within the reservation
come under federal trust status, to permit the holders of inherited
lands to consolidate their interests as they saw fit, and to have the
Tribal Council reimbursed up to $100,000 for its negotiating expenses.
The tribal members were promised that the federal government would aid
them in finding new land and in relocating and reestablishing them on
that land.

The law also guaranteed that no part of the settlement funds

would be used to offset or counter any previous tribal claim against the
government or interfere with any benefits the tribe already received
under previous treaties, laws, or executive orders, including the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.

Despite all of these provisions,

however, the Oahe settlement would be mpst remembered by the Cheyenne
River Sioux for what it did not give to them.^
51
The Oahe Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 1191 (1954).

^

During the period between the Washington Negotiating Conference
of November, 1952 and the signing of the final Oahe settlement in
August, 1954, a number of the provisions and requests of the Tribal
Negotiating Committee's proposed contract had been either altered or
eliminated.

The amount requested for the rehabilitation program had

been cut by more than $7,400,000, the tangible future damages by nearly
$5,200,000, and the tribal land appraisal by nearly $365,000.

The

interest rate on the settlement funds had been reduced by one per cent.
The provisions for tax exemptions had been eliminated as had the pro
hibition against hiring administrative personnel with funds from the
final settlement.

The requests to have a block of the hydroelectric

power of the Oahe Dam, to have the exclusive right to establish
recreational facilities along the reservoir shoreline, and to have all
undisposed of homestead lands returned to tribal ownership had also been
withdrawn.

The Secretary of the Interior, and not the Tribal Council,

had been given final authority over the disbursement and expenditure of
all settlement funds including those designated for the tribal re
habilitation program.

Substitute lands purchased outside the reservation

had been denied federal trust status.

Tribal members who rejected the

appraisal of their property had been denied free legal representation
in court and had been discouraged by the elaborate procedures estab
lished for these cases.

The Cheyenne River Sioux had also been denied

their requests to have the Department of the Interior establish programs--;
to assist individual Indians with their financial problems and to
develop fuel resources, surveying markers, and irrigation projects on
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the reservation.

In addition to having these requests and provisions

denied, the federal government had placed certain restrictions on the
rights and privileges that had been granted to the tribe.

The mineral

rights, for example, had been made subject "to all reasonable regulations which may be imposed by the Corps of Engineers."

Hunting,

fishing, and grazing rights had been made subject to "regulations
governing the corresponding use by other citizens of the United States"
of the land along the reservoir.

Salvage rights had also been made

subject to Corps of Engineers regulations and the final settlement had
provided that all timber within the taking area would have to be
salvaged within six months after the Corps gave its one year public
notice of the closing of the dam gates. 52
In late December, 1954, the Cheyenne River Sioux were asked to
vote on whether or not they wanted to accept the final settlement
offered by the Eighty-Third Congress for the Oahe lands.

Ballots were

distributed to approximately 2400 Indians and they were asked to return
them by January 5, 1955.

Frank Ducheneaux urged the tribal members to

vote for acceptance and he reminded them how important it was to return
their ballots since a three-quarter vote of the adult tribal enrollment
would be necessary for ratification and since all ballots not returned
would be counted as a "no" vote.
52 Ibid.

By mid-January the votes were in and

The restrictions placed on the mineral rights meant that
the Corps of Engineers might conceivably prohibit the extraction of
tribal mineral resources if it could find justification to do so in its
own regulations. The restrictions on the shoreline rights also meant
that agencies such as the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Outdoor
Recreation would govern the Indians in their use of the reservoir and
shoreline and that non-Indians would be able to have the same shore
line rights even within the reservation.
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approximately 92 per cent of the eligible tribal members had voted to
accept the provisions of Public Law 776.

53

53

Eagle Butte News, December 24, 1954, January 14, 1955.

CHAPTER V
THE AFTERMATH:
RELOCATION AND REHABILITATION
After the Cheyenne River Sioux ratified Public Law 776, a
comprehensive program for the expenditure of the appropriated funds was
developed by the Tribal Council and approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.

This program provided for the equal division of responsiK

bilities and authority between the Tribal Council and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs.

The BIA was given the responsibility of reestablishing

Cheyenne Agency, of appraising land and contacting property owners
regarding these approvals, of arranging for all land transactions, and
of making recommendations concerning the program as requested by the
Tribal Council.

While the Secretary of the Interior was given final

authority over all of the funds provided by Public Law 776, the Tribal
Council was given complete authority for initiating the Rehabilitation
Program and administering it once it was approved by the Secretary.
The Council was responsible for programming and spending the funds and
supervising the overall details of the program.

1316 BIA had no authority

to supervise the Rehabilitation Program or to maintain compliance with
any of the other expenditure programs provided for by Public Law 776
unless charges of mismanagement were brought against the Tribe or the
Tribal Council requested assistance.

As Frank Ducheneaux explained,

"this represented the first time that the BIA and a Tribe were put on
equal footing in such a program.

One could not move without the other,
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and this established a precedent in tribal authority."^
Once the expenditure program prepared by the Tribal Council had
received the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, MRBI repre
sentatives began contacting those tribal members who owned property
within the taking area.

Each of these Indians were advised of the

appraised value of their property and of their rights under Public Law
776.

They were also requested to indicate whether or not they wanted to

accept the appraised value as final payment.

There were 434 individuals

who either owned or had an heirship interest in property within the taking
area and the total value of their properties was appraised at $1,161,418,
or an average of $2,676 each.

In addition, the tribal property within

the taking area was valued at $1,088,582.

Because the Tribal Council

had not been satisfied with the payment offered by the MKBI appraisers
to those individuals who owned timber within the taking area, it authorized
an additional payment of $238,404 to these individuals.

The MRBI appraisal

of the timber had been based on the commercial stumpage value only.

The

Council felt that the appraisal should also reflect the utility value of
the timber as used by the tribal members for construction needs, fencing,
and firewood.

The additional payments for these timber values were taken

from surplus tribal funds rather than from those made available by Public
Law 776.^
All but one of the tribal members agreed to accept the appraised
value of their property.

Pete Hiett rejected the appraisal and

^MRBI Rep. No. 152, 1956 Rehabilitation Progress Report, pp. 1, 21.;
Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.
2MRBI Rep. No. 152, Ibid., pp. 1, 11, 15.
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requested that the value of his property be determined in the Federal
District Court at Pierre.

The MRBI had appraised his property at

$13,000 and the Tribal Council offered to give him an additional $8000
for the value of his timber.

After two years of trying to get his

case through the court, Hiett received a settlement of $22,000.

How

ever, after the legal fees and other expenses were deducted from this
amount, he was left with only $18,000, which was $3000 less than he
could have received from the original offers.

3

As soon as the other tribal members agreed to accept the amount
offered for their interests within the taking area, BIA and tribal
officials discussed the expenditure of funds with them and assisted
them in preparing a program which would provide for the most practical
and judicious use of their money.

Most of the tribal members gave

considerable thought and time to the preparation of their individual
expenditure programs.

Whenever possible they tried to coordinate the

use of their funds with those they planned to borrow from the Tribal
Rehabilitation Program.

Each family head was then requested to describe

the improvements on his property and to indicate Where he intended to
move those improvements.

They were also asked to estimate their repair

and replacement needs and to indicate how much of the moving, con
struction, and repair work they intended to do themselves and how much
they wanted done by the Tribe or by private contractors.

The problems

of land purchase and consolidation were also discussed and a plan was

^Ibid.: Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.

5
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worked out which would fulfill as many of the requirements of the
individual as possible.^
Once a program had been drawn up for each individual and approved
by the Superintendent of the Cheyenne River Agency and accepted by the
Tribal Chairman, it was presented to the Tribal Treasurer for payment.
Those individuals who had outstanding tribal or government obligations
signed a voucher which deducted the amount of their debt from their
final payment.

Nearly all of the tribal members who received a cash

payment immediately deposited their funds in commercial banks or in
their Individual Indian Money (IIM) Accounts that were safeguarded by
the BIA.

5

Following the enactment of Public Law 776 by the Eighty-Third
Congress, it became necessary for the Cheyenne River Sioux to readjust
and reevaluate their proposed Rehabilitation Program.

In the spring

of 1955 a committee consisting of Tribal Council representatives and
BIA personnel was established for this purpose.

Although the members

While the Indians of Cheyenne River were only obligated to pay
off their outstanding debts to the federal and tribe government out
of their final settlement funds, they displayed a remarkable
willingness to use their money to pay off their personal debts as
well. The tribal members scheduled $36,595 toward the payment of
personal debts to local merchants, mortgage payments, bank notes,
and medical bills. They also paid $36,207 to the Tribal Council
and $31,998 to the federal government for the repayment of out
standing loans. Of the remaining settlement funds, $288,291 was
scheduled for new houses, $88,996 for the purchase of reservation
land, $75,382 for livestock, $13,869 for small business enterprises,
$164,291 for old age subsistence and retirement investments, $4,876
for educational expenses, and $9,288 for the relocation of six
families off the reservation. MRBI Rep. No. 152, Ibid.
"*Ibid.
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of this committee held many divergent opinions as to what would
constitute the most satisfactory and workable utilization of the
approved funds, the program that was finally approved by the Secretary
of the Interior was largely written by Frank and Ellen Ducheneaux and
was based on the original proposals of the Tribal Negotiating Committee
which had been prepared in 1952.

As previously mentioned, this program

essentially gave the Tribal Council full responsibility for the
administration and supervision of the Rehabilitation Program.
After the adult members of the tribe ratified Public Law 776, the
sum of $5,160,000 for the program was appropriated by Congress and
deposited in the U.S. Treasury to draw interest at four per cent per
annum until expended by the Tribe.

At the outset, the tribal authorities

estimated that approximately $1,000,000 of the appropriation would be
used for the relocation and reestablishment of those tribal members who
resided within the Oahe taking area.

Half of this expenditure was

authorized for the purchase of new land and for the continuation and
expansion of the exchange assignment program and other land consolidation
methods designed to permit the Indians to make greater use of reservation
lands.

Of the $4,600,000 that would actually be used for the Rehabi

litation Program, approximately $2,700,000 was designated for a
Rehabilitation Repayment Cattle Program, $545,000 for a General
Assistance Housing Program, $300,000 for a Student Education Program,
$200,000 for a Rehabilitation Farm Program, $160,000 for a Business
Enterprise Program, and $100,000 was for an Adult Education Program.
6

Ibid.
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Approximately $150,000 was to be used for the administration of the
program and the remainder of the funds would be left to draw interest
in the U.S. Treasury until future needs could be determined.

7

As defined by the program, rehabilitation funds were to be used
"for the development of family and individual plans, prepared by the
person making application for participation in the program, to establish
the participants in economic units and to improve their economic and
social status."

But as Frank Ducheneaux pointed out, the term

"rehabilitation" was really a misnomer since it was "not a program to
bring the Indian people back to where they were, but a program to launch
them toward new gains."9

As such it was aimed at providing a new

start for as many of the tribal members as the funds available would
permit, giving first consideration to those families with the greatest
need.

But it was also designed to be sufficiently broad enough in

scope so that none of the tribal members would be barred from parti
cipation by such factors as age, education attainment, experience, or
wealth.

Established as a twenty-year program, it extended an opportunity

7 .
Ibid., pp. 19-20.; Frank Ducheneaux, Ellen Ducheneaux, interviews;
U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Present
Status and Projected Future Needs of Cheyenne River Rehabilitation
Program as of April 15, 1958, MRBI Rep. No. 157 (Billings: Missouri
River Basin Investigations Project, 1958), pp. 3, 8. (Hereinafter
referred to as MRBI Rep. No. 157, 1958 Rehabilitation Program Status.)
8
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council, Tribal Rehabilitation
Program, Rev. ed., Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, South Dakota,
CRSTC Files, p. 8. (Hereinafter referred to as Tribal Rehabilitation
Program.)
Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.
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to each family on the reservation to take advantage of some aspect of
rehabilitation even though they might be ill prepared to do so in
terms of experience or ability.10
The Rehabilitation Program strongly reflected the importance the
Cheyenne River Sioux placed on livestock operations.

More than half

of the rehabilitation funds were designated for the Repayment Cattle
Program.

This livestock program, modeled after the existing BIA

Repayment Cattle Program, was designed to provide cash and cattle
loans to any tribal member who intended to establish a ranching
operation.

Cattle loans were to be repayable-in-kind with eleven head

repayable for each ten head loaned.

Cash loans were to be repayable in

cash with an interest rate of three per cent per annum.

The available

loans were to be used by both those Indians who were just starting out
in the cattle business as well as those who only required a small
amount of assistance to bring them up to the level established by the
Rehabilitation Planning Committee as an economic unit.

At the start

of the program 100 head of stock constituted an economic unit and the
number was later raised to 150 head (in the previous BIA programs eighty
head of stock was considered an economic unit)
Those tribal members who required full rehabilitation in regard to
this program were loaned 100 head of yearling heifers and enough bulls
10
Tribal Rehabi1itation Program, pp. 8-9.; MRBI Rep. No. 157,
1958 Rehabilitation Program Status, p. 3.
11Tribal Rehabilitation Program, pp. 15-30.; MRBI Rep. No. 157,
Ibid.; MRBI Rep. No. 152, 1956 Rehabilitation Progress Report,
pp. 23-25.; Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council Resolution No. 9-61,
January 31, 1961, CRSTC Files.

to service that number (usually three).

Those tribal members who

required only partial rehabilitation were loaned enough stock to bring
them up to this number.

In addition the program provided each approved

tribal" member with up to $10,000 for improvements and operating
expenses including living expenses for the Indian rancher and his
family until they had their first calf sale (usually the third year of
operation).

These funds could also be used for the purchase or conso

lidation of land.

The Repayment Cattle Program established the carrying

capacity of the reservation at thirty acres per animal unit and this
meant that a minimum of 3,000 acres would be required for a basic ranch
unit, not including cropland. 12
In order to qualify for the cash and cattle loans a tribal member
had to be twenty-one years of age, unless he was the head of a family,
and he had to develop a workable plan of operation and have it approved
by the Tribal Council's Rehabilitation Committee.

In all cases, how

ever, preference was to be given to those Indian families who demon
strated the greatest need for the loans.

In order to limit the initial

cash-outlay and minimize the risks for the new ranchers, repayment on
the cattle loans was not required until the third year of operation
(since the rancher would not have enough yearling heifers for repayment
until then) .

Repayment on cash loans would be on the interest only for

the first five years, with the understanding that the loans would be
paid in full by the end of the tenth year.

In addition, supervisors
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or fieldmen were hired to provide guidance for the new ranchers in their
management practices and the program provided for the establishment of
the Cheyenne River Sales Pavillion to be used for weekly sales during
the calf sales season.

The program also provided for the initial pur

chase of seventy-five machinery units, thirty pickup trucks, and
enough barb wire and posts to build approximately 2,000 miles of fencing
for the Indian ranchers. 13
The Repayment Cattle Program anticipated the participation of more
than 210 Indian families.

However, a study made by the Tribal Council*s

Rehabilitation Committee in February, 1955 revealed that only about
twenty Indian families wanted loans to establish dry farm units.

The

Rehabilitation Farm Program was designed to provide each of these
families with $5,000 worth of mechanized farm equipment and another
$5,000 for the purchase of seed, cows, hogs, poultry, fencing, barns
and other buildings, and for operating costs.

While it was estimated

that three of these families would start farm operations during the
first year and $30,000 was budgeted for their use, no formal applications
were made for the farm loans during the course of 1956.

The program was

eventually abandoned for lack of interest and its funds were transferred
to the education and business enterprise programs.

14

The survey conducted by the Rehabilitation Committee in February,
1955 also discovered that about twenty tribal families or individuals
13A unit of machinery consisted of a tractor, a mower, a rake, a
power posthold digger, a hay grapple fork, a power lift, a bulldozer,
and a tractor trailer. Ibid.
14
MRBI Rep. No. 152, Ibid. , p. 24.; MRBI Rep. No. 157, Ibid., p. 7.
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were interested in establishing a small business enterprise of some kind
either on or off the reservation.

In order to accommodate these tribal

members, the Business Enterprise Program was designed to provide up to
$8,000 for each business venture.

Repayment arrangements were similar

to those of the cash portion of the Repayment Cattle Program.

During

the first three years of the program only six loans were actually made.
These included loans to establish a service station, auto repair shop,
and lunch counter on U.S. Highway 212, a recreation parlor and snack
counter in Eagle Butte, and a motion picture theater in Timber Lake,
South Dakota.

15

The Cheyenne River Rehabilitation Committee estimated that
twenty-five high school graduates per year might qualify for admission
to college or vocational training programs.

The Student Education

Program was designed to provide grants to these students to cover all
of their educational esqpenses including transportation, books, tuition,
and room and board for up to four years.

The Adult Education Program

was also established to provide forty qualified adult tribal members
with up to $2,500 each for up to two years of vocational training.
These programs provided for grants rather than loans because it was
felt that it would defeat the purpose of the program to saddle the
students with an additional financial burden.

During the first two years

that these programs were in operation seventy Indian youth and fiftyseven adult tribal members received educational grants.
15

Of this number,,

'
.
MRBI Rep. No. 157, Ibid., p. 15.; Tribal Rehabilitation Program,
pp. 33-37.
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however, 54 per cent dropped out of school without completing their
training.^
The General Assistance Housing Program was designed to aid those
tribal members who could not qualify for the other housing assistance
programs established under Public Law 776.

This program had two

phases, one for the building of new houses and the second for the repair
of existing houses.

Most of the tribal members who qualified for this

program were either full-bloods over fifty-five years of age or family
heads who were physically handicapped.

The new houses were to be built

by private contractors and were to measure 16 X 26 feet and would cost
approximately $2,500 each.

Funds were appropriated for the construction

of fifty-four new houses and the extensive repair of eight houses
during the first year of this program . ^
The Rehabilitation Administration Program called for the hiring of
a General Manager to supervise the entire program, Field Supervisors in
each of the reservation districts to assist and advise the tribal members
who were participating in the program, and a staff of clerical personnel
to handle the paperwork.

In addition, the program authorized the pur

chase of a complete line of office equipment and supplies and new auto
mobiles and pickup trucks for the General Manager and the Field Super
visors.

The Field Supervisors and the clerical personnel had to be

qualified members of the Tribe selected by the Tribal Chairman and the

16MRBI Rep. No. 157, Ibid., p. 15.; MRBI Rep. No. 152, 1956
Rehabilitation Progress Report, p. 26.; Tribal Rehabilitation Program,
pp. 38-43.
17

MRBI Rep. No. 157, Ibid., p. 13.; MRBI Rep. No. 152, Ibid.,
pp. 27-28.; Tribal Rehabilitation Program, pp. 44-46.
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Rehabilitation Committee.

18

In December, 1955, Larry Mayes, the State

Auditor for South Dakota, was hired by the Tribal Council to serve as
General Manager of the Rehabilitation Program. 19
During the spring of 1955 meetings were held on the reservation
to explain the Rehabilitation Program to the tribal members and to show
them how to make application for assistance.

In the meantime the

Tribal Council tried to decide the best place to relocate the facilities
at Cheyenne Agency.

After considering several locations on the reser

vation, the Council decided that the predominantly white town of Eagle
Butte, located fifty miles west of Cheyenne Agency, would be the best
location for the new agency site if an adequate water supply could be
provided.

The Council favored Eagle Butte because, unlike Cheyenne

Agency which was located 150 miles from some parts of the reservation,
it had a central location and would therefore be equally accessible for
all of the tribal members.

A main railroad line and U.S. Highway 212

also ran through the town and the Tribe already owned a half-section of
land there.

However, local BIA officials were against a move to Eagle

Butte since they felt that the water and sewage system there would not
be adequate enough to support the new Indian population.

When the

citizens of Eagle Butte heard that the Tribe was interested in moving to
their economically depressed town, they set to work to do everything in
their power to encourage the move.

The cost of a new water and sewage

18
MRBI Rep. No. 152, Ibid., p. 22.; Tribal Rehabilitation Program,
pp. 53-55.
19

Eagle Butte News, December 23, 1955.
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system for the town had been estimated at $200,000.

The townspeople

pledged to put up $35,000 in cash and to finance the rest of the
construction costs through municipal bonds if the Tribal Council would
give them the assurance that the agency would be moved to Eagle Butte.
The town newspaper, the Eagle Butte News, also urged its readers to
write to Congressman E. Y. Berry and ask him what they could do to get
the agency relocated to their town.

Finally, on October 21, 1955,

after months of negotiations, the BIA approved a petition from the
Tribal Council and Eagle Butte was officially named the new site for
the Cheyenne River Sioux Agency.

By November of the next year, the

town’s new water and sewage system was put into operation.
In July, 1956, the Tribe established a Relocation Office to
assist those Indian families who had to be removed from the reservoir
*>1

area and Lloyd Le Beau was hired to serve as Relocation Manager.~

In the spring of 1957 at meetings held at Cheyenne Agency, William G.
Evans of the Omaha District Office of the Corps of Engineers presented
a plan for relocation to representatives of the Tribal Council, the
BIA, the Indian Health Service, and the Eagle Butte School Board and
Town Council.

This plan called for the relocation of the agency

facilities to the Indian land adjoining the north city limits of Eagle
Butte.

Over 650 tribal members were to be moved to this location no

later than the spring of 1959 and they were to live temporarily in
small-house trailers until new housing facilities could be constructed

Ibid., February 25, April 9, October 21, 1955, November 30,
1956.; Frank Ducheneaux, Ellen Ducheneaux, interviews.
21

. . .

MRBI Rep. No. 152, 1956 Rehabilitation Progress Report,
pp. 18-19, 26-27.
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for them.

The Corps of Engineers predicted that this would be a very

difficult and chaotic period for the Indians involved since it was
estimated that the influx of construction workers and private con
tractors alone would double the population of Eagle Butte during this
period.

The Corps agreed that the new hospital would be the first

building constructed on the new agency site.

In the meantime, an old

clinic in Eagle Butte was opened up by the Indian Health Service to
provide outpatient and emergency medical care for the Indians until the
9 9

new hospital was opened.
In September, 1957, President Eisenhower signed into law an act
which

provided for the reimbursement of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal

Council for the expenses they had incurred as a result of the Oahe
negotiations.

In April, 1956 the Tribal Council had reported to the

Omaha District Engineer that their negotiating expenses totaled
$119,802, of which $72,222 was for attorneys fees.

Since Public Law

776 only authorized a total reimbursement of up to $100,000 and no more
than $50,000 for attorney fees, Congress only approved the payment of
$97,580 to the Tribe.

This meant that the Tribal Council had to pay

the remaining $22,294 out of their own funds.^
In October the Omaha District Office of the Corps of Engineers
began accepting bids from private contractors for the various relocation
22

Eagle Butte News, January 4, February 15, May 17, 1957.

23 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Providing Reimbursement to the Tribal Council of the Cheyenne River ,
Sioux Reservation in Accordance with the Act of September 3, 1954,
S. Rep. 1105, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, p. 2.; Act of September 2,
1957, Statutes at Large, LXXI, 598-99.
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and reconstruction projects on Cheyenne River.

Most of the construction

contracts were awarded to large out-of-state firms such as Peter Kiewit
and Sons of Omaha, Nebraska.

On Thanksgiving Day, construction work

began on the new agency site in Eagle Butte and the local townspeople
were permitted to sign up for construction jobs.2^

Although Lloyd Le

Beau reported that the private contractors also hired a number of Indians
and that earth-moving equipment owned by the Tribe had been used by
tribal members to prepare the site for construction, the tribal
officials generally felt that in view of the high rate of unemployment
on the reservation, members of the tribe should be given first
priority for all jobs they were qualified to perform.

Since the

clearing of the taking area and the relocation and reconstruction of
new facilities was of vital concern to the Indians and would greatly
effect their own lives and property, the tribal officials felt that
tribal members should be given the greatest opportunity possible to
participate in this activity.

The Tribal Council therefore requested

the members of the South Dakota Congressional delegation to take action
to require the Corps of Engineers to arrange for the hiring of more
Indian workers.

The Corps officials claimed that they had no authority

to do this since they were only authorized to enter into contracts with
the lowest bidder for any approved project and could not dictate the
employment practices of private contractors.2^

Finally, in 1961,

24
Eagle Butte News, October 11, December 9, 1957.
25

Lloyd Le Beau, Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.
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Senator Milton Young of North Dakota submitted a bill which would
authorize the Standing Rock Sioux to participate in clearing the land
within the Oahe taking area on their reservation and Senator Frances
Case amended this bill to include the same provisions for the Cheyenne River Sioux.

26

This legislation would require the Corps of

Engineers to enter into contracts with these respective tribes for the
completion of certain clearing and salvage operations.

By the time

that the Senate Committee on Public Works got around to considering
this bill,-showever, most of the reservoir area within the Cheyenne
River Reservation had already been cleared and most of the improve
ments and timber had been salvaged.
action on the bill.

The Senate never took any further

27

On August 3, 1958, at six o'clock in the morning, giant earth
movers began dumping dirt into the Missouri River at a site just north
of Pierre and dignitaries gathered for a public ceremony to mark the
closing of the Oahe Dam.

Winthrop Rockefellar served as the principal

speaker and Senator Karl Mundt, Representative E. Y. Berry, and
Governor Joe Foss of South Dakota, Senators Roman Hruska and Carl
Curtis of Nebraska, Senator Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa, and Generals
G. E. Galloway and John L. Person of the Corps of Engineers were also
on hand. 28

In September, President Eisenhower signed into law a bill

^ U . S . , Congress, Senate, A Bill Authorizing Standing Rock and
Cheyenne River Indian Tribes to Participate in Clearing Oahe Reser
voir Area, S. 340, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961.
27

.
Ibid.

28
New York Times, August 3, 1958, p. 38.: Pierre Daily Capitol
Journal, McLaughlin Messenger, August 3, 1958.
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which provided the Standing Rock Sioux with $12,201,553 for the pur
chase of their land and the damages caused to them by the Oahe project.
This amount was about $1,500,000 more than the Cheyenne River Sioux
had received four years earlier even though the Oahe Reservoir would
flood only half as much land on Standing Rock and less relocation and
rehabilitation would be required since most of the agency town of Fort
Yates, North Dakota would remain intact.

OQ

In October, a new multi

span bridge was opened over the Oahe Reservoir on U.S. Highway 212.
This bridge, located a half mile east of Cheyenne Agency and constructed
at a cost of over $5,000,000, would Serve as the new link between the
Cheyenne River Reservation and the outside world.^
In the spring of 1959 relocation activities began as scheduled on
Cheyenne River.

By April over 320 workers were employed at the re-

location site m

Eagle Butte and the weekly payroll exceeded $32,000.

31
In May, a group of Indians who preferred not to move to Eagle Butte
decided to move just a few miles from Cheyenne Agency to a site
adjacent to U.S. Highway 212.

The first man to relocate his house at

this new location was Mark Garter and as a result this new Indian
community became known as Marksville. 32
In September of 1959 the new Eagle Butte Community School was
opened just in time for the new school year.

The Tribal Council and

29
Act of September 2, 1958, Statutes at Large, LXXII, 1766 (1958).
30
Eagle Butte News, October 21, 1958.
^ I b l d ., April 15, 1959.
32
Aberdeen American, May 22, 1959.: BIA, Cheyenne River Fact
Sheet, p. 2
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the Eagle Butte School Board had previously agreed to consolidate the
old Cheyenne River Boarding School and the Eagle Butte High School in
order to provide for the joint funding, use, and control of the new
school facility.

In the meantime, the Indian students had celebrated

their last year at the old boarding school by winning the 1959 South
Dakota State Class B Basketball Championship.

While most of the new

school complex was ready for occupancy in September, the dormitories at
Eagle Butte had not yet been completed and the Indian students were
required to stay in their old dorms at Cheyenne Agency.

This made it

necessary to bus the students from one location to the other.

Each

school day over 500 Indian students were given sack lunches in the
morning and were required to ride the 100 miles to Eagle Butte and
back.

The Sioux Falls Argus-Leader called this "the biggest sack

lunch program in South Dakota"^ but it may have also been one of the
biggest public school bussing programs in the United States.

Finally,

in late October, the Indian students were moved into their new dorms
at Eagle Butte.

When fully completed, the new school complex included

elementary and secondary classrooms to accommodate 1,220 students,
dormitories to accommodate 400 boarding students, a gymnasium with a
seating capacity of 1,400, an auditorium with a seating capacity of
1000, a library, a vocational shop, and extensive office space.

In

addition to this new school, the Moreau River School was relocated

Eagle Butte News, March 27, September 18, 1959.
34

Sioux Falls Argus-Leader, October 23, 1959.
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twenty miles south to a site on U.S. Highway 212 and was renamed the
Swift Bird Day School and the Four Bear Day School was moved to
Parade, South Dakota. 3 5
During the fall of 1959 the BIA, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,
and the Indian Health Service also began to move their facilities from
Cheyenne River to Eagle Butte.

A new office building was constructed

for the administration of all BIA and Tribal services on Cheyenne River
and new housing units were built for those persons who were employed
by the BIA and the Tribe.

Eighty-one new houses were built for those

tribal members who wanted to live near the new agency facilities and
sixteen houses were moved from the old agency and remodeled.

In March

of 1960 the Indian Health Service Hospital at Eagle Butte was com
pleted and was named in memory of Ralph Hoyt Case, the tribal attorney
who had worked for the Cheyenne River Sioux for thirty-five years.
This new hospital facility had a thirty bed capacity, offered general
medical, surgical, pediatric, and obstetrical service and an active
outpatient clinic, and had an initial staff of forty-five permanent
personnel.

Twenty-four apartments and eight new cottages were built

to accommodate these hospital employees and thirty new two-room
houses were built under the General Housing Assistance Program for those
elderly tribal members who required special care and access to the
hospital facilities.

Four field clinics, at Red Scaffold, Cherry

Creek, Swift Bird, and White Horse, were also constructed to supple
ment the activities of the new hospital.
35

These clinics were to be

BIA' Cheyenne River Fact Sheet, p. 5.

A
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served by a travelling medical team from the Case hospital.

In

addition, a contract was made for additional inpatient care with St.
Mary's Hospital in Pierre and the Mobridge Hospital in Mobridge, South
Dakota.^
Except for a five-day wildcat strike called by the workers of
two firms in September, 1958 and a fire which caused $6,000 damage at
the relocation site in December, 1959, construction work continued at
a rapid pace at Eagle Butte.

As they had anticipated, the white

citizens of the town enjoyed an economic boom as a result of the re
location activity.

In 1959 alone a new bank, bowling alley, super

market, motel, drive-in restaurant, and newspaper office were con
structed in the town, the post office was expanded and remodeled, and
the municipal liquor store grossed over $132,000.
were also expanding their economic activities.

37

But the Indians

Besides the individual

tribal members who started businesses of their own with funds from
the Business Enterprise Program, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe also
ventured into the local business world with investments in a Super
valu supermarket, a service station and garage, a laundromat, and a
beef camp.

Between 1956 and 1958 the Tribe also purchased two local

telephone companies and launched the Cheyenne River Sioux Telephone
Company, the only telephone franchise ever awarded to an Indian tribe
36

Ibid.; U.S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Indian Health Service, Summary of Indian Health Service Reports in
South Dakota (Aberdeen: 1968), p. 10.
37
Eagle Butte News, September 19, 1958, December 5, 1959,
January 1, 1960.
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in the United States.**®

In October, 1960, a private contracting firm

from Oklahoma was hired to relocate the Indian cemeteries, shrines, and
monuments on Cheyenne River.

By late November of 1961, the Corps of

Engineers reported that the area around Cheyenne Agency had been completely salvaged and was ready to be flooded. 3 Q
On August 16, 1962, a crowd of over 10,000 persons gathered at the
Oahe Dam site to witness the dedication of the $380,000,000 project by
President John F. Kennedy.

Stewart L. Udall, the Secretary of the Inte

rior, Cyrus R. Vance, the Secretary of the Army, and General Walter K.
Wilson, the Chief of Engineers, were present for the ceremony along with
several Congressmen and other regional dignitaries.

Clarence Runs After,

the Tribal Treasurer, and Kenneth West, a member of the Tribal Council,
represented the Cheyenne River Sioux in the absence of Andrew Le Beau,
the acting Tribal Chairman, who had to be in Washington at the time.
West was on the platform with President Kennedy and he shook his hand
and presented him with a mahogany statue of Henry Standing Bear, a
Sioux chief, that had been made by Korczak Ziolkowski, the famous sculp
tor of the Crazy Horse Monument in the Black Hills.

The President was

then introduced to his early morning audience by George McGovern, who
had recently quit his post as Director of the Food for Peace program in
order to campaign as South Dakota's Democratic candidate for the
38
BIA, Cheyenne River Fact Sheet, p. 4.
39
Eagle Butte News, October 7, 1960, November 22, 1961.

United States Senate.

"This dam provides a striking illustration,

the President remarked, "of how much a free society can make the
most of its God-given resources.

^ I b i d ., August 23, 1962.; New York Times, August 17, 1962, p
Pierre Daily Capitol Journal, August 17, 1962.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION:
"EFFECTS a l l b a d , b e n e f i t s NONE"
When asked to briefly describe the effects of the Oahe Dam
project on the Indian people of Cheyenne River and to enumerate the
benefits they received from it, Ellen Ducheneaux quickly replied,
"effects all bad, benefits none."^

While "effects mostly bad, benefits

few" might have been a more accurate and objective analysis of the
situation.

Mrs. Ducheneaux's reply was precise at least in reflecting

the general attitude of the Cheyenne River Sioux toward that "Great
Imposition" they have now been living with for the past quarter century
For those tribal members who can still remember "the good old days"
before their reservation was inundated and the scenery, wildlife, and
timber destroyed, the gains produced by the Oahe will never outweigh
the losses, and, admittedly, the gains thus far have indeed been meager
While the Tribe did receive over $10,600,000 for their trouble from
the federal government, this seems to be immaterial to the Indians
since, as one tribal member has explained, "no amount of money could
have compensated us for our loss."

2

^Ellen Ducheneaux, interviews. The sardonic and ever-quotable
Mrs. Ducheneaux is never without a quip. When my wife and I first
entered her office for an interview, she loudly asked, "What have
we here? A couple of white liberals high on Indians?"
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Perhaps the feeling the Cheyenne River Sioux have about the Oahe pro
ject has best been captured in words by the following passage from
the "Declaration of Indian Purpose" that was drawn up by the American
Indian Chicago Conference in 1961:
When our lands are taken for a declared public pur
pose, scattering our people and threatening our
continued existence, it grieves us to be told that
a money payment is the equivalent of all the things
we surrender. Our forefathers could be generous
when all the continent was theirs. They could cast
away whole empires for a handful of trinkets for
their children. But in our day, each remaining
acre is a promise that we will still be here
tomorrow. Were we £aid a thousand times the market
value of our lost holdings, still the payment would
not suffice. Money never mothered the Indian
people, as the land has mothered them, nor have
any people become more closely attached to the
land, religiously and traditionally.3
If the benefits which the Cheyenne River Sioux received from the
Oahe

project are to be measured, they should first be measuredin terms

of the purposes for which the dam and
structed.

reservoir were originallycon

Assuming that the multi-million dollar engineering wonder

known as the Oahe Dam was truly designed to be beneficial to the
people of the Missouri Valley, then it should be equally beneficial to
those people, both Indian and non-Indian, who were caused to suffer the
most as a result of its construction.

But such is not the case.

The

Pick-Sloan Plan was designed to provide the benefits of flood control,
irrigation, hydroelectric power, navigation, and recreation.

But one

2Hazel Garreaux, interview held at Cheyenne River
.
.
Sioux. Tribal
Office, Eagle Butte, South Dakota, August 2, 1972.
3
American Indian Chicago Conference, Declaration of Indian Purpose
(Chicago: 1961), p. 16.
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of its biggest projects, the Oahe Dam, has not materially improved the
lives of the Indian people of Cheyenne River in regard to any of these
provisions, as the following evidence will show.
Flooding was seldum a serious problem on the Cheyenne River
Reservation prior to the construction of the Oahe Dam.

Frank Ducheneaux

could only remember two big floods on the reservation during his life
time.

Granted the fact that the flood control features of the Oahe Dam

Were primarily designed to benefit the people of the lower Missouri
Valley, it might be expected that the project could also sufficiently
control the periodic floods on the reservations of the upper Valley.
But this may not be so.

Despite Oahe, there was a flood on that portion

of the Moreau River within the Cheyenne River Reservation in 1968 and,
as this is being written, serious flooding is occurring near St. Louis,
Missouri, on that portion of the Missouri River which Pick-Sloan was
specifically designed to protect.^
Whether or not the Cheyenne River Sioux have flood control or
not, they are not very impressed with the fact since, as Ellen Duchen
eaux has pointed out, it is quite natural to assume that "if you flood
out the bottomlands you will then have flood c o n t r o l . What the
Indians are concerned with is the fact that the rise in the maximum
pool level of the Oahe Reservoir has caused the water to infringe on
Indian land that has never been purchased by the federal government
and that the fluctuation of the water level has created a far greater
4
.
.
Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.; St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
April 19-20, 1973.
^Ellen Ducheneaux, interviews.
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hazard to the Indian livestock and other resources than any of the
infrequent floods of the past.

6

The Oahe Dam has been completed for nearly a decade.

Most of

the irrigation units planned in conjunction with the project by the
Bureau of Reclamation are still on the drawing boards and few of the
residents of the central Missouri Valley have been able as yet to take
advantage of the irrigation benefits promised by Pick-Sloan.

According

to the BIA land classification there are 50,176 acres of potentially
irrigable land on the Cheyenne River Reservation.

The original Pick-

Sloan Plan called for the Bureau of Reclamation to build an irrigation
unit on the Moreau River which would provide water for more than 17,000
acres of land in the northern portion of the reservation.

But only

1,000 acres near the mouth of the river has actually been irrigated
and there are no immediate plans to expand this project.

As this study

has already pointed out, there is a question as to whether or not
irrigation farming can ever be financially feasible for the Indians.
Now there is the question of whether or not the reservation land
really is irrigable.

The experience in the Moreau River district

has not been encouraging.

Because of the excessive content of dissolved

sodium in the river water and the potential for soil sterilization
caused by the use of this kind of water, the Bureau of Reclamation has
cancelled its plans for further irrigation projects on the Moreau
River.

On the reservation land that has already been substantially

g

Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.; Rusty Farmer, BIA Administrative
Manager for Cheyenne River Agency, interview held at Eagle Butte,
South Dakota, August 2, 1972.
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irrigated there is such a heavy concentration of shale that the soil
will not soak up the water.

As a result, the water just stands on

the land and only serves to bring up the alkaline out of the soil.

7

The Cheyenne River Reservation now has more electrical power
than ever before.

It is doubtful whether this power increase is a

direct result of the construction of the Oahe project.

As previously

pointed out, the lack of electrical power on the reservation prior to
the construction of the Oahe power plant was primarily due to factors
of affordability rather than those of availability.

To this extent

the increase in electrical power is more of a result of the rise in
the general economic level of the reservation rather than the increase
in the availability of electrical power provided by the Pick-Sloan
projects.

Although these projects have definitely provided more

electrical power for the residents of the Missouri Valley, there is
no evidence to show that electricity has been provided at a lower cost,
as the Pick-Sloan Plan had promised.
The Cheyenne River Sioux could have received direct hydroelectric
benefits from the Oahe project if a block of power could have been set
aside for their exclusive use or otherwise provided to them at a low
cost.

But presently the reservation does not receive any of its power

from the Oahe Dam.

Although Oahe provides power for a wide area south

7
Frank Ducheneaux, Ibid.; Donald Kritzsinger, Oahe Area Manager,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, interview held at Oahe Dam, Pierre,
South Dakota, July 27, 1972.
(Hereinafter referred to as Donald
Kritzsinger, interview.); Cheyenne River Redevelopment Committee,
Overall Economic Development Plan for' Cheyenne River Red evelopment
Area (Eagle Butte: 1969), pp. 41-42, 73-74.
(Hereinafter referred
to as Overall Economic Development Plan.)
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of Pierre, most of the Cheyenne River Reservation is serviced by the
Moreau-Grand Electrical Cooperative of Timber Lake, South Dakota,
which gets its power from the Fort Peck and Garrison projects as well
as a smaller power plant on the Cannonball River.

Despite the in

creased availability of power, affordability continues to be the most
important factor as far as the Indians are concerned, and there are
still vast areas of the reservation that are without electrical power
just as they are without telephone service.®
Even if the Corps of Engineers had provided for a clear channel
on the Oahe Reservoir, improved navigation could be of little benefit
to the Cheyenne River Sioux.

The Tribe does own a ferry boat which

it intends to use to shuttle cars and passengers across the Reservoir
near the mouth of the Cheyenne River where the state road department
has refused to build a bridge.

But few of the individual tribal

members can afford to purchase their own boats even if they were in
clined to do so.

Due to the nature of the salvage operations conducted

by the Corps of Engineers, however, clear navigation is presently
obstructed on the Oahe Reservoir.

In some places the water level

barely clears those structures that were left standing at the old
Cheyenne Agency site.

Since the Tribe was not permitted to salvage

all of the timber in the area and the Corps of Engineers made no
attempt to do so itself, there are a large number of dead trees which
have been left standing above the water surface.

As a result, many

0Overall Economic Development Plan, p. 50.; Lloyd Le Beau,
Donald Kritzsinger, Kermeth S. Engle, .interviews.
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miles of the Oahe Reservoir are now cluttered by a dead forest and
perpetually filled with driftwood.

These obstacles interfere with

recreational activities in the area, which was another of the pur
poses for which the Oahe Reservoir was created.^
Of all the benefits promised by the Pick-Sloan Plan, the most
immediate and successful results have been realized in the areas of
outdoor recreation and tourism.

Since the filling of the Oahe Reser

voir, or Lake Oahe as it is now more commonly called, over 150
recreational areas have been developed along its 2,250 mile shoreline.
Twenty-nine of the major access areas have been developed by the Corps
of Engineers and provide public facilities for swimming, fishing,
boating, camping, and p i c n i c k i n g . F e d e r a l and state fish and wild
life departments have increased both the number and variety of fish in
Lake Oahe and the reservoir is now recognized as one of the best areas
in the country for walleye f i s h i n g . T o u r i s m has also flourished and
presently over 2,000,000 people visit Lake Oahe each year during the
peak recreation season.

But again the Cheyenne River Sioux have not

been able to share in this new prosperity.

As previously pointed out,

fishing and swimming have never been important activities among the
Indians.

Likewise, few of them are inclined, nor can they afford, to

9
Overall Economic Development Plan, p. 69.; Lloyd Le Beau,
Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.
10
U.S., Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Missouri River
Division, Omaha District, "Oahe Dam-Lake Oahe" (Omaha: 1972), pp. 1-4.
^ Overall Economic Development Plan, p. 72.; Jack Merwin,
"Those Dam Walleyes," Outdoor Life, April, 1973, pp. 61-64.
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purchase boats or truck-campers.

If anything, the recreational

activities of the tribal members has declined as a result of the Oahe
project since the flooding of the bottomlands has drastically reduced
the game population on reservation and has led to the subsequent de
cline in hunting, which was previously the favorite sport of the
Indians.

They are now bothered by an increasing number of white

sportsmen who trespass on their land in order to gain access to the
reservoir.

While the Indians are generally becoming more inclined to

take advantage of the recreational features of Lake Oahe, they as well
as the white fishermen are hampered by the fact that there are few
access roads to the reservoir on the reservation.

Other than a small

boat ramp and camping area developed by the Corps of Engineers near
the Highway 212 bridge, there is a complete lack of developed recreational facilities.
Even if the Indians never take advantage of the recreational
features of Lake Oahe themselves, tribal officials are beginning to
realize the economic potential of tourism and outdoor recreation on
Cheyenne River.

The latest Economic Development Plan drawn up by the

Cheyenne River Economic Development Committee calls for the construction
of new access roads to the reservoir and the establishment of extensive
recreation and tourist facilities at four locations on the reservation.
In this regard, the Cheyenne River Sioux have been slow to follow the
example of the Crow Creek Sioux who have built a multi-million dollar

^Corps of Engineers, "Welcome to Oahe Dam," p. 2.; Frank
Ducheneaux, Kermeth S. Engle, Donald Kritzsinger, interviews.

recreational complex at Fort Thompson, South Dakota near Lake Sharpe,
the reservoir created by the Big Bend Dam, and the Standing Rock Sioux
who are presently building a similar complex near Lake Oahe across from
Mobridge, South Dakota.

The Cheyenne River Sioux are also investi

gating the possibility of establishing facilities for the seining and
processing of pike and other fish for the commercial market.

But all

of these economic development plans are still on the drawing boards and
it is likely to be several years before they are implemented, if in
fact they ever are.

For the present, the Cheyenne River Sioux are no

better off in terms of recreation and tourism than they were when they
still lived along the muddy Missouri River.
Another of the benefits promised by the Oahe project was the
development of an adequate water supply for municipal, industrial, and
domestic uses.

While the Oahe Reservoir does provide an unlimited

supply of good potable water, few of the farms, ranches, towns, and
industries in the area surrounding the reservoir, including those' on
the Cheyenne River Reservation, have been able to take advantage of
this water supply.

The need for good water is particularly acute in

this area since it is very difficult to obtain ground water of good
quality.

The wells have to be very deep and the water they yield is

highly mineralized and generally unfit for human use.
in the town of Eagle Butte provides a good example.

The water supply
Although new wells

were built to increase the quantity of water in the town prior to the
13Overall Economic Development Plan, pp. 68-72.
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relocation of the agency facilities, nothing was done to improve the
quality of the water supply.

As a result, the water in Eagle Butte

now exceeds the federal standard for maximum impurities and the chemical
characteristics of the water causes excessive corrosion and also poses
a threat to public health.

The South Dakota Department of Health

reported in 1969 that there were excessive amounts of iron, sulfate,
flouride, and dissolved solids in the Eagle Butte water supply and
little has been done to improve the condition of the water since then.
The excessive amount of iron in the water causes red and brown stains
on clothing and porcelain and affects the color and taste of beverages.
The level of sulfates and dissolved solids is high enough to have a
laxative affect on nearly all persons who drink the water.

Combined

with calcium deposits the sodium forms a hard scale on water heaters
and boilers and in combination with chloride deposits it causes the
water to have an extremely salty taste.

Moderate amounts of flouride

can play a part in the prevention of tooth decay.

But the flouride

concentration in the Eagle Butte water supply is high enough to mottle
the enamel on the children's teeth.

Besides having a foul odor, a

terrible taste, and an extremely hardness factor which greatly reduces
the lathering ability of soap, the residents of Eagle Butte claim that
their water "kills the grass and will rust door hinges five feet
away. ,,14
The condition of the water in most of the other reservation

14Ibid., pp. 41-46.; Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.
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communities is much the same.
has to be transported in.

In some areas the entire water supply

Not only has the water problem affected

the health and living conditions of the Cheyenne River Sioux, it has
also greatly impeded their future economic development.

Because of

the poor water the Tribe has experienced a great deal of difficulty in
obtaining federal housing assistance and in attracting industry to the
reservation.^

Indian ranchers have suffered as a result of the in

adequate water supply.

Since most of them have to depend on surface

water for their stock and since it is difficult to keep the stock water
ponds open during the winter, the lack of adequate ground water sources
has greatly contributed to the high death rate of livestock during the
winter.16
The Cheyenne River Sioux are presently exploring ways to improve
the quality of their water supply.

Though a new water treatment pro

cess has been field tested in Eagle Butte, the Tribe feels that a direct
pipeline from the Oahe Reservoir offers the best solution to their
problems.

The initial cost of developing a pipeline would be much

higher than that of developing water treatment plants, but the Indians
feel that it will provide the most satisfactory and economical results
in the future.

Consequently, the Tribal Council is attempting to get

federal funding for a pipeline from Lake Oahe to Eagle Butte.
15

Once this

.
Lloyd Le Beau, interview.

16

U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Evaluation of the Livestock Phase, Cheyenne River Rehabilita-tion
Program, MRBI Rep. No. 190 (Billings: Missouri River Basin Investi
gations Project, 1968), p. 13.
(Hereinafter referred to as MRBI
Rep. No. 190, Livestock Rehabilitation Evaluation.)
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project is completed additional pipelines can then be built to distri
bute water from Eagle Butte to the other reservation communities.

The

cost of the initial phase of this pipeline project has been estimated
at $3,000,000.

As the tribal representatives prepare once again for a

battle in Washington to obtain pipeline funds, they cannot help but
regret that the development of an adequate water supply was not made a
provision of the Oahe settlement.^
The Oahe project Was supposedly designed to stabilize the soil,
reduce the flpw of silt, and generally increase productivity in the
central South Dakota region.

There is no evidence to show that Oahe

has brought about any of these desired effects and, in fact, several
sources report that the reservoir and its tributaries are silting at
a rapid rate as a result of the construction of the dam.

The Indians

on Cheyenne River think that the tributaries may eventually silt out
just like the small reservoirs that were built on the reservation
during the Thirties.

At least one BIA official also shares the view

that silting may be one of the more undesirable results of the rude
interruption in the cycle of nature caused by the construction of the
Oahe project.

The project aimed at providing bank stabilization, but

the fluctuation of

the water level of the reservoir now

causes constant

bank erosion.

The cutting action of the water not only

endangersmen

and livestock,

but in one case, has caused the exposure

of bodiesfrom

unmarked graves along the shore.

Since the Corps of Engineers did not

17
Overall Economic Development Plan, pp. 65-66.

\
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i
bother to take the time and effort to determine the contour of the
entire shoreline prior to inundation, the water now infringes on
Indian property when it is at its maximum pool level.

Because the

Corps also failed to build fences along the boundary of the taking
area, Indian ranchers regularly suffer livestock losses because their
cattle either fall off the eroding banks or drift into the reservoir
in search of water.

IP

The proponents of the Pick-Sloan Plan made great claims about
the development of industrial and mineral resources which would result
e-

from the construction of the reservoir.

But again the Cheyenne River

Sioux have failed to see these benefits materialize.

Industrial

development on the reservation is virtually nonexistent and most of
the Indian's mineral resources are now at the bottom of Lake Oahe.
While it is conceivable that the Tribe could extract gas, oil, sand,
gravel, and lignite from Lake Oahe, the Corps of Engineers, which now
has regulatory authority over the Indian mineral rights within the
reservoir area, would probably restrict such activity by invoking
certain pollution control regulations.

Even if the Indians were per

mitted to extract minerals from the reservoir it would be nearly
impossible to determine the ownership of the resources since the
mineral rights were allowed to remain in heirship status and the
*

fractionation of interests has continued since the bottomlands were
18Frank Ducheneaux, Lloyd Le Beau, Kermeth S. Engle, Donald
Kritzsinger, interviews.
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flooded.1^
Among other minor benefits, the Pick-Sloan Plan also promised to
provide extensive land surveys, increased employment opportunities,
and comprehensive historical and archeological investigations in the
region adjoining its reservoir projects.

In regard to the Oahe pro

ject, detailed land studies were made of the Cheyenne River Reser
vation by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and this survey has greatly
aided the Tribe in its land consolidation program.

The Oahe project

also created many job opportunities for tribal members just as the
government reports had predicted.

But Indian employment was not as

extensive as it could have been and most of the new jobs were ter
minated as soon as the reconstruction and relocation programs were
completed.

The unemployment rate on the reservation has declined

steadily since the construction of the Oahe project', but this is
due primarily to the many federal manpower programs that have been
established m

the last decade. 20

Through the Inter-Agency Archeological Salvage Program, a pro
ject coordinated by the National Park Service and the Smithsonian
Institution in cooperation with sixteen regional universities and
museums, more than 300 archeological, paleontological, and historic
sites were located and investigated within the Oaje Reservoir area,
many of which are directly relevant to the history of the Cheyenne
19
Overall Economic Development Plan, pp. 40-41, 47-48.; Kermeth S.
Engle, IbidJ-; Gladys Le Beau, BIA Realty Office, Cheyenne River Agency,
interview held at Eagle Butte, South Dakota, August 3, 1972.
20
Lloyd Le Beau, Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.

.
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River Sioux.

But most of the tribal members found little in the way

of compensation or consolation in this multi-million dollar project
since they were not permitted to participate actively in it and since
most of them were already acutely aware of their own history and
. .
21
origins.

The Cheyenne River Sioux have received, therefore, almost none of
the benefits which were supposed to be provided by the Oahe project
though they have suffered a great deal as a result of its construction.
It may still appear to the reader, as it certainly does to the federal
government, that the $5,160,000 appropriated by Congress for the Tribal
Rehabilitation Program should be counted as a direct benefit of the
Pick-Sloan Plan.

Such is clearly not the case.

As this study has

revealed, the Cheyenne River Sioux were in dire need of a rehabilitation
program prior to the construction of the Oahe project.

That they could

have received rehabilitation funds from the federal government through
separate legislation is almost certain.

Separate bills for a reha

bilitation program for the reservation had been introduced prior to the
Oahe settlement of 1954 and both the Department of the Interior and the
Corps of Engineers had urged that the rehabilitation program be made
21

Ibid.; For a general description of the Inter-Agency Archeo
logical Salvage Program see U.S., Corps of Engineers, Missouri River
Division, Omaha District, Oahe Reservoir: Archeology, Geology,
History, by Warren W. Caldwell and Hubert G. Smith (Omaha: 1962),
pp. 2-8, and U.S., Department Of Interior, National Park Service,
Introduction to Middle Missouri Archeology, by Donald J . Lehmer,
Anthropological Papers I (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1971), pp. 1-20. For a description of the archeological sites see
Lehmer, pp. 65-179. For a description of the historic sites see
Mattison, Historic Oahe Sites, pp. 1-159.
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the subject of separate legislation.

In several cases since then,

Congress has appropriated funds for the establishment of rehabilitation
programs on reservations, such as those of the Rosebud and Pine Ridge
Sioux in South Dakota, which were not otherwise affected by the PickSloan Plan or any other public works project.

That rehabilitation

program was included in the Oahe settlement only as a matter of ex
pediency for the Congress is now certain.

Rather than being considered

a beneficiary, the Oahe project should have properly been viewed as a
liability to the rehabilitation program since the government funds
would have been much more effective if the economic life of the reser
vation had not been disrupted by the project and if the money had been
used for existing facilities and programs.

Since in the popular view

the Tribal Rehabilitation Program is generally considered a direct
benefit of Oahe and Congress apparently felt that the $5,160,000 it
appropriated would be sufficient to rehabilitate all of the tribal
members on Cheyenne River, a brief evaluation of the rehabilitation
program appears to be in order.
The rehabilitation of all of the Indian families on Cheyenne
River would have been such a tremendous task, that it was completely
unreasonable for Congress to expect that such a job could be accomp
lished in any satisfactory manner with the limited funds that were
appropriated for the program under Public Law 776.

As early as 1958

the Tribal Rehabilitation Committee had projected that 24 per cent of
the resident tribal members would not be able to directly participate
in the program and that there would not be sufficient funds to provide

a second opportunity for those Indians who could not be successfully
.
.
oo
rehabilitated by their
initial program participation.-

Of the 230

tribal members who participated in the Repayment Cattle Program, only
eighty-eight were still in operation in 1970 and only sixty-six had
managed to pay off their original loans.

Only three out of the

twenty-two Indians who participated in the Business Enterprise Program
are still in business and only seven have paid off their accounts.
The Rehabilitation Farm Program was cancelled.

The Student Loan Program

assisted over 200 college and vocational training students, but only
forty-seven of these students completed their courses.
Education Program was cancelled in 1960.

The Adult

Of the seventy-six adults

who participated in this program only twenty-four of them completed
their courses although the majority of the participants obtained
employment as a result of their training.

Under the General Assistance

Housing Program over 100 houses were built on the reservation, but some
of them were so poorly constructed that they are no longer standing.
Whether or not the Rehabilitation Program can be judged a success
or failure on the basis of these statistics largely depends on who is
being asked to evaluate it.

Frank Ducheneaux, who is encouraged by

these results, thinks that the program was more successful than most
federally-administered programs.

He feels that the most important

result of the program, and the one not reflected in these figures, was
22

MRBI Rep. No. 157, 1958 Rehabilitation Program Status, pp. 4-5.

23
BIA, Cheyenne River Fact Sheet, p. 4.
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that it gave the Tribe practical experience in administering their own
.
.
24
multi-million dollar project.

Donald Pennington, the BIA Land

Operations Officer on Cheyenne River, also shares this view.

He

points out that the success rate of the Indian ranchers was much
higher than that of the local white ranchers who tried to start livestock operations during the same period. 25

On the other hand, T. L.

Traversie, the present Tribal Chairman, is a bit more pessimistic.
Scarcely concealing his hostility toward the Ducheneaux regime, which
he helped to ouster, he expresses the view that the program could have
been a lot more successful "if it had not been set up and administered
by a bunch of amateurs."

Traversie, who is himself a lawyer, thinks

that the program should have been controlled by someone with more
expertise and managerial ability and that even supervision by the BIA
would have been preferable to that of "the dictatorial Ducheneaux." 26
Many of the other tribal members also share this view.

They feel that

too much emphasis was placed on the cattle program to the exclusion of
what they considered to be the more necessary land, housing, and welfare
24
Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.
25
Donald Pennington, BIA Land Operations Officer, Cheyenne River
Agency, interview held at Eagle Butte, South Dakota, August 3, 1972.
(Hereinafter referred to as Donald Pennington, interview.)

pg

Theophile L. Traversie, Tribal Chairman, Cheyenne River Sioux,
interview held at Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Office, Eagle Butte,
South Dakota, July 31, 1972.
(Hereinafter referred to as T. L.
Traversie, interview.) Traversie, known as "Mr. Travesty" by his
political enemies on the reservation, was elected by only twenty-six
votes over Alex Chasing Hawk, Ducheneaux's right-hand man, in a hotly
contested election in 1970. A Navy veteran and a graduate of the
University of South Dakota Law School, he had worked to establish a
legal aid program on the reservation. He decided to enter the viscious
game of tribal politics after Ducheneaux tried to terminate this

\
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programs. 27
The Rehabilitation Program has also been attacked by local white
ranchers and businessmen.

This attack may be interpreted as reflecting

positively on the program since the businessmen are disturbed only be
cause they were not permitted to milk profits from the project and the
ranchers are angered because they lost the use of Indian land as a
result of the tribal land consolidation and the repayment cattle
programs.

Finally, Lloyd Le Beau and Ellen Ducheneaux, two of the

people who helped design the program, are also critical of its results.
Le Beau thinks that the program only served to reinforce the Indian's
dependency on federal and tribal assistance while at the same time it
discouraged their relocation to urban areas off the reservation.

Ellen

Ducheneaux claims that "rehabilitation, like prohibition, was a noble
experiment but it just didn't work out."

She suggests further that the

real rehabilitation program provided by the Oahe project was not for
the Indians at all since in her view "the entire Pick-Sloan Plan was a
rehabilitation program for the Engineers." 28
The mistakes of the rehabilitation program are now apparent.

In

general, the Cheyenne River Sioux and the BIA should have been more
specific in defining the duties of each party in regard to the program.

program. At thirty-eight, he is now one of the youngest tribal chair
men in the United States and is also president of the intertribal
organization known as The United Sioux Tribes. He was re-elected to
office in 1972.
27Ibid.; MRBI Rep. No. 152, 1956 Rehabilitation Program Report,
p. 5.
28

Lloyd Le Beau, Ellen Ducheneaux, interviews.
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Much more time and study should have been devoted to the preparation
of the overall program and in clarifying operational and eligibility
requirements before the funds were disbursed.

The Tribe and the BIA

now both agree that the program moved much too rapidly.

The Tribe

intended to provide all of the reservation families with an equal
opportunity to make use of the program funds, but many loans were
approved for individuals who were simply not prepared to make
efficient use of the money.

Housing, ranching, and business sites

were often picked out without regard to future needs or the development
OQ

of the community or reservation as a whole."

In regard to the Repayment Cattle Program, e^qperience indicates
that the Indians should have been given at least a year to properly set
up their ranch units before they received their cattle loans.

Many of

the tribal members received cattle before they had sufficient land or
capital to support them.

As a result, some of the livestock had to be

repossessed soon after being issued and there were also many incidents
of cattle trespassing.

Some of the white ranchers complained that

they were not given sufficient notice to vacate the land they leased
on the reservation before the Indian cattle were turned on their
grazing units.

For their part the Indian ranchers complained that they

felt compelled to grab both the land and the loans while they were
still available and that they did not have adequate guidance in their
operations from either the Tribe or the BIA.

As a result they often

29
MRBI Rep. No. 152, 1956 Rehabilitation Program Report, pp. 2,
4-5.; MRBI Rep. No. 157, 1958 Rehabilitation Program Status, pp. 3-4.
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ended up with ranching units which did not have adequate water access,
grazing area, or additional land for expansion.

Because of these prob

lems there was a high dropout rate from the program during its first
few years of operation.

Those who did manage to stay in business

during this period experienced small calf crops and high death losses.
These ranchers have suggested that they would have been better off if
they could have been loaned bred cows instead of yearling heifers
since their returns would then have been much quicker and their losses
much less.

But this suggestion was never followed.

Later applicants

for the program were more carefully screened and the majority of those
ranchers who managed to stay with the program over the years were able
to increase the net worth of their operations and provide an adequate
Irving for therr famxlres. 30
Like the cattle program, the education program also moved much
too hastily.

The students who participated in these programs did not

receive adequate educational counselling.

As a result, grants were

received by many students who could not meet or maintain minimum scho
lastic requirements.

Only after a large number of the initial parti

cipants dropped out of school was a certified educational counselor
hired to advise prospective students.

Finally in regard to the Gene

ral Assistance Housing Program, the Tribe now feels that it would have
been better to have used their money to build a lesser number of larger
and better constructed homes. 31
30
MRBI Rep. No. 152, Ibid., p. 6.; MRBI Rep. No. 157, Ibid., pp. 3,
22, 25.; MRBI Rep. No. 190, Livestock Rehabilitation Evaluation, pp.
13-17, 21-23.; Donald Pennington, interview.
31
.
MRBI Rep. No. 152, Ibid., p. 5.; Lloyd Le Beau, interview.

The relocation program was hampered by numerous problems.

The

tribal members who lived within the taking area received payment for
their property long before it was time for them to move.

Since only

limited assistance and direction was provided for these individuals
in the expenditure of these funds, a number of them spent their money
on other things besides the purchase of new property.

As a result,

it later became necessary for them to seek additional cash loans in
order to purchase new land and housing.

The premature and often

foolish spending of the settlement funds therefore, handicapped many
families in regard to the overall rehabilitation program and, as a
result, some of them noto have living conditions which are much worse
than they were before they had to move. 32
The Oahe settlement created an inflated land market on the
reservation and most of the tribal members were not able to purchase
as much land as they had lost.

Frank Ducheneaux, for example, had

previously owned 1,400 acres of some of the best land on the reser
vation.

With the money he received for his property from the Oahe

settlement, however, he was only able to purchase 200 acres of lesser
quality land. 33

32MRBI Rep. No. 152, Ibid., pp. 5-6.
33

Ibid.; Frank Ducheneaux, interviews. Ducheneaux's property is
located on U.S. Highway 212 at the far eastern end of the reservation
overlooking Lake Oahe, not far from the old Cheyenne Agency site.
Ironically enough, considering the great number of white "fortune
hunters" who make their living by selling Indian artifacts, Ducheneaux
since his retirement from tribal politics in 1970, has been running an
antique shop on his property which deals almost exclusively in the
sale of furniture, implements, and utensils of the early white home
steaders. Soon after the Oahe settlement Frank and Ellen Ducheneaux
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A number of errors were made in the assignment of new land and
the relocation of improvements.
located on the wrong land.

One tribal member's house was re

Since the Corps of Engineers would not

authorize a second relocation of the house, it became necessary for
this individual to purchase the small tract rather than go to the
trouble and expense of moving the house himself.

Another tribal

member built a house and barn and fenced in a pasture on a section of
land which he later found was not his.

Still another tribesman had to

remove his fence from around a quarter section of land after he found
that he had been assigned the wrong tract.

This same man later had

his ranch divided into three sections several miles apart from each
other as a result of yet another mixup in assignments. 34
The Cheyenne River Sioux also experienced difficulty in getting
adequate replacement of their facilities.

In the Moreau River

district of the reservation the Indians are still waiting to have
their school and bridge replaced and their telephone service restored.
The tribal members on Cheyenne River, like those on Standing Rock
Reservation, were also not allowed to exercise their full salvage
rights in regard to their timber.

As a result, they later had to

were divorced. Frank later took a third wife but she died a short time
after they were married. He now lives in a comfortable house adjoining
his shop where he is taken care of by his daughter Karen, a political
science graduate of the University of South Dakota and a former
editorial assistant for Vine Deloria, Jr. Here he is frequently
visited by his thirty-six grandchildren. One of his sons, also with
him, runs a farm on the Ducheneaux property, and another son, Franklin,
an attorney, is presently the Chief Legislative Officer for the BIA in
Washington.
34

MRBI Rep. No. 157, 1958 Rehabilitation Program Status, p. 25.
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purchase lumber elsewhere, for their building and fencing needs while
the reservoir now has deadwood floating m

it. 35

Of all the mistakes made in regard to the rehabilitation and
relocation programs, however, the Cheyenne River Sioux regret most
their decision to move to Eagle Butte.

The dusty, dirty, windswept

town on the flatland could never replace the shady riverside community
of Cheyenne Agency.

The townspeople have never made an effort to

accommodate tribal members, even though Indian money is all that now
keeps them alive.

The merchants have not been appreciative of the fact

that they were the ones who really got the benefits as a result of the
move.

Although the town bank has mostly Indian depositors it does not

have any Indian employees and neither do most of the local stores, with
the exception of those that are actually owned by tribal members.
Indian veterans are not allowed in the American Legion Club while
white non-veterans are openly admitted.

Prices for groceries and other

basic commodities are substantially higher in Eagle Butte than they are
in the white communities adjacent to the reservation.

Though the town

was originally selected as a site for the agency facilities because of
its central location and because it was on a main highway and railroad
line, even these advantages no longer seem to be important.

U.S. High

way 212 is badly in need of repair and is now mostly used by only local
traffic.

There is no bus or taxi or any other form of public trans

portation to serve the town, the railroad freight service has been
reduced to once a week, and the freight truck line service has been cut
35
Lloyd Le Beau, Frank Ducheneaux, interviews.
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to three times a week.

Besides all of its other disadvantages, Eagle

Butte's water is unfit for human use, its streets are in miserable
shape, and there is hardly a shade tree to be found.

As Ellen Duchen

eaux has remarked "moving to Eagle Butte was the sorriest thing the
Tribe ever did."3**
The smartest thing the Cheyenne River Sioux ever did in regard to
the Oahe project was to use their rehabilitation and relocation funds
to help establish a successful land consolidation program.

Between

1950 and 1970 the tribally-owned land holdings were increased from
798,173 to 915,225 acres as a result of this program.

During this same

period, the individually-allotted Indian land holdings were increased
from 390,000 to 497,093 acres.

At the same time the amount of reser

vation land used by non-Indians was reduced from 742,216 to only
162,635 acres and the government-owned land was also cut from 6,003 to
3,914 acres.

The total effect of the land consolidation program during

this twenty-year period has been an increase in the amount of Indian
land actually used by tribal members from 787,381 to 1,231,037 acres.

37

While conducting a study of Indian land problems for the National
Congress of American Indians, Vine Deloria, Jr., executive director of
the NCAI, claimed that the Cheyenne River land consolidation program
38
was "among the best we have seen."

In addressing the National

36

Ibid.; Ellen Ducheneaux, interviews.; Overall Economic
Development Plan, pp. 75—76.
37

U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Aberdeen Area Statistical Data, 1971 (Aberdeen: 1971), pp. 21, 24.
(Hereinafter referred to as BIA, 1971 Aberdeen Area Statistics.)
38
Hough, Development of Indian Resources, p. 39.
\
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Conference on Manpower in 1967, Deloria also stated that, "If the other
tribes would use their tribal land as the Cheyenne River Sioux have, we
could solve our own problems in a tribal way, and preserve our tribal
way of lifc."3^
The land consolidation program appears to be the one bright spot
in the entire Oahe story for the Cheyenne River Sioux.

But it should

be pointed out that it was assisted by other federal and tribal funds
in addition to those provided for by the Oahe settlement.

Likewise,

the multitude of new programs established on the reservation by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Depart
ment of Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare, Housing and Urban Develop
ment, Agriculture, and other federal agencies in recent years have been
primarily responsible for the progress the Tribe has made in the areas
of housing, job training, employment, and community and economic
development.

As a result of these programs, the Cheyenne River Sioux

have managed to increase their tribal assets to more than $15,000,000.
They have also brought the per capita family income above the poverty
level of $3,000, which is quite an accomplishment for any tribe, and
they have reduced the unemployment rate to less than 32 per cent,
.
. 4 0
which is presently the lowest of any of the major Sioux reservations.
Despite their progress, the Cheyenne River Sioux still feel
39
Steiner, The New Indians, p. 172.
^ Ibid.; BIA, Aberdeen Area Statistics, pp. 10-12.; U.S., Office
of Economic Opportunity, "Cheyenne River Sioux Community Action Agency,"
Self Determinafion: A Program of Accomplishments, by Arizona Affiliated
Tribes, Inc., Indian Community Action Program (Washington: 1971),
pp. 188-89.
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hampered, and to a large degree haunted by the damages they have
suffered as a result of the Oahe project.
accurately be described.

Their sense of loss cannot

The meager compensation they received from

the federal government can never make up for what they have lost.

The

rehabilitation they have received has only been moderately successful
and to a large extent they are still crippled.

As a result they cannot

help feeling hostile toward what they perceive as the cause of their
injury, which appears to be the Corps of Engineers.
The general conclusion of the Cheyenne River Sioux is that "the
Corps; of Engineers ain't too damn smart.

While the Tribe does not

hold the Corps entirely responsible for the damage caused by the Oahe
project, the brunt of their criticism does seem to fall on that agency.
The Indians not only feel that the Corps is insensitive to them as
human beings but that it is completely incapable of understanding their
aesthetic values.

As Ellen Ducheneaux has again so aptly put it, "If

the Corps had its way the entire world would be water and concrete."^
Ecologically speaking, the Indians feel that the Oahe Dam is an
unnatural phenomenon.

They fear that the reservoir will continue to

cut away at their land and that the dam may someday cause the tri
butaries, if not Lake Oahe itself, to silt out.

Moreover, they think

that all of the Pick-Sloan projects are very dangerous since, as they
point out, if the Fort Peck Dam ever breaks or is bombed by an enemy
of this country the resulting flash flood would sweep all of the
41

.
Ellen Ducheneaux, interviews.
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|
reservoir projects into the Gulf of Mexico and would take the entire
midsection of America along with it.

That might be sweet revenge for

the Indians if it were not for the fact that it would also wipe out
all of the Sioux tribes not fortunate enough to be on high ground.
What has been learned from the Oahe experience?

The lessons

for the Cheyenne River Sioux have been bitter and many.
federal government, they appear to be few.

43

For the

In terms of recognizing

the Native Americans as human beings with legitimate property rights
the government continues to demonstrate that it has learned virtually
nothing from the mistakes of the previous two centuries.

In 1969, for

example, the Department of the Interior proposed legislation which
would make it possible for the federal government to build dams,
highways, and power lines on Indian lands without tribal 'consent.^
In 1970, the Interior Department's Bureau of Outdoor Recreation pro
posed the establishment of the Great Prairie Lakes National Recreation
Area to encompass all of the reservoirs on the Missouri River from
Garrison to Gavins Point.

This proposed project would be administered,

as might be expected, by the Corps of Engineers.

The new plan would

make it necessary for the Corps to acquire an additional 74,000 acres
t

of private land in order to expand its recreational sites and provide
a 300 foot buffer zone around all of the reservoirs.

The Indians on

Cheyenne River insist that this program is only a ploy to cover up the
fact that the Corps did not take enough land when the dam projects
43
Frank Ducheneaux, Lloyd Le Beau, Kermeth S. Engle, interviews.
44

New York Times, March 16, 1969, p. 78.

174

were originally built .and that the federal government is embarrassed by
the fact that the reservoir now infringes on privately-owned land.

When

the government does come to buy more land, the Cheyenne River Sioux,
armed with the lessons they have learned from the Oahe experience,
intend to hold out for a settlement which will more than make up for
their own earlier mistakes and one that will provide them with enough
money to establish their own recreational facilities along the Oahe
shoreline. 45

U.S., Department of the interior, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation,
The Middle Missouri, A Rediscovery: A- Study of Outdoor Recreation
Potential (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 4-5.;
Frank Ducheneaux, Lloyd Le Beau, T. L. Traversie, interviews.
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